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Abstract 
 
 
 
The life and fate of Maximilian I, the last emperor of Mexico, has attracted a substantial 
amount of research since his death in 1867. However, these works either only deal with 
the last few years of Maximilian’s life, from his candidature for the Mexican throne to 
his death at the hands of the Mexican liberals, or with other aspects of his life such as 
his time as governor of Lombardy-Venetia.  
Thus the main aim of this thesis is to offer a biography of Maximilian, which will not 
only look at Maximilian’s reign as emperor of Mexico but will also examine the 
Habsburg aspect of the story. It is thus necessary to look at the extent to which his 
Habsburg upbringing, his education and his experiences as governor of Lombardy-
Venetia shaped his idea of kingship; how his travels and his time in Italy conditioned 
him to regard the “other” in a certain imperial way; and how all these essentially 
Habsburg experiences and ideas played a part in his failure and demise in Mexico. 
This thesis will thus aim to give a rounded picture the life and death of Maximilian I by 
examining his upbringing, his education, and his experiences in the navy and in 
Lombardy-Venetia. For without an understanding of these it is impossible to fully 
comprehend Maximilian’s actions in Mexico.   
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Introduction 
 
 
The fate of Maximilian I, the last emperor of Mexico, is hardly a popular or common 
subject of historical interest to the public in Europe, the U.S. or even Mexico today. In 
the Americas, little is known about Maximilian apart from the fact that he was the 
adversary of the Mexican folk hero Benito Juárez, who defeated the French invaders, 
put an end to the Second Empire and re-established the republic in Mexico. In Europe, 
most people have never heard of Maximilian and his Mexican adventure and apart from 
Edouard Manet’s painting and his castle Miramar in Trieste no legacy of Maximilian 
remains; only in Austria still exists an interest of the public in the fate of “poor Max”, 
though it has to be said that the memory of Maximilian is not as great as that of Franz 
Joseph. Even in death, it appears, Maximilian is destined to play the second fiddle to his 
brother.  
Although Maximilian’s story has almost been forgotten today, his death in 1867 and the 
events in Mexico had caused a big stir in Europe. The public in France and Austria had 
demanded more information about his death and had also raised broader questions 
concerning the involvement of Napoleon III and Franz Joseph. As a consequence, there 
was a flood of publications that dealt with the events that led to the death of 
Maximilian. Most of these early publications were diaries and eyewitness accounts of 
people, who had been directly involved in the events in Mexico. Thus these reports did 
not give an objective account of Maximilian’s rule and of the Second Mexican Empire, 
but concentrated on the individual and subjective experiences of the respective authors.1 
                                                        1 For diaries and eye witness accounts of people involved in the Mexican adventure see: Count 
Horace de Viel Castel, Memoirs, London, 1888; Felix Prinz zu Salm-Salm, Queretaro. Blätter 
aus meinem Tagebuch in Mexico. Nebst einem Auszuge aus dem Tagebuch der Prinzessin Agnes 
zu Salm-Salm,Stuttgart, 1868; Emile Walton, Souvenirs d'un Officier Belge au Mexique, 
ix 
In May 1868 Samuel Basch, Maximilian’s private physician, published his memoirs; 
although Basch claimed that ‘in the prison Maximilian asked me to publish an unbiased 
account of the events upon my return to Europe’1, his account was anything but 
objective. Basch mainly blamed Napoleon III and Marshal Bazaine, the commander of 
the French forces in Mexico, for the failure of the Second Mexican Empire and for the 
death of Maximilian. The biography by Friedrich Hellwald published in 1869 almost 
took the same line; according to Hellwald Marshal Bazaine as well as Juárez and the 
republican form of government were responsible for the downfall of Maximilian.2 
However, what is remarkable about this book is the fact that Hellwald attempted to 
excuse the actions of Napoleon III by portraying Maximilian as the colonizer of 
Mexico. This was in stark contrast to the prevailing opinion of the public and amongst 
historians in Austria, such as Johann Kemper, who portrayed Maximilian in a much too 
positive light by overlooking the flaws in Maximilian's character and blaming the 
failure of the Mexican adventure on the withdrawal of military support by Napoleon 
III.3  
In France the focus was mainly on the French intervention and the military campaigns 
in Mexico. The earliest French works on Mexico, largely memoirs or observations of 
contemporaries, were almost entirely critical of France’s involvement in general, and of 
Napoleon III in particular. After the last French forces withdrew from Mexico in 1867, 
Napoleon’s political standing diminished rapidly; thus it was mainly the political 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Brussels,1868; Sara Yorke Stevenson, Maximilian in Mexico: A Woman’s Reminiscences of the 
French Intervention 1862-1867, New York, 1899;Calderón de la Barca, F., Life in Mexico, 
Chapman and Hall, New York, 1866; Klinger, W., Für Kaiser Max nach Mexiko - Das 
Österreichische Freiwilligenkorps in Mexiko 1864/67, Grin Verlag, Vienna, 2008; Kollonitz, P., 
Eine Reise nach Mexiko im Jahre 1864, Carl Gerold’s Sohn, Vienna, 1867;Murray, R.H., 
Maximilian Emperor of Mexico. Memoirs of his Private Secretary José Luis Blasio, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1934. 
1 Basch, S., Recollections of Mexico. The last Ten Months of Maximilian’s Empire, Sr Brooks, 
Wilmington, 2001, p. 228 2 Hellwald, F. Maximilian I  - Kaiser von Mexico, Braumüller, Vienna, 1869 
3 Kemper, J., Mexico unter Kaiser Maximilian I, Mainz, Regensburg, 1907 
x 
opposition that criticized Napoelon for the French involvement in Mexico. One of the 
few historical works of the Mexican intervention that has been sympathetic is that of 
Paul Gaulot.4 His work was based on the correspondence of Marshal Bazaine with 
Napoleon III, the minister of war and others, and it claimed that the French emperor was 
misinformed and badly served his ministers and commanders in Mexico. Nevertheless, 
the fact Gaulot only examined the French side of the story without taking reports and 
documents of Austrian or Mexican eyewitnesses into account, of course skewed his 
analysis, making it favourable for the French emperor. 
While there was interest in the Mexican intervention in France and in the fate of 
Maximilian in Austria, the Second Mexican Empire was completely ignored by 
contemporaries and historians in Mexico. Most of the reports and historical research in 
Mexico concentrated on the French invasion of the country and the military struggle 
against the occupation. Moreover, the Mexican public as well as biographers were more 
interested in Benito Juárez; this did not only turn the Mexican president into a sort of 
legendary figure but it also helped to stabilize the new republic in Mexico as Juárez 
became a sort of folk hero. During the struggle between the monarchy and the liberals 
Juárez had been acting president under the provisions of the constitution of 1857. 
However, his fight against Maximilian gave him the necessary prestige to be elected as 
president in 1867 and again in 1871. 
Therefore, it was not until 1928 when Egon Caesar Conte Corti gained access to the 
archives of Maximilian in Vienna that a first comprehensive and objective biography of 
Maximilian was published. His monumental work, Maximilian and Charlotte of 
Mexico, addressed the negotiations between Maximilian and Napoleon III, and 
Maximilian and the Mexican emigrants in Europe, then followed the progress of the 
                                                        4 Gaulot, P., L’Expedition du Mexique, Ollendorf, Paris, 1906 
xi 
Mexican Empire until its collapse in 1867.5 Although Conte Corti could only draw on 
the sources available in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Vienna, his work nevertheless 
provides the basic research on which many historians still rely today. However, Conte 
Corti’s work appeared to satisfy the demand for publications and academic research on 
Maximilian and the Second Mexican empire and, as a consequence, there were few 
works written on the subject in the next decades. 
It was only in the 1970s that there was a renewed interest in the Mexican affair; this was 
due to the fact that revisionist historians in Europe and the U.S. began to interpret 
certain aspects of historical events differently; thus they also questioned Maximilian’s 
role in the Second Mexican Empire anew. For the first time, though, interest in the topic 
did not only come from academics in France and Austria but also from historians in the 
United States and in Britain. In the United States the academic debate centred less on 
Maximilian but was focused above all on the relationship between the USA and the 
Juárez government and the reforms in Mexico.6 The work of the British biographer Joan 
Haslip was also crucial in renewing interest in Maximilian and the Second Mexican 
Empire.7 However, Haslip’s work can be criticized for being written too fancifully and 
for failing to analyse the broader political and personal motivations that led Maximilian 
as well as Napoleon to get involved in Mexico. In the two European countries that had 
been the most involved in the Mexican adventure the interest in the subject also 
increased again. In France the focus began to shift from Napoleon III to different 
aspects of the interlude: on Maximilian and Charlotte and on analysis on possible 
economic motives for Napoleon’s intervention.8 In Austria the impetus was largely due                                                         5 Conte Corti, E.C., Maximilian und Charlotte von Mexico, A. Knopf, Vienna, 1924 6 Sinkin, R. The Mexican Reform. A Study in Liberal Nation-Building, University of Texas 
Press, Austin, 1979 7 Haslip, J., Imperial Adventurer. Emperor Maximilian of Mexico and his Empress, 
Littlehampton Book Services, London, 1971 
8 Lecaillon, J.F., Napoleon III et le Mexique. Les illusions d’un grand dessein, l’Harmattan, 
Paris, 1994 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to an exhibition at the castle of Hardegg, which resulted in a series of articles and books 
being published in the 1970s and 1980s on Maximilian and the Second Mexican 
Empire, the so-called Hardegger Beträge zur Maximilianforschung. These included 
amongst others the works of Ferdinand Anders’ Erzherzog Ferdinand Maximilian und 
das Segundo Imperio Mexicano,9 and Konrad Ratz’s Das Militärgerichtsverfahren 
gegen Maximilian von Mexiko.10  
In the last two decades the research on Maximilian and the Second Mexican Empire has 
become more diverse. Jasper Ridley tried in his book Maximilian and Juárez to show 
the relationship between the two and their resulting actions and reaction.11 Moreover, 
for the first time there was a genuine interest in Maximilian within Mexico; until this 
point the Maximilian and the Second Mexican Empire were largely overlooked by 
Mexican historians and the focus had largely been on the French intervention. As 
already mentioned, this was largely due to the fact that Juárez had become such a 
legendary figure that research into the life of his opponent was almost impossible. 
Nevertheless, in 1998 Erika Pani published her research on Maximilian’s court and 
court protocol as well as his policy towards the indigenous population of Mexico.12 In 
addition to this research on Maximilian’s court Richard Dunkin also looked at the 
different ways in which Maximilian attempted to legitimise his rule in Mexico and to 
fashion popular support for the empire.13 In Austria the focus of the research on 
Maximilian shifted from Mexico to his earlier years as governor of Lombardy-Venetia. 
Brigitte Mazohl-Wallnig has written an article on the constitutional framework under                                                         
9 Anders, F., Erzherzog Maximilian und das Segundo Imperio Mexicano, Enzenhofer, Vienna, 
1974. 
10 Ratz, K. Das Militärgerichtsverfahren gegen Maximilian von Mexiko 1867, Enzenhofer, 
Hardegg, 1985 11 Ridley, J., Maximilian and Juárez, Orion Publishing Group, New York, 1992 12 Pani, E.P., ‘El Proyecto de Estado de Maximiliano a Través de la Vida Cortesana y del 
Ceremonial Público’. In: Historia Mexicana, 1995, Vol 155/2. 13 Duncan, P.H. Political Legitimation and Maximilian’s Second Empire in Mexico, 1864-1867. 
In Estudios Mexicanos, 1996, Vol. 12/1. 
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which Maximilian had to work as governor in Lombardy-Venetia and the changes that 
Maximilian proposed to it.14 Julia Toelle, on the other hand, focused on Maximilian’s 
social and cultural policy of Maximilian in Italy, which was aimed to win over the elites 
in Milan and Venice that were opposed to Austrian rule in Italy.15 Moreover, Clemens 
Weber has recently completely a thesis that dealt with Maximilian’s perceptions of Italy 
and the Italians and how these changed over time.16 
However, although there have been a lot of publications on Maximilian and the Second 
Mexican Empire since his death in 1867, these works either only deal with the last few 
years of Maximilian’s life, from his candidature for the Mexican throne to his death at 
the hands of the Mexican liberals, or with other aspects of his life such as his time as 
governor of Lombardy-Venetia. Perhaps, therefore, the time is ripe for a further attempt 
to understand the life, character and motivation of the last Mexican emperor. No single 
volume could encompass all aspects of Maximilian’s life and reign, and there are 
significant and deliberate omissions from this one. For example, those primarily 
interested in the iconography of Manet’s painting will find that it receives scant 
attention here, mainly because they are extensively treated elsewhere.17 Similarly, I 
have little to add to Ferdinand Anders’ understanding of the Mexican coin system and 
the awarding of military medals in the Second Mexican Empire,18 or to Albert 
Duchesne’s analysis of the Belgian volunteer corps.19 Thus the thesis that follows is a 
                                                        14 Mazohl-Wallnig, B., Österreichischer Verwaltungsstaat und administrative Eliten im 
Königreich Lombardo-Venetien 1815-1859. In: Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für europäische 
Geschichte, Vol. 146, Mainz, 1998. 15 Toelle, J. Das tanzende General-Gouvernement. Die kulturpolitischen Ideen des Erzherzogs 
Ferdinand Maximilians als Generalgouverneur des Lombardo-Venetischen Königreiches, 1857-
1859. In: Römische Historische Mitteilungen, Vienna, 2007. 16 Weber, M.C., Das Italienbild von Erzherzog Ferdinand Maximilian, University of Vienna, 
Vienna, 2008. 
17 Elderfield, J., Manet and the Execution of Maximilian. In: Das MoMa in Berlin, Hatje Cantz 
Verlag, Berlin, 2006  
18 Anders, F., Erzherzog Ferdinand Maximilian und das Segundo Imperio Mexicano, 
Wissenschaft, Münzen & Medaillen/Ordenswesen/ Philatelie, Hardegg, 1974 
19 Duchesne, A., L’expédition des voluntaires belges au Mexique, 1864-1867, Brussels, 1967 
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biography of Maximilian, which lays strong emphasis on political and diplomatic 
history; however these fields still offer a wide scope of debate.   
The standard interpretation of Maximilian’s political views and his resulting actions 
first in Lombardy-Venetia and later in Mexico is that of a liberal idealist, who due to 
circumstances and external pressures could never fulfil his liberal convictions. 
However, the central argument of this thesis is that in contrast to the common view of 
Maximilian, his political thinking was not formed by liberal concepts and ideas but was 
fundamentally conservatives. As a consequence, the main focus in this work is on 
Maximilian’s understanding of kingship, his political ideas as well as his views of the 
‘other’ and his capability to modify these concepts in order to adapt to new situations. It 
is thus crucial for this thesis to investigate whether Maximilian was essentially a 
Habsburg with Habsburg ideas and principles of kingship? 
 In the context of the Habsburg Empire in the middle of the nineteenth century this 
question refers to the conviction of the members of the House of Habsburg that it was 
their divine right to rule over the empire and that any constitution or parliament 
constituted an infringement on the ruler’s God-given rights. The revolution in 1848 had 
threatened these principles, yet Franz Joseph’s accession to the throne on 2nd December 
1848 marked the return to a centralised absolutist system, which has been labelled neo-
absolutism. In the face of the still raging uprisings and rebellions in parts of the 
Habsburg Empire, Franz Joseph order the dissolution of the Kremsier parliament on 6th 
March 1848 and the replacement of the Kremsier draft by a constitution drawn up by 
Count Franz Stadion.20 Stadion’s constitution suffered form two drawbacks: firstly, it 
lacked the authority of the Kremsier draft, which had been agreed to by an elected 
parliament. Secondly, it was never put into practice, for by the time the authorities had 
overcome the crisis still outstanding in the monarchy by force, Stadion’s constitution                                                         
20 Beller, S., Francis Joseph, Longman, Harlow, 1996, p. 50  
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appeared an unnecessary liberal compromise.21 It is thus hardly surprising that Franz 
Joseph tried to do away with the constitution altogether; the Sylvester Patent removed 
any kind of popular sovereignty for the Austrian system of government, including the 
elected local councils envisaged by Stadion. The provisions concerning the equality of 
language and nationality were expressively revoked, as was the list of individual rights. 
Moreover, the Reichsrat was reduced to a consultative body of elder statesmen, much 
like the State Conference of before 1848.22 Thus neo-absolutism amounted to a power 
system designed to create more power for the Habsburg state and its ruler, Franz 
Joseph, so that he could maintain and enhance his and the Habsburgs’ dynastic prestige 
and position in Europe. 
Nevertheless, in order to understand how Franz Joseph and respectively Maximilian 
developed these concepts, it is important to examine their childhood, upbringing and 
education at the court of Vienna. Maximilian was brought up together with Franz 
Joseph and his younger brother Karl Ludwig; the brothers shared the same household 
that was presided over by the Ajo Count Bombelles, they had the same governess Luise 
von Sturmfeder and followed the same teaching syllabus. As the educators, teachers and 
superintendents spent a lot of time with the archdukes, it is worth investigating whether 
all of them were stout conservatives or whether some of them held enlightened, 
Josephinist views. Moreover, the subjects and teaching timetables also give an 
interesting insight into the values and politics at the Viennese court. 
As Maximilian joined the Austrian navy and as he travelled extensively in the 
Mediterranean and even ventured to the New World, this thesis also investigates his 
view of the ‘other’. Throughout his travels he kept a journal and it will be worth to find 
out to what extent his experiences abroad shaped his perceptions of foreign cultures and                                                         
21 Beller, S., Francis Joseph, 1996, p. 52ff 
22 Sked, A.,  The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815-1918, Pearson Education, 
London, 2001, p. 144ff 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peoples. Even more importantly, did his travels change his political views and his idea 
of kingship? 
Understanding both Maximilian’s neo-absolutist concept of government and his view of 
the non-German people of the empire are fundamental to analyzing his approach to 
being governor of Lombardy-Venetia. As his role lacked any kind of military power and 
did not give him a lot of civilian authority, Maximilian attempted to bind the Italian 
nobility to the court by granting them favours and positions. This essentially absolutist 
concept of government was also documented in his proposal greater autonomy of the 
Lombard-Venetian kingdom from the central government in Vienna;23 in many respects 
it mirrored the system of government established by Franz Joseph after the suppression 
of the revolutions in 1848. The proposal would have concentrated power in the hand of 
the governor but crucially envisaged parliament as a mere consultative institution.24  
Maximilian’s upbringing, his travels, his time in the navy and his experiences as 
governor in Lombardy-Venetia clearly shaped his idea of kingship. Thus when he was 
crowned emperor of Mexico he brought these experiences and ideas to his new role. 
This thesis will, therefore, examine to what extent Maximilian attempted to apply 
Habsburg values and ideas of kingship and government to Mexico. It will also 
investigate whether Maximilian was able to modify his fundamentally Habsburg 
concepts and ideas of government and the ‘other’, when he found that they were not 
applicable to the situation in Mexico. Moreover, did his failure to do so lead to his 
downfall? 
As the questions raised above clearly show, it is impossible to only examine 
Maximilian’s rule in Mexico in isolation from childhood in Vienna and his experiences 
                                                        23 HHStA, Archiv K. Maximilian von Mexiko, cart. 84, Faszirkel I, p. 354 24 Mazohl-Wallnig, B., Österreichischer Verwaltungsstaat und administrative Eliten im 
Königreich Lombardo-Venetien 1815-1859. In: Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für europäische 
Geschichte, Vol. 146, Mainz, 1998, p. 435 
xvii 
in the navy and as governor of Lombardy-Venetia. These experiences were extremely 
important as they shaped Maximilian’s ideas about kingship, about the way he viewed 
the “other” and played an essential part in his demise. In order to be able to fully 
examine and analyse these concepts and ideas this thesis is using the biographical 
approach; without understanding Maximilian’s upbringing, his education, his 
experiences in the navy and in Lombardy-Venetia, it is impossible to fully comprehend 
his actions in Mexico.   
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1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 A Small Archduke 
— 
‘The little one is eager to learn and very lively (…) but sometimes I worry about his 
stubbornness’ 
Marie Luise von Sturmfeder, Maximilian’s governess, 1833/34 
 
 
 
 
 
‘We marry to have children and not to satisfy the desires of our hearts’.25 This comment 
made by the Austrian state chancellor, Count Metternich, about the reasons for marriage 
must have been uppermost on the mind of the Bavarian Princess Sophie, when she was 
told that she was to marry the Austrian Archduke Franz Karl. It was obvious that Franz 
Karl could not fulfil the desires of her heart for he was dull, uncouth, even stupid and 
had no other interests than hunting. However, as a loving and obedient daughter, Sophie 
followed the wishes and political ambitions of her father, the Bavarian King Maximilian 
I, and married the archduke in 1824. Nevertheless, it was not only the ambitions of her 
father that Sophie had to fulfil in this marriage, but also the hopes of the entire Austrian 
imperial family and the whole country to continue the imperial line of the House of 
Habsburg. The formerly numerous dynasty of Habsburg-Lorraine had diminished to 
only two archdukes in the direct line of succession and it seemed likely that the 
marriage between Franz Karl’s older and epileptic brother Ferdinand and Archduchess 
Marianna would have no progeny. Therefore, the continuation of the Habsburg dynasty                                                         
25 Hanateau, J., Lettres du Prince de Metternich à la Comtesse de Lieven, 1818-1819, Plon-
Nourrit,Paris, 1909, p. 179 
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depended solely on Sophie’s ability to produce male heirs. It was an enormous amount 
of pressure that was put on the shoulders of this young woman and maybe as a result 
Sophie suffered two miscarriages in July 1826 and June 1827.26 Sophie’s apparent 
inability to produce any living offspring fuelled already existing whispers and gossip at 
court; family members began to ask questions, since for centuries every wife of a 
Habsburg had brought numerous children into the world, despite suffering from 
tuberculosis, epilepsy and various other diseases, whereas this young and healthy 
Bavarian princess could not conceive. In the 19th century it was generally accepted that 
it was solely the women’s fault if a marriage remained childless, so Sophie was 
subjected to a number of household remedies and other courses of treatment.27 Despite 
all these efforts, the marriage between Sophie and Franz Karl remained childless for six 
years until on 18th August 1830 Sophie gave birth to long awaited heir, who later 
became Emperor Franz Joseph I. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
26 Most historians seem to be in agreement that Archduchess Sophie had two miscarriages. 
However, more recent research by Gerd Holler and Gabriele Praschl-Bichler suggests that 
Sophie suffered up to five miscarriages between 1825 and 1829. 
27 Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA): Hofapotheke, Receptbücher der AH Familie, 
Hofapotheke HAp, cart. 52 
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1.1. RUMOURS ABOUT MAXIMILIAN’S BIRTH 
 
 
 
The birth of Franz Joseph in 1830 had secured the continuation of the line of the House 
of Habsburg-Lorraine; thus, when Sophie was with child again in 1832 the pressure on 
her was less intense than during her earlier pregnancies. Nevertheless, she was confined 
to her bed in Schönbrunn, the summer palace of the Habsburgs on the outskirts of 
Vienna, for several months during her second pregnancy, for the doctors feared that she 
would suffer another miscarriage. As the date for the expected birth drew closer Sophie 
asked her father-in-law, the Emperor Francis I (II), for a “quiet” birth;28 as it was still 
customary at the beginning of the 19th century at most of the courts in Europe Sophie 
had given birth to Franz Joseph in the presence of a large number of witnesses, whose 
purpose had been to guarantee the legitimacy of the newborn child. According to 
Sophie’s wishes there were only a few witnesses present in her chamber when the 
contractions began on the evening of the 5th July 1832; with the help of the experienced 
midwife Schmalzl, the birth was relatively quick and painless. At six o’clock in the 
morning the Archduchess was delivered of a healthy boy, who was baptized Ferdinand, 
Maximilian Joseph29 which was shortened to Maxi by all the family. 
If there had been gossip about Sophie’s marriage to her husband Franz Karl before the 
birth of Franz Joseph then rumours were rife after Maximilian’s birth due to his not very 
Habsburg-like appearance: he did not have the famous Habsburg lip nor the prominent 
                                                        
28 Holler, G., Sophie. Die heimliche Kaiserin. Mutter Franz Joseph I, Amalthea, Vienna, 1993, 
 p. 59 
29 He was baptized Ferdinand in honour of his godfather, the later Emperor Ferdinand I; 
Maximilian in memory of Sophie’s father, the Bavarian King Maximilian I; and Joseph in 
honour of Emperor Joseph II.  -  Source: Gruber, S. Ferdinand Maximilian – Auf dem Weg zu 
einer verhängnisvollen Krone, Univesity of Vienna, Vienna, 1999, p. 4 
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chin and above all he was sandy-haired, something unseen before in the Austrian 
Imperial family. As a result, many people at court and in the streets of Vienna 
whispered that Sophie had been unfaithful to her husband and that Maximilian, and 
maybe even Franz Joseph, were not fathered by Franz Karl but by the Duke of 
Reichstadt, Napoleon Bonaparte’s legitimate son. But what was the basis for these 
rumours? 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1.1. RUMOURS AT COURT 
 
 
When Sophie first came to the court in Vienna in 1824 she was unhappy and longed for 
her parents and her beloved Munich. Sophie’s letters proved that even after three years 
of marriage to Franz Karl she still did not feel at home in Vienna and longed to see her 
parents: ‘You cannot imagine, dearest mother, how often I have yearned to see you, 
since I have left you’.30 It is not surprising, therefore, that in the course of the years that 
followed her establishment in Vienna of a close relationship between her and the Duke 
of Reichstadt developed. Transplanted into surroundings that were at first strange to her, 
Sophie took to this young man, who, separated from his mother, lived at the court in 
Vienna in a sort of exile. However, it was not only the feeling of not belonging, of not 
being at home at the court of Vienna that drew the two together but also the fact that 
they shared common interests. Both Sophie and the Duke of Reichstadt were young and                                                         
30 HHStA: Nachlass EH Sophie, cart. 19, 2nd November 1827 
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mildly hedonistic and stymied at a court that largely consisted of old and conservative 
men. As a consequence, Sophie and the Duke of Reichstadt often attended the theatre 
and were regularly seen dancing together at court balls.31 Moreover, the Duke of 
Reichstadt, although he was six years Sophie’s junior, was possessed of a charm and 
elegance that contrasted with the boring insipidness of her husband Franz Karl. 
Rumours were fuelled not only by the close friendship that existed between Sophie and 
the Duke of Reichstadt but also by the fact that Sophie, childless after six years of 
marriage to the unattractive Franz Karl, produced the longed-for heir at the exact time 
when her close friend, the Duke of Reichstadt, reached manhood.  
To strengthen the argument, the rumourmongers at court claimed that the Duke of 
Reichstadt showed more interest in Sophie’s pregnancy and in Franz Joseph than was 
befitting for an uncle. The purpose of these rumours concerning Maximilian’s and Franz 
Joseph’s parentage did not only discredit Sophie’s reputation and threatened her 
standing within the imperial family but also undermined her children’s status as the 
possible heirs to the throne of the Habsburg Empire. In 1832 Emperor Franz I (II) had 
ruled the Habsburg Empire for forty years but the issue of who should inherit the crown 
after his death was still unresolved. The legitimate heir to the throne, Ferdinand, was 
regarded by many contemporaries at court and in the public as an amiable idiot for he 
was mentally disabled and suffered from epilepsy, which, it was assumed, meant he 
would be unable to father any children. Despite these deficencies, Metternich supported 
Ferdinand’s succession to the throne, mainly because he thought that Ferdinand would 
be easier to manipulate than any of the other archdukes: Archduke Johann disliked 
Metternich and had always been opposed to Metternich’s politics; Archduke Franz Karl, 
who was the next in the line of succession, was only marginally more intelligent than 
                                                        
31 Holler, G, Sophie, 1993, p. 33 
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Ferdinand but his wife Sophie was a very energetic woman, who would have had more 
influence on her husband’s decisions than the state chancellors and his advisors.32 
However, now that these rumours existed they could not be stopped and despite the lack 
of viable evidence they can even be found in some modern biographies of Archduchess 
Sophie and have been accepted by many biographers of Maximilian. Joan Haslip, for 
instance, was convinced that these rumours were true and supported this claim by a 
letter written by the Duke of Reichstadt to his mother Marie Louise a day after 
Maximilian’s birth in which the already dangerously ill young man pleaded: ‘She 
[Sophie] has to stay alive for the sake of the child that she carries at her breast’.33 
However, it is questionable whether this comment by the Duke of Reichstadt is proof of 
his paternity: firstly, he could have actually just expressed concern for Sophie’s health 
and that of the child; and secondly, researchers such as Gerd Holler and myself have 
attempted to locate Haslip’s evidence in the Montenuovo archive, in which all the 
letters between the Duke of Reichstadt and his mother are registered, and no such letter 
can be found.34 Of course this does not prove that there had not been a love affair 
between Archduchess Sophie and the Duke of Reichstadt as all evidence indicating a 
relationship between the two and the possible paternity of the Duke of Reichstadt of 
Maximilian and Franz Joseph would in all likelihood have been destroyed. However, 
historical research does not provide any evidence to support the claims that the Duke of 
Reichstadt was the father of the two archdukes; and above all the comment made by the 
Duke of Reichstadt to his intimate friend Count Prokesch-Osten on 10th October 1831 
                                                        
32 Herre, F., Metternich. Staatsmann des Friedens, Kiepenheuer & Wietsch, Cologne, 1983, 
 p. 351 
33 Quoted in: Haslip, J., Imperial Adventurer. Emperor Maximilian of Mexico and his Empress, 
Littlehampton Book Services, London, 1971, p. 13 34 Holler, G., Sophie, 1993, p.  
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that ‘he had never touched a woman’35 refutes the rumours about his supposed paternity 
of Franz Joseph and Maximilian. In addition, his death in 1832 made it impossible for 
anyone to suggest that Sophie’s third and fourth sons, Karl Ludwig (1833) and Ludwig 
Viktor (1842) were the results of a love affair between her and the Duke of Reichstadt. 
Nevertheless, the rumours whispered at the time were shouted from the rooftops some 
years later above all by French journalists, novelists and playwrights; this mainly 
reflected the fact that there were many in France who were dissatisfied with the political 
realities of both the July monarchy and the Second Republic. Thus, these people began 
to glorify the “better days” of the Napoleonic period, and if Maximilian were indeed the 
son of the Duke of Reichstadt then he would be the only direct living descendent from 
the Napoleonic line, which in return would have also legitimized French support for the 
Emperor Maximilian in Mexico in the 1860s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
35 Prokesch-Osten, Mein Verhältnis zum Herzog von Reichstadt, W. Spemann, Stuttgart, 1878, 
p. 102 
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1.2. IN THE NURSERY: 1832 -1838 
 
 
 
For centuries it had been customary for royal and imperial families throughout Europe 
to entrust the upbringing and education of their offspring to the care of governesses, 
educators and teachers. In the case of the House of Habsburg-Lorraine the upbringing 
and education of the little archdukes (and it only applied to the male descendents of the 
house) was divided since the late Middle Ages into three stages: the domestic education 
through a governess, a so-called Aja, in the nursery until the age of six; the academic 
education at the hands of several teachers and under the control of the main educator, 
the Ajo, until the age of eighteen;36 the last stage was supposed to be the political 
education through the father, though this last stage was often neglected due to a 
surprising amount of early deaths in the Habsburg  dynasty.37 In accordance with this 
concept, Maximilian was given into the care of a governess, Baroness Marie Luise von 
Sturmfeder, who was responsible for every aspect of Maximilian’s, and also Franz 
Joseph’s, upbringing – she took care of their health, began with their religious education 
and also influenced the archdukes at a stage in their lives when they were very 
impressionable. It is thus important to have a closer look at Maximilian’s governess. 
 
 
 
                                                        36 The word „Ajo“ and its feminine version “Aja” derived from the Spanish word Ayo that in 
return derived from the Gothic word hagja, which could be translated as “warden”. 
Source: Vocelka, K. & Heller, L., Die private Welt der Habsburger. Leben und Alltag einer 
Familie, Böhlau, Vienna, 1999, p. 53 37 Strakosch-Grassmann, G., Erziehung im Hause Habsburg, Städt. Kaiser Franz Josef 
Jubiläums-Realgymnasium, Korneuburg, 1903, p. 24 
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1.1.3. THE AJA: MARIE LUISE VON STURMFEDER 
 
 
The governess of Maximilian was born in 1789 as the sixth of ten children into a family 
of lower nobility in Württemberg and was brought up in accordance with Catholic 
principles. From 1818 onwards she lived with her sister Charlotte von Dalberg in 
Moravia to look after her sister’s sons; as the young woman belonged to the gentry, but 
was not rich, it was necessary for her to find some sort of employment. At the beginning 
of the 19th century women, above all those of the gentry, were not supposed to work, 
and the only kind of employment open to them was that of a lady-in-waiting at some 
court or that of a governess. The connection between the young Marie Luise von 
Sturmfeder and the court in Vienna was an indirect one: the godmother of Marie Luise 
von Sturmfeder was a certain Duchess Stadion, whom Archduchess Sophie had known 
from her youth as a Bavarian princess in Munich; it was the Duchess Stadion that 
recommended Marie Luise von Sturmfeder as a governess to Archduchess Sophie.38 
After Sophie had given birth to Franz Joseph in 1830 Marie Luise Sturmfeder began her 
work as Aja and as the head of the imperial household, with which the archduke and the 
nursery were provided. Subordinate to the Aja were a nurse, an assistant nurse, a cook, a 
chamber woman, a general-purpose maid, a scullery maid and two footmen. Directly 
after his birth Maximilian was also given into the care of Marie Luise Sturmfeder and 
was integrated into this already existing system; consequently Franz Joseph and 
Maximilian as well as Karl Ludwig, born in 1833, were brought up together. 
                                                        
38 Holler, G., Sophie, 1993, p. 42 
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 Much detail of these early days can be reconstructed from an edited selection of Marie 
Luise von Sturmfeder’s letters to her sister, published some forty years after her death, 
but while Franz Joseph was still on the throne. Sturmfeder’s notes vividly described the 
exaggerated fears over minor happenings, such as the near panic of the court physician 
Dr. Malfatti and the whole imperial family whenever Maximilian or Franz Joseph had a 
cold.39 The notes also painted the picture of a happy childhood; however, some 
historians, like Martin Weber have refuted this view by pointing out that even as young 
children the archdukes were already forced to adhere to the strict court protocol and 
were forced to be present at court dinners from a very young age onwards.40 
Nevertheless, it appears that Maximilian and Franz Joseph were happy under 
Sturmfeder’s care and that the Aja managed to create an atmosphere of warm affection 
around the children. Both cherished fond memories of her for the rest of their lives; 
throughout his adult life Maximilian kept up a lively correspondence with his former 
governess and when he was Emperor of Mexico he was deeply moved to receive a letter 
by his Baroness Sturmfeder, who worried about this adventure: ‘rarely has a letter 
touched me as deeply as yours’.41  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
39 Sturmfeder, L.v., Die Kindheit unseres Kaisers - Briefe der Baronin Louise von Sturmfeder 
Aja Seiner Majestät, aus den Jahren 1830 – 1840, Garlach & Wiedling,, Vienna, 1910, p. 64 
40 Weber, M.C., Das Italienbild von Erzherzog Ferdinand Maximilian,  University of Vienna, 
Vienna, 2008, p. 4 
41 HHStA: Archiv K. Maximilian von Mexiko, cart. 68 
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1.2.1.1. The educational principles of Marie Luise von Sturmfeder 
 
 
When Marie Luise von Sturmfeder began her employment as governess at the court at 
Vienna she expected that Archduchess Sophie would give her a detailed educational 
curriculum, which she would have to follow. Instead, Sturmfeder was only given 
general direction by Sophie: 
 
She [Sophie] said, she and the Archduke wished that the child should not always be 
disturbed; that everything should be quiet around him, (…); that he should not be 
given sweets all the time but be given simple and healthy food.42 
 
Marie Luise von Sturmfeder was thus at liberty to pursue her own ideas; according to 
her own notes and letters the Aja based her concept on the works of the Catholic 
theologian Johann Michael Sailer,43 who ‘tells you that the first years of childhood are 
incredibly important. Firmness, religiosity, friendliness are the most important concepts 
in order to positively influence such a young person’.44 Sturmfeder’s letters showed that 
she attempted to adhere to these principles and also tried to instil them in Maximilian 
and Franz Joseph. She saw it as her responsibility to introduce her charges to the basic 
principles of the Catholic faith and to encourage them in their childish religiosity by 
                                                        
42 Sturmfeder, L.v., Kinheit unseres Kaisers, 1910, p. 10 
43 Johann Michael Sailer was a German Jesuit professor of theology; 1777-1780 he was a tutor 
of philosophy and theology, and from 1780 second professor of dogmatic at Ingolstadt; in 1829 
he became bishop of Regensburg. The book Sturmfeder is referring to was probably either 
“Vollständige Lese-und Gebetbuch zum Gebrauch von Katholiken” or “Handbuch der 
Christlichen Moral” – Source: Lachner, R., ‘Johann Michael Sailer’,in: Biographisch-
Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon, Vol. 8, Traugott Bautz GmbH, Herzberg, 1994, pp. 1182-
1197 
44 Sturmfeder, L.v. Kinheit unseres Kaisers, 1910, p. 143  
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‘talking and speaking to them of God’45. Another concept that Sturmfeder also stressed 
was tidiness; apparently Marie Luise von Sturmfeder managed to convey this principle 
to Franz Joseph, who throughout his life remained well organised and tidy, whereas 
Maximilian could be lazy and untidy. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2.2. TWO DIFFERENT BROTHERS 
 
 
As the notes of Marie Luise von Sturmfeder, as well as the diaries and letters of 
Archduchess Sophie, already suggested, the two brothers had two very different 
characters; Franz Joseph was serious, quiet and tidy, whereas Maximilian was the 
complete opposite: he was out-going, lively and imaginative. A note by Archduchess 
Sophie illustrated Maximilian’s imaginative and lively character very well: one evening 
the five-year-old Maximilian asked his mother if he could accompany his uncle, 
Archduke Ludwig ‘to the land where the oranges grow?’46.  It took Archduchess Sophie 
some time before she understood that he meant the balcony, where some orange trees 
were growing in pots. The fact that Maximilian was the more imaginative of the two 
brothers made attending military exercises and parades a very boring matter for him, 
whereas Franz Joseph delighted in everything to do with the military. Franz Joseph’s 
                                                        
45 Sturmfeder, L.v. Kinheit unseres Kaisers, 1910, p. 165f. 
46 Quoted in: Haslip, J., Imperial Adventurer, 1971, p. 37 
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love of the military and Maximilian’s disinterest became apparent when Archduchess 
Sophie took the two boys to watch a military parade: 
 
I took Franz Joseph to observe a military parade and I was delighted with him; he was 
as thrilled by roar of the canons, which were fired in close proximity to him, as by the 
gunfire. All the soldiers were delighted by his courage. Maxi was at his side while the 
troops were passing by but he [Maximilian] seemed to be bored because he has got 
such little interest in military matters that I did not take him to the manoeuvres the 
following day. Franzi, on the other hand, said later that he had not seen anything more 
beautiful in his entire life.47   
 
Franz Joseph’s love of the military was indicative of the major traits of his character: he 
was calm, obedient and orderly, which made him well suited for army life with its 
emphasis on hierarchy, structures and clear orders. Maximilian, on the other hand, was a 
much more impulsive child to the extent that his Aja was ‘worried about his 
stubbornness’;48 Sophie also described the tantrums Maximilian threw when the four 
years old boy did not get his way:  
 
You have no idea, dear mother, how terribly this child can contort his face, when he 
gets into a rage. At these occasions he pushes his lips and his jaw (…) forward and he 
pulls his eyes together. At such a moment he is really frightening to look at.49 
 
Both Archduchess Sophie and Marie Luise von Sturmfeder were very much aware of 
the two different personalities of the two brothers and although they loved both boys the                                                         47 HHStA: Nachlass EH Sophie, cart. 19, 8th July 1836 48 Sturmfeder, L.v., Kindheit unseres Kaisers, 1910, p. 151 49 HHStA: Nachlass EH Sophie, cart. 19, 5th October 1834 
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two women had, nevertheless, slight preferences for the one or the other. The governess 
clearly preferred Franz Joseph; when Maximilian was given into her care Sturmfeder 
wrote: ‘from now on I have a real son [Franz Joseph] and a step-son [Maximilian]’.50 
Sophie, on the other hand, had a slight preference for Maximilian: 
 
I have got to say that of all my boys Franz Joseph is the best behaved (…) but Maxi 
wins everyone’s hearts; without being beautiful in the slightest, he draws everyone in 
with his changing (…) physiognomy, his lovely small figure and his funny ways. It is 
true he is very advanced for his age.51 
 
Maybe Sophie’s preference for Maximilian can be explained by the fact that although 
all her sons loved her dearly ‘Maxi has the richest spirit’52 and his personality was more 
like her own, lively and playful, whereas Franz Joseph was more like his father Franz 
Karl. In many ways Franz Joseph, as the heir apparent, was her guarantee for the future, 
her strength, whereas Maximilian was her weakness, but also the joy of her heart. 
However, the relationship between Maximilian and Franz Joseph did not suffer because 
of these preferences of Archduchess Sophie and Marie Luise von Sturmfeder, at least 
not during their boyhood. Apart from scraps and fights, which are common and normal 
amongst boys their age, Franz Joseph and Maximilian were close and their relationship 
was marked by a deep and sincere love.53 Whenever they could not be together, they 
sent each other letters or sketches about what the one or the other had done during the 
day. One of these instances was when Maximilian had to be separated from the rest of 
his brothers because he was ill with chicken pox. Franz Joseph wrote almost daily to his                                                         50 Sturmfeder, L.v., Kindheit unseres Kaisers, 1910, p. 123 51 HHStA: Nachlass EH Sophie, cart. 19, 22nd September 1840 52 HHStA: Nachlass EH Sophie, cart. 19, 20th July 1840 53 Cerny, H., Die Jugendtagebücher Franz Josephs, 1843-1848, Böhlau, Vienna, 2003, p. 38 
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brother for he wanted to ‘divert him as much as possible with sketches and little 
notes’.54 Therefore, in order to entertain his ill brother Franz Joseph described to 
Maximilian occurrences within the imperial family as well as the new toys he got: 
  
On Sunday we had a huge dinner (…) I am sorry I have not send you a sketch yet but I 
did not have time to do it yesterday, (…) grandmother gave me a toy castle, which can 
be fired at with little canons. The whole thing is really cute and it has even got toy 
soldiers.55 
 
Archduchess Sophie was happy with the close relationship between her children and 
with their physical and mental development but she knew that in contrast to her 
girlhood in Munich, the boys could gain little intellectual stimulus from the court 
around them when they grew older. Therefore, she was afraid that they, and in particular 
Franz Joseph and Karl Ludwig, would grow as antipathetic to the finer aspects of the 
arts and of cultural life as their father Franz Karl. She attempted to remedy the problem 
by inviting selected writers and performers into the Hofburg. Thus the three little 
archdukes listened to Hans Christian Anderson telling them his stories and fairy tales 
himself. Sophie also took the boys to the theatre; it is true that early letters of 
Maximilian and Franz Joseph show more interest in the mechanics of scene changing 
than anything performed on stage, but this is hardly surprising amongst boys their age.56 
However, Sophie’s plan seemed to have been successful with Maximilian for he was 
                                                        54 HHStA: Varia aus der Kabinettsregistratur, cart. 1 55 HHStA: Varia aus der Kabinettsregistratur, cart. 1 56 Palmer, A., Twilight of the Habsburgs – The life and Time of Emperor Francis Joseph, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1994, p. 17 
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fond of the theatre and accompanied his mother often, whereas Franz Joseph and Karl 
Ludwig remained disinterested in the performing arts, even as adults.57 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3. “GOING TO THE MEN” 
- Emperor Francis I (II) 
 
 
 
As it was customary in the House of Habsburg Maximilian and his brothers spent the 
first six years of his life in the care of women but when he reached the age of six he 
passed from this “feminine” care into a male-dominated world; it meant that 
Maximilian was taken from the loving care of Marie Luise von Sturmfeder and put 
under the supervision of an Ajo, and several teachers, educators and superintendents. 
According to the article 24 of the “Imperial Austrian family statute” it would have been 
the responsibility of the ‘head of the house to take an interest in the education of all of 
the princes and princesses of the house and to take care that they receive an education 
according to their august position (…), without interfering in the education, which had 
been provided by the respective heads of the family in their fatherly care’.58  This meant 
that the family statute put the responsibility for the education and the selection of the                                                         57 Archduke Karl Ludwig often complained in his diary that Maximilian was allowed to 
accompany their mother to the theatre, while he had to stay at home. 
Praschl-Bichler, G., Kaiserliche Kindheit: Aus dem aufgefundenen Tagebuch Erzherzogs Karl 
Ludwig, eines Bruders von Kaiser Franz Joseph, Amalthea, Vienna, 1997, p. 25 
58 Quoted in: List, J. Beiträge zur Stellung und Aufgabe der Erzherzoge unter Kaiser Franz 
Josef I, University of Vienna, Vienna, 1982, p. 453 
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Ajo of the archdukes in the hands of the head of the House of Habsburg and the 
respective father. In the case of Maximilian and his brothers it would have been the 
responsibility of Emperor Ferdinand I, since Francis I (II) had died in 1835, as the head 
of the House of Habsburg and of their father Franz Karl to provide an education for the 
archdukes. However, due to the limited mental capacities of Emperor Ferdinand I and 
the disinterest of Franz Karl in the education of his children, it was the Chancellor 
Metternich, who took the place of the former and Archduchess Sophie, who replaced 
the latter. As the three oldest sons were only three years apart in age, Sophie and 
Metternich decided that they should be brought up and taught together, which meant 
that they had the same Ajo, educators, teachers and were taught according to the same 
schedule.59 As the positions of the Ajo, as well as those of superintendents and the 
teachers of the archdukes, were extremely important and influential, the selection of 
these positions was not a private decision for the best of the children but also a social 
and political one. During the French Revolution and the Napoleonic War, Austria had 
been a bastion of conservatism and both Metternich and Sophie had been opposed to the 
liberal ideas expressed in France and elsewhere in Europe at the time. Therefore, the 
Ajo and superintendents for the archdukes had to be stout conservatives supporting the 
Habsburg claim to rule over their territories as absolute monarchs. Bearing in mind that 
the concepts of absolutism and religion were seen as interconnected, it is not surprising 
that it was more important for Metternich and Archduchess Sophie that the Ajo, 
educators and superintendents were good Catholics and conservatives rather than that 
they had the necessary qualifications.60 It was thus hardly surprising that Metternich and 
Sophie only reached a decision after long consultations. From their sixth birthdays until                                                         59 Woeginger, S.K., Die Erziehung der österreichischen Kaiser. Kaiser Franz II./I., Kaiser 
Ferdinand I., Kaiser Franz Joseph I., Kaiser Karl I., Otto von Habsburg, University of Vienna, 
Vienna, 1996, p. 59 60 Weber, M.C., Italienbild, 2008, p. 16 
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the age of eighteen the three archdukes were entrusted to the care of Count Heinrich 
Bombelles, as Ajo, and Johann Baptist Coronini-Cronberg, Timotheus Ledochowski 
and Franz Gorizutti as educators and superintendents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3.1. THE AJO: HEINRICH BOMBELLES 
 
 
After a long series of consultations the choice of Archduchess Sophie and Chancellor 
Metternich for the Ajo of the three archdukes fell on Count Heinrich Bombelles. Many 
at court and even in the imperial family, i.e. Archduke Johann, thought that the 
appointment of Bombelles was rather odd and consequently they regarded it with 
suspicion. These suspicions derived not only from Count Bombelles foreignness but 
also from the fact that he was one of Metternich’s protégés. The family of Count 
Heinrich Bombelles originally came from France. His father, Marc Marie marquis de 
Bombelles had been a diplomat in the service of Louis XVI; when the French 
Revolution broke out in 1789 the family, like many others of the nobility, fled the 
country and found refuge at the Bourbon court in Naples. However, when the revolution 
reached Naples in 1799 the Bombelles had to flee again, this time to Vienna. After the 
restoration of the Bourbon monarchy Heinrich Bombelles’ father returned to France, 
whereas the son began his career in the Austrian service. In 1805 Heinrich Bombelles 
joined the Austrian army and took part in the wars against Napoleon. From 1815 
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onwards he joined the Austrian diplomatic service: first in London before he became the 
Austrian ambassador in Lisbon, which were followed by positions in St. Petersburg and 
Turin.61 Metternich had watched Bombelles’ career with interest; when an Ajo for Franz 
Joseph and his brothers was needed Metternich suggested Heinrich Bombelles. In the 
obituary for Heinrich Bombelles’ death in 1850 Metternich revealed the reason why he 
had furthered Bombelles’ career. Metternich wrote that he considered Bombelles as a 
person, who due to an innate inclination ‘thinks in the same way as I think, sees things 
in the same ways as I see them and wants the same things as I want’.62  
The most important thing for Metternich, and thus in return Heinrich Bombelles, was 
trying to prevent was any more revolutions like in France in 1789 and the following 
upheavals throughout Europe. Considering Bombelles’ biography it is hardly surprising 
that he was a stout anti-revolutionary and a firm supporter of absolutism; Sophie and 
Metternich could hardly have found someone less sympathetic to liberal ideas. 
Bombelles’ belief in the concept of absolutism that was based on the idea that the 
monarch ruled by the grace of God, which meant that the monarch stood above his 
subjects and that those should have no say in the running of the country.63 Franz Joseph 
had clearly absorbed this principle. After he had become emperor Franz Joseph initiated 
a process of returning Austria to formal absolutism; the Sylvester Patent in 1851 
removed any kind of popular sovereignty from the Austrian system of government and 
Franz Joseph commented that ‘we have thrown constitution overboard and Austria has 
from now on only one master’. 64 Even when it became apparent that neo-absolutism 
was about to collapse in 1859, Franz Joseph only grudgingly acceded to an experiment                                                         61 Haas, W.,  Erziehung und Bildung Kaiser Franz Josephs, University of Vienna, Vienna, 
1948, p. 16 62 Metternich-Winneberg, R., Aus Metternichs nachgelassenen Papieren, W. Braumüller, 
Vienna, 1880, p. 124 63 Woeginger, S.K., Erziehung, 1996, p. 59 64 Beller, S., Francis Joseph, 1996, p. 55f 
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in constitutionalism. It was only due to mounting internal and external pressure that 
Franz Joseph granted the October Diploma in 1860 and the February Patent in 1861.65 
While Franz Joseph has generally been seen as a conservative-absolutist monarch, 
Maximilian has often been portrayed as a man with liberal principles, who supported 
the ideas of creating a constitution and parliament. However, as a young archduke he 
often spoke negatively about constitutional procedures in other countries such as 
Belgiu. More importantly, when Maximilian became emperor of Mexico he never 
granted a constitution or established a parliament.66 It is thus possible to argue that 
Maximilian had probably absorbed the conservative idea of absolutism. 
In religious matters Maximilian was less open to the influence of the Ajo. Bombelles 
was a devout Catholic but his critics at court, like Baron Wesenberger, have pointed out 
that Bombelles ‘only distinguished himself by demonstrating his devoutness and his 
support for the Jesuits’.67 Although Maximilian himself was a good Catholic, he 
nevertheless thought that Bombelles’ religious beliefs were too ‘ultra’ and that his Ajo 
demanded ‘eccentric things’68 from him in religious matters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         65 Beller, S., Francis Joseph, 1996, p. 80 66 When Maximilian’s engagement to his wife Charlotte was announced in 1856 the Belgian 
parliament had to approve Charlotte’s dowry. Maximilian called the whole affair [a way] to 
inspire the unprejudiced observer with a profound disgust for constitutional shams’ 
Ridley, J., Maximilian and Juárez, Orion Publishing Group, Niew York, 1992, p.55 67 Quoted in: Haas, W., Erziehung und Bildung, 1948, p. 33 68 Ibid, p. 47 
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1.3.2. JOHANN BAPTIST CORONINI-CRONBERG 
 
 
Officially Coronini-Cronberg was one of the educators of Franz Joseph but a note by 
Archduchess Sophie, in which she wrote that ‘Coronini sometimes completely 
despairs’69 due to Maximilian‘s laziness, indicates that he was also involved in 
Maximilian’s education. Coronini-Cronberg was a military man: he was born on 16th 
November 1796 in Görz, joined the Austrian army at the age of seventeen and was 
quickly promoted through the ranks. He was mainly stationed in Italy, a fact that refutes 
Joan Haslip’s claim that there existed a long-standing friendship between him and 
Metternich,70 for where should this friendship have developed?  Walther Haas, on the 
other hand, suggested that Coronini had been chosen due to his impressive curriculum 
vitae, his knowledge in the arts of war and the fact that he spoke German, Italian, 
French, Serbian, English and Latin.71  
Coronini’s military background was also reflected in the way he treated the three little 
archdukes; most available sources and literature stated that Coronini tried to turn his 
charges into little soldiers72, since he was above all a military man, who emphasized the 
importance of composure and form.73 Bearing in mind that Franz Joseph, even as a 
young boy, showed a preference for all things concerning the military it was naturally 
Coronini’s military attitude that appealed to Franz Joseph’s character, whereas his 
attempts to bring the military life closer to Maximilian remained unsuccessful. The fact 
that Coronini failed to instil in Maximilian a kind of enthusiasm for military matters, is 
                                                        69 HHStA: Nachlass EH Sophie, 14th January 1841, cart. 19 
70 Haslip, J., Imperial Adventurer, 1971, p. 18 
71 Haas, W., Erziehung und Bildung, 1948, p. 36f. 
72 See: Weber, M.C., Italienbild, 2008, p. 22; Haas, W., Erziehung und Bildung, 1948, p. 40; 
Holler, G., Sophie, 1993, p. 88 
73 Haas, W., Erziehung und Bildung, 1948, p. 37f. 
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illustrated by a trip of the three archdukes to Verona in 1845. There Field Marshal 
Radetzky gave them lessons in military strategy by introducing them to the mysteries of 
the Quadrilateral on which Austria’s military supremacy in Northern Italy depended. 
While Franz Joseph was proud to be told about this mystery, Maximilian showed again 
his disinterest in military matters and preferred to spend his time visiting churches and 
museums.74  
Despite the fact that Coronini put such emphasis on the military education, Maximilian 
appears to have preferred him to his other superintendents, though he complained that 
Coronini had bad breath.75 It is possible that an aspect of Coronini’s character appealed 
more to Maximilian; in contrast to the Ajo, Coronini was not a religious fanatic but held 
some enlightened principles in religious matters, which led to constant quarrels between 
him and Bombelles.76 
 
 
 
 
1.3.3. MAXIMILIAN’S SUPERINTENDENTS: TIMOTHEUS LEDOCHOWSKI 
AND FRANZ GORIZUTTI 
 
 
Most of the available literature completely neglects Maximilian’s superintendents and 
only focuses on Bombelles and to some extent on Coronini, as there are very few 
primary sources that deal with Maximilian’s superintendents. However, as it was 
customary at the court in Vienna Maximilian, like his brothers, was provided with his                                                         
74 Haslip, J., Imperial Adventurer, 1971, p. 25f. 
75 Quoted in: Erziehung und Bildung, 1948, p 47 
76 Haas, W., Erziehung und Bildung, 1948, p. 39ff 
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own superintendent upon leaving the nursery at the age of six: for Franz Joseph Count 
Coronini-Cronberg was appointed as superintendent, Count Morzin was assigned to 
Karl Ludwig and Maximilian’s superintendent was Ledochowski, who was later 
replaced by Gorizutti.77 Although the responsibility for the education, and above all for 
the academic education, of the three brothers, rested with the Ajo, Count Bombelles, it 
is, nevertheless, important to bear in mind that the superintendents had a lot of influence 
over Maximilian and his brothers. It was Coronini-Cronberg, Morzin and Ledochowski, 
who organised the archduke’s daily routines; who monitored their development; and 
who influenced the choice of teachers for the brothers.78 Moreover, their position of 
superintendent gave them the opportunity to influence the education of the archdukes, 
as they had direct and unsupervised access to Franz Joseph, Maximilian and Karl 
Ludwig.  This would have made it possible for the superintendents to transfer and instil 
some of their own political and religious ideas in their charges; as already discussed 
above Count Coronini-Cronberg successfully furthered Franz Joseph’s interest in the 
military, while he failed to do so with Maximilian. Thus, it is important to look at 
Maximilian’s superintendents, Ledochowski and Gorizutti, in order to be able to judge 
what kind of influence these two men had on the development and character of 
Maximilian. 
The first superintendent of Maximilian, Timotheus Ledochowski, came from a military 
background; he had been an officer in an Ulan regiment and had been recommended for 
higher purposes due to his many talents and the fact that he spoke French, German and 
Polish.79 Apart from these facts though not a lot more is known about Ledochowski 
only that he left the court due to health reasons in 1843.80 Since the sources about                                                         
77 Haas, W., Erziehung und Bildung, 1948, p.44 
78 Weber, M.C., Italienbild, 2008, p. 24 79 Haas, W., Erziehung und Bildung, 1948, p. 42 
80 Sturmfeder, L.v., Kindheit unseres Kaisers, 1910, p.164 
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Ledochowski are so sparse it is impossible to judge how much influence he had on the 
character of Maximilian. 
Maximilian’s second superintendent Franz Gorizutti was a close friend of Coronini, 
who suggested the former for service at court; both had been born in Görz in 1796 and 
Gorizutti had also joined the Austrian army in 1813. Most of the available literature 
described Gorizutti as the most “enlightened” and progressive of all of Maximilian’s 
superintendents, which in a Habsburg context meant that he was a Josephinist.81 As 
Gorizutti had direct and unsupervised access to Maximilian, it is likely that he passed 
some of his ideas of this Austrian form of enlightened absolutism, with its emphasis on 
religious tolerance and the centralisation of the state, on to the archduke.82 This may 
have influenced Maximilian’s concepts of rulership in Northern Italy and Mexico later. 
Thus Gorizutti was probably the first person who brought Maximilian into contact with 
“enlightened” ideas at a very conservative court.83 However, due to his enlightened 
ideas Gorizutti was constantly in trouble with the Ajo Heinrich Bombelles and the other 
conservative superintendents and teachers.84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
81 Haas, W., Erziehung und Bildung, 1948, p. 42f 
82 Valjavec, F., Der Josephinismus. Zur geisten Entwicklung Österreichs im 18. und 19. 
Jahrhundert, Rudolf Rohrer Verlag, Vienna, 1944, p. 12 
83 Haas, W., Erziehung und Bildung, 1948, p. 42f. 
84 Ibid, p.44 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1.4. THE ACADEMIC EDUCATION 
 
 
 
The way in which society treats and regards its children and their education has always 
been a mirror of the society itself as well as of the circles in which the children were 
brought up. In the case of Maximilian and his brothers these were the highest circles of 
Austrian society; in 19th century Europe, between the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and 
the revolutions of 1848, the nobility can definitely be regarded as the social and political 
elite. As Maximilian and Franz Joseph were part of this elite it is obvious that their 
education differed greatly from that of the rest of the population; one of the greatest 
differences was that the nobility still held an extremely old-fashioned concept of 
children, childhood and education. This becomes apparent in comparison to other social 
circles, such as the bourgeoisie: here a new concept of family had developed during the 
late 18th century. This new concept, which became known as the Biedermeyer, included 
the idea of the nuclear family that was based on a loving-relationship between the 
parents and provided homely comfort. It also changed the conception of childhood; for 
the first time parents and the society began to perceive the child as an individual, who 
had its own personal needs and talents.85 
In contrast to the bourgeoisie, the children of the nobility were still brought up in 
accordance with centuries-old principles; children were regarded as small adults - this 
can be deduced from the fact that most portraits of children up until the 18th century 
mirrored the portraits of adults in dress and mimic.86 The main purpose of the education                                                         85 Fertig, L., Zeitgeist und Erziehungskunst. Eine Einführung in die Kulturgeschichte der 
Erziehung in Deutschland von 1600 bis 1900, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 
1984, p. 17 86 Ibid, p. 13 
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was thus to turn the children into functioning adults as soon as possible, since what the 
families needed above all was an heir, who could one day take over the duties of a 
monarch or a lord. As the children were not regarded as individuals, their development, 
needs and talents were not taken into account in the education.87 In order to turn the 
children into functioning adults as soon as possible the whole education was perfectly 
organised, the schedules were very tight and control was permanent. The main aim of 
this education was to provide the children with the traditional values, which were based 
on the two pillars of the Church and the dynasty.88 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4.1. THE SUBJECTS 
 
 
In accordance with the principles mentioned above, the schedule of Maximilian and his 
brothers were strictly organised and regulated; the study quota was immense and was 
only interrupted by a few hours of repose. There were more tasks and duties than free 
time: the boys were under strict control and supervision from the moment they got up at 
6 am until they went to bed at 8 pm. It can be argued that that during these thirteen 
hours they were nothing more than little slaves to their respective timetables. 
Maximilian’s timetable for the year 1844, when he was just twelve years old, showed a 
                                                        87 Neumann, T., Quellen zur Geschichte Thüringens. Pädagogik im 18. Und 19. Jahrhundert, 
Sömmerda, Erfurt, 2002, p. 14 88 Fertig, L., Zeitgeist und Erziehungskunst. 1984, p. 5f. 
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heavy weight of subjects and hours he had to master every week; this included fourteen 
different subjects as well as several hours of sports and military exercises.†. 
Taking a closer look at the timetable it becomes obvious that the main focus of the 
education was put on different languages, history and religion. The emphasis on 
languages was due to the fact that Franz Joseph, Maximilian and their brothers were 
regarded as the future monarch and the elite of a multi-national and multi-linguistic 
empire. It was necessary for them to be able to speak most of the languages in the 
Habsburg Empire. Therefore, in addition to classical Latin and the traditional court 
languages of French and German that were predominately spoken in the Hofburg, the 
archdukes had to study other languages spoken in the empire, such as Czeck, Hungarian 
and Italian. The fact that these languages were included in the education of Franz 
Joseph, Maximilian and Karl Ludwig can be regarded as an attempt by Metternich and 
Sophie to create a sense of dynastic loyalty in these parts of the empire; for a sovereign, 
who could converse with his subjects in their respective native language, was much 
more likely to be regarded as the rightful ruler than an emperor, who appeared to be a 
foreign monarch. Nevertheless, examining the timetable it becomes obvious that the 
balance was tipped in favour of the traditional languages: in 1844 Maximilian received 
thirteen hours of German, French and Latin compared to six hours of Czeck, Hungarian 
and Italian. Despite this imbalance, native speakers were employed to teach the 
respective language to the archdukes as far as possible; an example for this attempt to 
provide the archdukes with the best language education possible was the choice of the 
Austrian Italian Gian Battista Bolza as the Italian teacher for Maximilian, Franz Joseph 
and Karl Ludwig. Bolza had published several textbooks about how to learn to speak 
the Italian language and he managed to teach Maximilian a good level of Italian. Some 
historians, like Joan Haslip, have identified Bolza as the first person who brought                                                         
† Appendix 1 – Maximilian’s timetable in 1844 
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Maximilian into contact with liberal and enlightened ideas.89 However, this appears to 
be hardly possible as Bolza, in contrast to Maximilian’s superintendent Gorizutti, did 
not have constant and unsupervised access to the archdukes. It was very common for 
Archduke Franz Karl and above all for Archduchess Sophie to be present in the 
classroom; as Archduke Franz Karl had received a similar education as his sons he 
spoke some Italian and at least at the beginning the lessons would have taken place 
mainly in German until the students had gained a certain level and understanding of the 
language. Thus Archduke Franz Karl and Archduchess Sophie would have noticed any 
such attempts by Bolza to influence his charges.  
Another subject that was particularly emphasised in the educational schedule was 
history; the way in which the three archdukes were taught the subject was very 
subjective. The main focus was on the argument that the Habsburg monarchs were 
chosen by the grace of God to rule over the empire and its people,90 which of course 
was meant to demonstrate to Maximilian and Franz Joseph that it was the emperor’s 
innate right to reign without the interference of a parliament or the hindrance of a 
constitution. For the same reasons any kind of liberal concepts, such as a parliament or a 
constitution, had negative connotations and the three archdukes were only given a very 
subjective version of the accounts of the French Revolution. Instead, Maximilian and 
his brothers were extensively taught about the Catholic kings of the Middle Ages, which 
again aimed to justify the Habsburgs claim to power.91 Moreover, the way in which 
Franz Joseph, Maximilian and Karl Ludwig were taught the history of the Reich was 
just as subjective; the basis for this was the academic publication Reichs- und 
                                                        
89 Haslip, J., Imperial Adventurer, 1971, p.28 
90 Haas, W., Erziehung und Bildung, 1948, p. 56 
91 Weber, M.C., Italienbild, 2008, p. 34 
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Rechtsgeschichte zum Gebauch bei akademischen Vorlesungen by George Phillips.92 
Examining the book it becomes clear that the author puts the Germanic tribes of the past 
on the same level with the German-speaking people in the nineteenth century and thus 
concluded ‘that they are one people’.93 Therefore, he supported a German state, which 
included Austria, as it was ‘a historic reality Austria and the rest of Germany need each 
other and will have to stand by each other against the changes of time’.94  Phillips also 
argued that Austria should be the hegemonic power in such a state, as the Habsburgs 
had the biggest household power of all the German princes.95 The book was clearly too 
theoretical and too difficult to be used in the education of the young archdukes, indeed 
the title suggested that it was intended as a source in academic lectures, and thus it is 
hardly surprising to find Dr. Frick, the history teacher, complaining that Maximilian and 
his brothers ‘lacked the necessary attention and (…) will to understand the scientific 
material’.96 In many ways the two subjects of history and religion were interlocked, 
which can also be seen by the fact that from 1848 onwards Cardinal Rauscher taught 
both history and religion. The two subjects served the purpose to implant into the mind 
of Franz Joseph, Maximilian and Karl Ludwig that by the grace of God the Habsburg 
dynasty had the right to rule over the countries and people of the empire and thus to 
justify the system of absolutism that was in place in the Habsburg Empire.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
92 Phillips, G.,  Reich- und Rechtsgeschichte zum Gebrauch bei akademischen Vorlesungen, 
Verlag der literarisch-artitistischen Anstalt der J.G. Cotta’schen Buchhandlung, Munich, 1859. 
93 Phillips, G.,  Reich- und Rechtsgeschichte, 1859, p. III 
94 Ibid, p. VII 
95 Ibid, p. 385 
96 Quoted in: Weber, M.C., Italienbild, 2008, p. 37 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1.4.2. Maximilian as a student  
 
 
In general though, the academic education of Maximilian and his brothers had grave 
defects, even by the standards of the time; there was too much rote-learning, too little 
emphasis on how to think, and apart from his brothers, virtually no contact with other 
young boys in the classroom. The only time when the three archdukes were actually 
were allowed to play with other children were the Sunday afternoons when the children 
of high ranking Austrian officials, i.e. Edi Taaffe, Henry Salis, the four Falkenhayn 
boys and Franz Coronini, were invited over to the palace. Moreover, it is surprising that 
half a century of social and political upheaval in Europe and the rapid scientific 
progress at the beginning of the 19th century had had so little influence on Maximilian’s 
education. In fact there was little difference between what Maximilian was learning in 
the late 1830s and what his grandfather, Emperor Francis I (II) had been learning some 
sixty years before.97 The old-fashioned and strict education could hardly stimulate the 
mind of a young, lively and creative boy such as Maximilian. Although he was by far 
the most gifted and intelligent of the brothers, having a passion for literature and the 
history of his house, Maximilian was nevertheless a rather difficult student. In a letter to 
her mother Archduchess Sophie complained about Maximilian that ‘…everything that is 
hard work for him or that he does not want to do, he hates’.98 Consequently, Maximilian 
was often scolded by his teachers and by Count Bombelles for he was not as well 
behaved as his brothers Franz Joseph or Karl Ludwig. Sophie was aware that 
Maximilian was a rather trying student for his teachers: 
                                                         
97 Peham, H. Leopold II – Herrscher mit weiser Hand, Styra Verlag, Graz, 1987, p. 174 
98 HHStA: Nachlass EH Sophie, cart. 19, 14th January 1841 
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Maxi is very lazy and talks too much, because his wild imagination runs away with 
him against his will. He is often scolded but it is like talking to a cow. (….) He is a 
good little boy but his imprudence and his laziness make me worry about the future. If 
only he will turn out well! Bombelles, who adores him, believes he will, but Coronini 
sometimes almost despairs.99 
 
Maximilian also had a mischievous pleasure in picking at the weaknesses and little 
quirks of his teachers. For instance, one teacher who always insisted on calling him and 
his brothers by their titles, Maximilian nicknamed ‘His Royal and Imperial Highness, 
the Professor for Geography’ and a French teacher he called ‘Monsieur Foppabile’.100 
However, if a teacher managed to capture his interest Maximilian proved to be an 
intelligent student. Therefore, the professor for English at the university of Vienna and 
the Archduke’s English teacher, Charles Gaulis Clairmont, was Maximilian’s favourite 
teacher for a long time.101   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
99 HHStA: Nachlass EH Sophie, cart. 19, 14th January 1841 
100 Quoted in: Haslip, J., Imperial Adventurer, 1971,  p.22 
101 Weber, M.C., Italienbild, 2008, p. 37 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1.4.3. Comparison with the academic education of Albert of Saxe-Coburg and of 
Frederick William in Prussia 
 
 
Comparing Maximilian’s academic education to that of that of other royal princes at the 
time it becomes obvious that his education remained far narrower than for example the 
syllabus followed by Albert of Saxe-Coburg some twelve years earlier102. Examining 
Albert’s education it becomes obvious that it was broadly based on Wilhelm von 
Humboldt’s ideal of humanism, which basically promoted the unity of academic 
knowledge and moral education, the so-called “wholeness of education”. As the 
beginning of the nineteenth century was also a time of great advances in natural 
sciences, Albert’s education not only incorporated classical and modern languages, such 
as English, French, German and Latin, but also included mathematics and natural 
sciences such as biology. Moreover after his education at home Albert attended 
university in Bonn, where he studied law and German. Compared to Maximilian’s 
education, Albert received much broader and more modern education than the 
archdukes in Vienna. 
However, it is even more worthwhile to compare Maximilian’s education with that of 
the Prussian heir to the throne Frederick William, who was born a year before 
Maximilian and who later became the German emperor Frederick III. In many ways the 
education of Maximilian and Frederick  were similar: both were entrusted to the care of 
a governess until the age of six and an academic education until the age of eighteen. 
Moreover, both were introduced to the traditional education of the European gentry, 
                                                        102 Wiedau, K., Eine adelige Kindheit in Coburg – Fürstenerziehung und Kunstunterweisung 
der Prinzen Ernst und Albert von Sachsen-Coburg und Gotha, Kunstsammluch d. Veste, 
Coburg, 2001, p. 24-35 
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such as piety, modern languages and courtly behaviour.103 However, there are also some 
marked contrasts between Maximilian’s education and the far more liberal and scientific 
education that the future Emperor Frederick III was receiving in Berlin.104  Frederick’s 
mother saw it as the main purpose of an education to ‘prepare the person for life’105, 
which in effect meant that the education of the heir to the throne should equip him with 
the necessary skills to understand the changes in society and to react adequately to 
them. Whether his education actually gave Frederick III the skills to cope with the rapid 
changes in society is hard to judge as his reign lasted only ninety-nine days; too short a 
period to actually implement any political and social changes. However, throughout his 
time as heir to the throne he showed himself to be torn between certain liberal ideas and 
the success of the conservative politics of Bismarck.106 
 
 
 
 
1.4.4. The beginning of the rivalry between Maximilian and Franz Joseph 
 
 
As already mentioned Maximilian and Franz Joseph were two very different brothers: 
Franz Joseph was serious and quiet, whereas Maximilian was outgoing, even charming                                                         103 Wagner, Y., ‘Prinzenerziehung in der 2. Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Zum 
Bildungsverhalten des preußisch-deutschen Hofes im gesellschaftlichen Wandel’, in 
Europäische Hochschulschriften, Vol. 3, 1995, p. 85-91 
104 Emperor Frederick’s superintendent Count Dellbrück was a strong supporter of a modern 
and liberal educational theory founded by Johann Bernhard Basedow that stressed the 
importance of natural science and it’s practical application in the classroom  
Schuster, G (Ed) Zur Jugend- und Erziehungsgeschichte des Königs Friedrich Wilhelm IV. von 
Preußen und des Kaisers und Königs  Wilhelm I – Denkwürdigkeiten ihres Erziehers Friedrich 
Dellbrück, Berlin, 1904, p. 34-49 
105 Wagner, Y., Prinzenerziehung, 1995, p. 77 
106 Herre, F., Kaiser Friedrich III. Deutschlands liberale Hoffnung. Eine Biographie., Heyne, 
Stuttgart 1987 p. 84 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and was in general more sociable than Franz Joseph. For instance, on a visit to Sophie’s 
family in Munich, her Wittelsbach relations rather obviously preferred Maximilian over 
Franz Joseph; the same was also true for many at the court in Vienna and above all for 
some ladies there. Their different personalities had not been a problem during their 
childhood but as the two boys grew older it put a strain on their relationship. Franz 
Joseph began to experience pangs of jealousy of his much more open and likeable 
brother, whereas Maximilian was jealous of the attention his brother received. Since it 
was considered impossible that the epileptic emperor Ferdinand I could produce an heir, 
Franz Joseph was seen as the heir to the throne. As a consequence, Sophie thought it 
necessary that Franz Joseph, who often felt awkward in public, should be put in the 
spotlight during family dinners and other court affairs. For instance, she insisted that 
Franz Joseph always played the lead role in any theatre play her children performed 
such as “Le siège de Colchestre”.107 Unfortunately Franz Joseph was an untalented 
actor, whose performance was rather wooden, whereas Maximilian was a born actor and 
enjoyed the attention of the audience. Both boys suffered under this situation: Franz 
Joseph because he hated having to perform on stage, Maximilian because he felt 
neglected next to his brother. However, the older Maximilian got the more he became 
aware of the difference between his position as a mere Archduke and his brother’s as 
the heir to the throne and as a consequence the relationship between the two brothers 
gradually deteriorated. 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
107 Cerny, H., Tagebücher, 2003, p. 78 
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1.4.5. The educational and Grand Tours  
 
 
In the two centuries preceding the birth of Franz Joseph and Maximilian it had become 
customary for the nobility to send their sons and daughters on grand tours through 
Europe. The purpose had been to further the education of the sons and to enrich their 
respective culture.108 Most of these tours led through Italy; in German-speaking 
countries, Italy, her landscape and her classical architecture had been idealised by many. 
The publications of Johann Winkelmann had sparked a new interest in and approach to 
the arts and architecture of the ancient civilisations and had influenced German writers 
such as Kant, Lessing and Goethe.109 Goethe’s voyage to Italy in 1786 and publication 
of his impressions of the country were widely read and were often seen as the basic 
reading material for young noble men on grand tour though Italy.110 
The first documented tour of Maximilian, Franz Joseph and Karl Ludwig took place in 
1843 and led them to Hungary; the purpose of this tour as well as of the rest that would 
follow was to make the three boys see more of the vast Habsburg Empire and 
understand the different ethnic groups living within it better. Two years later in 1845 the 
three brothers visited for the first time the Italian regions of the empire. The itinerary 
included a trip to Verona, where the Field Marshal Radetzky had his headquarters. The 
elderly Field Marshal tried to amuse and entertain the three brothers with parades and 
fireworks. He also gave them lessons in military strategy by introducing them to the                                                         108 Korte, B.,  Der Englische Reisebericht. Von der Pilgerfahrt bis zur Postmoderne, 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1996, p. 59 
109 Winkelmann’s works included: Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums. Waltherische 
Hofbuchhandlung, Dresden 1764; Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in 
der Malerey und Bildhauerkunst, Waltherische Hofbuchhandlung, Dresden, 1756; 
Sendschreiben von den Herculanischen Entdeckungen, Waltherische Hofbuchhandlung, 
Dresden, 1762. 
110 Rother, K., ‘Deutsche Reisende vor der süditalienischen Kulturlandschaft’, in Reisen in den 
Mittelmeerraum, H.H. Wetzel (ed.), Passauer Mittelmeerstudien, Passau, 1991, p. 35 
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mysteries of the Quadrilateral on which Austria’s military supremacy in Northern Italy 
depended. While Franz Joseph was proud to be told about this mystery, Maximilian 
showed again his disinterest in military matters and preferred to spend his time visiting 
churches and museums.111 Apparently Maximilian took a liking to the country, to the 
Italian people, to the warm climate and to rich culture for ‘Maxi has lost his heart to 
Italy and to the Italians’.112 Maximilian was above all fascinated by Venice; 
unfortunately there is no diary entry of his first visit and thus we only know what 
impression Venice made on this romantic thirteen year-old boy through the letters that 
he wrote to his mother during the voyage.113 The moonlit Canale Grande, the palaces 
decorated with flags and the Piazza San Marco, which glowed in the light of the new 
gas lanterns for the first time, could not fail to make a great impression on 
Maximilian.114 During the continuation of the journey which led from Pola along the 
coast to Trieste, Maximilian told his brothers and his other companions that the wanted 
to become a sailor.115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
111 Haslip, J., Imperial Adventurer, 1971, p. 25f. 
112 HHStA: Nachlass EH Sophie, cart. 18, 24th August 1845 
113 Haslip, J., Imperial Adventurer, 1971, p. 43 
114 It is true that most people only came to the St Mark’s Square in order to see the square lit by 
the new glass lanterns for the first time and not to cheer the three Archdukes, although the 
government of Lombardy-Venetia failed to mention this in the reports to Vienna. 
115 Haslip, J., Imperial Adventurer, 1971, p. 48 
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1.5. “Are they allowed to do that?” 
        - Emperor Ferdinand I 
 
 
 
The context of Maximilian’s almost idyllic childhood was, of course, punctuated by 
phases of political instability. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars had left 
deep scars in the political landscape in Europe; for European conservatives the ideas of 
liberalism and nationalism inevitably meant revolution and the destruction of the 
existing order.116 The Habsburg monarchy as an absolute and a multi-national empire 
was especially threatened by liberal and nationalist concepts, since the former was 
directly opposed to the system of an absolutist monarch, ruling over his country by the 
grace of God, and the later would lead to the fragmentation of the Habsburg Empire.117 
Therefore, it was the Austrian foreign minister, and later chancellor, Count Metternich, 
who was the main architect of the conservative order that was agreed upon by the 
European powers at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The purpose of the settlement had 
not only been to maintain international peace but also to keep the threats of liberalism 
and nationalism at bay and thus to restore the conservative and monarchical order 
throughout the continent.118 In the case of the Habsburg Empire, as in fact in most of the 
European countries with the exception of France, Britain, the Netherlands and some 
smaller German states, this meant the restoration of absolutism, an increased 
surveillance of the population through the secret police and the tightening of 
                                                        
116 Gebhardt,B, & Braubach, M., Von der französischen Revolution bis zum Wiener Kongress. 
Dtv, Munich, 1974, p. 59 
117 Seward, D., Metternich. The First European, Viking Adult, New York, 1991, p. 76 
118 Dyroff, H.D. (ed.): Der Wiener Kongress – Die Neuordnung Europas. Dtv Dokumente, 
Munich 1966, p.158ff; Kissinger, H.A.; Das Gleichgewicht der Großmächte, Manesse Verlag, 
Zurich ,1990, p. 139ff 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censorship.119 However, these political restrictions imposed on Europe and its people 
inevitably provoked opposition: in 1820 a revolution broke out in Naples and in 1822 in 
Piedmont, both were suppressed by Habsburg forces; in July 1830 the French King 
Charles X was toppled by a three-day uprising in the streets of Paris and replaced by the 
more liberal minded Louis-Philippe; in the same year the Belgians overthrew Dutch rule 
and a revolution broke out in Poland, which was brutally crushed by Russia in 1831.120  
Metternich’s greatest fear had been that these liberal and nationalist ideas would tear 
apart the Habsburg Empire, but in the end it was the unresolved social question that 
threatened the existing order. Since the mid-nineteenth century the population had 
grown relentlessly: between 1819 and 1843 the monarchy’s population increased by a 
quarter to over 36 million; Vienna’s inhabitants, who at the end of the previous century 
had numbered 235,000 were now nearly 400,000.121 Unfortunately, the industrial 
development in the Habsburg Empire had not kept pace with its rise in population; the 
economy that only stood at the beginning of the industrialisation process could not 
create a sufficient amount of jobs. Thus the rise in population combined with a lack of 
sufficient jobs led to extreme poverty amongst the working class. These poverty-
stricken people usually lived in overcrowded tenements, worked up to sixteen hours in 
the factories under appalling conditions and struggled to scratch out a living.122 It was 
the dire economic distress in the mid-1840s that drove these people to extremes: the 
capitalist cycle of boom and bust had led to a recession that increased the number of 
unemployed people dramatically; during 1847, 10,000 factory workers were laid off in 
Vienna alone.123 The recession coincided with a series of bad harvests and potato 
                                                        
119 Sked, A.,  Habsburg Empire, 2001, p. 32 
120 Wrycza, H., Der Novemberaufstand 1830–1831 im Königreich Polen im Spiegel der 
neuesten Forschung,  University of Salzburg, Salzburg, 1983, p. 29 
121 Seward, D., Metternich, 1991, p. 229 
122 Ibid, p. 227 
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blights, which caused soaring food prices. In the spring of 1847 workers looted several 
grocery shops on the outskirts of Vienna and on 1st June 1847 the rise of the price of 
meat and bread triggered an uprising in Vienna.124 
However, it was not only the majority of the workforce that was dissatisfied with the 
political system; it was the growing new middle class, the financiers, lawyers, 
professors and writers that became increasingly frustrated by their exclusion from 
government as well as irritated by the strict censorship that would not leave them 
alone.125 Not only were journalist and playwrights affected by it but also theologians 
and scientists; academics and professional men complained constantly.126 Nevertheless, 
some historians like Alan Sked have suggested that the system of censorship was not as 
strict and all-powerful as generally assumed. He pointed out that academics managed to 
get hold of published materials whether or not they were banned and that Austrian 
writers could publish their political views abroad if they assumed a pseudonym.127 
Moreover, it was possible for the general Austrian public to subscribe to foreign 
newspapers such as the Leipziger Zeitung,  Le Constitutionnel  and the Augsburger 
Zeitung,128 which proved that even the censorship of the Habsburg Empire could not 
prevent a flood of hostile literature that entered the country via Germany. One of the 
most influential of these publications was Karl Moering’s Sibylline Books from Austria, 
which was a blistering attack on the regime’s ineptitude. Similar publications were 
printed in Brussels and read in the cafes in Vienna; all of them demanded more power 
for the provincial diet, an imperial diet and an end to censorship.129 In the end the 
comment of Count Sedlnitzky, the man who was responsible for the censorship of the                                                         
124 Kißling, R., Die Revolution im Kaisertum Österreich, Universum, Vienna, 1948, p. 193 
125 Seward, D., Metternich, 1991, p 219 
126 Ibid, p. 217 
127 Sked, A.,  Habsburg Empire, 2001, p. 52 
128 Ibid, p.53 
129 A. Wandruszka, K. Möring, In: Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische 
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Habsburg Empire, ‘that a people, from the moment it begins to desire freedom, to 
acquire education is already in the first stage of a revolution’130 proved to be true. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.5.1. 1848 
 
 
It is questionable whether the fifteen-year-old Maximilian knew anything about the 
plight of the paupers or the growing dissatisfaction with the régime, as he and his 
brother had virtually no contact with the ordinary population; they lived rather isolated 
from the rest of the world in the palaces of Laxenburg and Schönbrunn. However, the 
events that took place in 1848 disturbed Maximilian’s highly regulated life and shook 
the core of the monarchy. Although Maximilian had been encouraged from a very 
young age to keep a diary, he stopped writing entries at the end of 1847 and only 
resumed the task in 1849. Thus there are no records of what he thought about the 
revolutionaries, whether he even sympathised with their demands or whether he agreed 
with the measures taken by the imperial government. The only source of information 
available about the reaction of the imperial family to the outbreak of the revolution are 
Sophie’s diaries and correspondence, which she continued to write throughout the year 
1848. 
The series of revolutions that would spread across Europe began in Italy but it was from 
France, where an angry mob forced Louis-Philippe to abdicate and proclaimed the                                                         
130 Reschauer, H. Das Jahr 1848, Vienna, R.v. Waldheim, 1878, p.4 
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republic, that the spark of revolution spread. Soon demands for liberty, freedom and 
constitution could be heard and all over Europe; the news of a revolution in Paris 
reached Vienna on 29th February but the city remained quiet. The spark that inflamed 
the revolution in Vienna was a speech delivered by Lajos Kossuth in the Hungarian Diet 
declaring that Habsburg absolutism was ‘the pestilential air which (…) dulls our nerves 
and paralyses our spirit’ and demanded that Hungary should be ‘independent, national 
and free from foreign interference’.131 Copies of the speech found their way to Vienna 
and it gave new stimulus to the meeting of the Lower Austrian Estates and to the 
students, who now demanded a constitution and the abdication of Count Metternich.132 
Austria had always appeared to be a fortress of conservatism and thus it took Metternich 
and the imperial family completely by surprise when a crowd of students hammered at 
the door of the Chancellery at the Ballhausplatz demanding Metternich’s resignation.133 
In many ways it appeared like the imperial family and the rest of the court merely stood 
by and watched as the mob of students tried to tear down the conservative structure on 
which the power and stability of the Habsburg Empire rested. Even more incredible to 
the imperial family than the student revolt was the fact that the citizens of Vienna, who 
had always been loyal to the Habsburg dynasty, now joined the students in their 
demands for a constitution, freedom of the press and the resignation of Count 
Metternich.134 Sophie commented on the situation in her diary that ‘unfortunately the 
spirit is really, really low just like it is not very good here either. May the Lord have 
mercy with us and with our children’135. The pressure from the streets was mounting 
and it actually came to violent confrontations between the population and the army 
during which four people died. Under the impression of these riots and after the advice                                                         
131 Quoted in: Rapport, M., 1848. Year of Revolution, Abacus, London, 2008, p. 60 
132 Waissenberger, R., Wien 1815-1848, Ueberreuter, Vienna, 1986, p. 175 
133 Knaus, H., Wien 1848 – Reportage einer Revolution, Holzhausen, Vienna, 1998, p. 123 
134 Ibid, p. 126 
135 HHStA: Nachlass EH Sophie,  cart. 24 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of Archduke Johann, who had never been on friendly terms with Metternich, Emperor 
Ferdinand reluctantly complied with the demands of the revolutionaries and dismissed 
the chancellor on 13th March 1848.136 The man, who had had a firm grip on the politics 
of the Habsburg Empire for over forty years, had to flee Vienna in the middle of the 
night.  
After the dismissal of Metternich the situation in Vienna had calmed considerably, 
which was also at least partly due to the fact that Emperor Ferdinand I, whom people 
called “Nandl the Looney”, had promised the revolutionaries that he ‘would grant you 
everything’,137 even a constitution. However, despite these promises there was a 
backlash against the students and known revolutionaries after the events in March; 
many had been questioned by the secret police or had been taken into custody.138 These 
measures, however, could not deter the progress of the revolution; when the constitution 
was granted on 25th April 1848 there were many at the universities and in the cafes in 
Vienna, who argued that the constitution had been imposed from above and that 
therefore that state had taken away from the people the right to express their will. On 
15th May 1848 a student demonstration in Vienna almost ended with the students 
forcing their way into the Hofburg and into the presence of Emperor Ferdinand 
demanding a constitution that truly represented the will of the people and the end of 
censorship;139 although the students did not manage to enter the palace it nevertheless 
came to violent riots between them and the National Guard posted outside the 
Hofburg.140 It was obvious that the person of the emperor was no longer sacrosanct and 
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that from this point onwards the imperial family was in effect at the mercy of the mob 
of Vienna. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.5.1.1. The flight 
 
 
As the situation was no longer safe in Vienna, the imperial family quietly left Vienna on 
17th May and sought refuge in Innsbruck.141 Franz Joseph was with the army in Italy, in 
order to suppress uprisings there, and thus it was Maximilian who rode next to his 
parents’ carriage out of Vienna. He was sixteen years old at that point; old enough to 
understand that this was not an amusement trip but an actual flight from the revolution. 
Moreover, Maximilian, who had always been very proud of the history of the House of 
Habsburg, understood his mother’s indignation only too well, when she told him that 
 
I could have borne the loss of one of my children more easily than I can the ignominy 
of submitting to a mass of students. In the future the shame of the past will seem 
simply incredible.142 
 
The flight of the imperial family had shocked the people in Vienna and above all the 
bourgeoisie began to complain about the situation; business was bad, the riots had 
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destroyed a lot of property and the fear of further excesses by the proletariat increased 
every day.143 It was under these circumstances that the provincial diets and the 
conservative newspapers asked the Emperor Ferdinand I to return to Vienna, who 
complied with their wishes and the entire imperial family returned to Vienna on 8th 
August. A contemporary, who witnessed the return of the imperial family, commented 
on the appearance of Franz Joseph; it can be assumed that his mood was symbolic for 
the rest of the court including Maximilian. He observed that Franz Joseph had ‘a 
serious, almost dark expression not without a hint of indignation’.144 
 However, the situation in the city proved to be very unstable: there were fights between 
the moderate and radical revolutionaries and the impoverished working class who took 
up arms and began to loot the shops in the city.145 The final spark that ignited this 
explosive atmosphere was the decision of the imperial government to dissolve the 
Hungarian diet and to declare all the laws that had been enacted by it as void. The diet 
and above all Kossuth refused to adhere to this directive from Vienna, whereupon 
Ferdinand and the state council decided to dispatch troops to Hungary, which were 
supposed to leave the capital on 6th October.146 The revolutionary mob in Vienna tried 
to prevent the departure; in the riots and chaos that followed several people were killed 
including Count Latour, the minister of war. Again the imperial family managed to 
escape from the chaos and revolution in the capital on 7th October 1848; this time they 
took refuge in Olmütz in Moravia.147  
Although the situation seemed more dire and dangerous than during the first flight of 
the imperial family, the counterrevolution finally gathered strength. The empire was 
saved by Radetzky, Marshal Jelačić and Field Marshal Windischgrätz, and by the  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nationalist hatred that divided the revolutionaries. Radetzky crushed the revolution in 
Italy, and Windischgrätz recaptured Prague and Vienna, though the intervention of the 
Russian army was needed to reconquer Hungary.148 Archduchess Sophie was the 
leading figure behind the counterrevolution for now she was the most powerful 
personality in the imperial family; the “only man in the Hofburg” as the people of 
Vienna called her later. It was Sophie, together with the Field Marshal Windischgrätz 
and the new chancellor Prince Felix von Schwarzenberg, who persuaded Emperor 
Ferdinand I to abdicate, since he was not a suitable head of state in such a dangerous 
situation. Sophie also persuaded her husband Franz Karl to relinquish his right to 
succeed to the throne, since she though that her eighteen-year-old son Franz Joseph 
would be a much better leader of a counterrevolution. Franz Joseph had the necessary 
youthful energy and popular appeal to lead the counter-revolution and he had above all 
no connections to the concessions made in March 1848.149  
 
 
 
 
 
1.5.2 The Emperor Franz Joseph  
 
 
The abdication of Emperor Ferdinand and the following succession of Franz Joseph had 
been kept secret, and it was only at the very last moment that Franz Joseph’s brothers 
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had been told about the plan.150 Maximilian had been aware that something was going 
on but had come to the conclusion that Franz Joseph would be made governor of 
Bohemia.151 However, during the ceremony in which Emperor Ferdinand I abdicated, 
Franz Karl renounced his rights of succession, and Franz Joseph began his reign, which 
was to continue until 1916, Maximilian was not only proud of his brother but also 
slightly awed by the elevated position that Franz Joseph now held.152  Sophie was also 
delighted with Maximilian’s conduct towards Franz Joseph after the coronation and she 
even though that it had a positive influence on his character: 
 
I can’t express (…) how happy I am with the conduct of my other children towards 
their brother.  It surpassed all my expectations; you would think that a year passed 
between the 1st and 2nd December, so completely changed is Maxi; he is behaving 
respectful and subservient towards the Emperor (…) I think that the great surprise of 
the [Franz Joseph’s] succession to the throne has had a very positive influence on 
Maxi, on the whole youth, (…), on all people.153  
 
Although this was definitely wishful thinking Maximilian was, nevertheless, among the 
first to take the oath of allegiance to his brother, the new emperor. Did Maximilian 
realize that from this day onwards he would have to ask for an audience to speak with 
his brother, that his brother was above all criticism and that any of his independent 
actions and ideas would rouse his brother’s suspicion? 
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At first this new difference in positions seemed to have caused little disagreement 
between the two brothers. The revolution was still raging in Hungary where the imperial 
forces made little progress and Franz Joseph had to accept the aid of the Russian tsar 
Nicholas I. Franz Joseph insisted on visiting the troops in Hungary and Maximilian 
accompanied him. Both were present at the capture of Raab; the letter that Maximilian 
send to his mother praised Franz Joseph’s heroism and his bravery. Since it was a letter 
to his mother and since this kind of correspondence was usually passed around in the 
imperial family it is questionable whether the events took place in the exact same 
manner as described in the letter or whether Maximilian wanted above all to please his 
mother and to increase his own reputation and that of the new emperor at court: 
 
Our emperor is magnificent. As soon as he heard gunshots near Raab, he rode (…) to 
the advancing troops; you can imagine the endless cheering, an emperor sharing all 
their dangers and troubles. As the troops entered the town, the emperor also entered it 
over the beams of a burning bridge.154 
 
It was in the aftermath of the revolution that the first serious rifts in the relationship 
between Franz Joseph and Maximilian appeared; the main issue was that the two 
brothers held two very different opinions about how captured revolutionaries in 
Hungary and Lombardy should be treated. After the revolution was crushed many 
radical leaders, such as Count Batthyány, were shot, hanged or whipped after trial by 
court martial, while others like Count Andrássy were sentenced to death in their absence 
and had to go into exile. Franz Joseph wholly approved of the draconian measures and 
policy of Radetzky, Windischgrätz and Schwarzenberg, whereas the less military and 
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more philosophical Maximilian disapproved of the measures. In his diary he wrote that 
although: 
 
We call our age the age of enlightenment (…). In very many cities in Europe posterity 
will view with amazement and horror [that military tribunals] under the influence of 
hateful revenge, condemned people to death at a few hours’ notice, perhaps they 
wanted something different from what was desired by the power that stands above the 
law.155 
Of course, these ideas if mentioned in public would have been treason. This raises the 
question what reasons Maximilian had to make the comment: did he want to express his 
true convictions? Did he, as a young man, rebel in some way against the established 
methods and order of his seniors? Or was he, as a Christian, appalled by the misery and 
sorrow that he had seen and thus he was moved by pity for these people? Many 
conservatives at court, like Schwarzenberg, feared that the young archduke was a true 
liberal and sympathised with the defeated revolutionaries and their concepts.156 They 
placed Maximilian at the opposite side of the political spectrum and thus managed to 
make him, his comments and ideas appear suspicious at a court that had defeated a 
revolution. However, Maximilian only held some vague and diffuse liberal ideas: for 
instance he supported the granting of a constitution but only if this was the wish of the 
monarch,157 which suggests that Maximilian was in fact a conservative and that he was 
modern-minded only in a superficial way. The sympathies that he showed for the 
captured and sentenced revolutionaries probably derived from his compassionate 
character, from a sense that the rule of law should be upheld and from pity rather than 
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from liberal convictions. On the contrary, his views on most matters were conservative; 
he was a devout Catholic, went to Mass regularly and had a strong sense of honour – the 
Habsburg sense of honour in which he had been brought up. This sense of honour also 
made it impossible for Maximilian to directly criticise Franz Joseph; he was directing 
his critique against the military tribunals and the military commanders such as 
Radetzky, Windischgrätz and Jelačić, who had set up these tribunals and were 
ultimately responsible for them although the sentences were carried out in the name of 
the emperor, by pointing out that ‘perhaps they wanted something different from what 
was desired by the power that stands above the law’.158 There are no records or 
comments whether Maximilian ever expressed this directly to Franz Joseph but it can be 
assumed that his critique, although made in private, nevertheless reached the emperor. 
Maximilian’s opponents, above all Count Schwarzenberg and the conservative circles at 
court, would have made sure that Franz Joseph knew of Maximilian’s critique; it not 
only gave them the opportunity to discredit Maximilian and to limit any kind of 
influence he had on his brother but also raised the question of whether Maximilian, who 
was apparently did not completely supported the strictly conservative line taken by 
Franz Joseph and his advisors, should be removed from Vienna and given a task at 
some distance from the capital. 
Therefore, this disagreement already marked the beginning of the estrangement between 
Maximilian and Franz Joseph. The former was not allowed to criticize the actions of his 
brother anymore and the latter grew more and more suspicious of Maximilian’s ideas 
and actions. Maximilian was still very popular amongst the people in the streets and at 
the more liberal circles at court centred around Archduke Johann.159 Schwarzenberg and 
other conservatives at court feared that many of those dissatisfied with the current  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political situation were ready to form a group around this apparently more liberal 
minded archduke and would consequently encourage Maximilian to take over the throne 
and thus overthrow Franz Joseph.160 At this point Franz Joseph had only been in power 
for a couple of months; his regime was very unstable and his grip on the political and 
military power in the Habsburg Empire was still rather weak. Thus Franz Joseph might 
have been afraid to lose his throne to Maximilian, who enjoyed so much more 
popularity than him.161 However, in none of Maximilian’s notes can a hint be found that 
he considered such actions nor that he was in touch with the liberal circles around 
Archduke Johann at court. Moreover, Maximilian had been brought up in the Habsburg 
sense of honour that made it imperative for every member of the imperial family to 
accept the current emperor as the head of the House of Habsburg and to follow his 
orders. Since Maximilian had a strong sense of honour it remains doubtful whether he 
would have went against the family’s code of honour by attempting to stage a coup 
d’état.162 Even if Maximilian had turned against his brother it would still have been 
unlikely that the army would have followed him; the officer corps largely consisted of 
members of the nobility and was consequently rather conservative. Schwarzenberg’s 
fear, therefore, lacked any kind of foundation; he and some of Franz Joseph’s ministers, 
nevertheless, hinted that it might be a good idea to find for His Imperial Highness a 
suitable position at some distance from Vienna.163 Although Franz Joseph was fond of 
his brother’s company, he was nevertheless hurt by Maximilian’s criticism of his orders 
concerning the treatment of captured revolutionaries. Consequently, it was agreed that 
Maximilian, who was now almost eighteen-year-old and who had always loved the sea, 
should go to Trieste and join the navy. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
In his Brother’s Shadow 
 — 
‘Sometimes I ask myself the question if I can settle it with my conscience to follow 
the orders from Vienna blindly’ 
Archduke Maximilian, as governor of Lombardy-Venetia, 1858 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When Maximilian reached the end of his education in 1850 the problem of the provision 
for the younger brother of Emperor Franz Joseph presented itself. As an archduke, and 
as the next in the line of succession, Maximilian was well provided for financially: he 
was entitled to an apanage of 75.000 florins a year; from 1st November 1853 onwards 
Maximilian received an additional grant of 25.000 florins per year; and on 6th October 
1856 the emperor doubled the original apanage to the sum of 150.000 florins a year.164 
Apart from the financial provisions it was also necessary to find Maximilian a suitable 
career; traditionally most Austrian archdukes joined the army in order to get a certain 
amount of military training and were then gradually promoted to governor of some part 
of the empire.165 However, since Franz Joseph was so strongly identified with the army 
and since he perceived his brother as a rival and as a threat to his throne it was 
impossible for Maximilian to follow this traditional route. It was thus necessary to find 
a different career for Maximilian that was yet suitable for his status as an archduke,  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challenging enough to keep him occupied and most importantly, at some distance from 
Vienna as not to pose a threat to Franz Joseph. Therefore, it was thought appropriate 
that Maximilian should join the navy and in 1850, when he was eighteen years old, he 
was given a command in the Adriatic fleet.166 It is true though that Maximilian was 
anything but unhappy about this career path; his journals and diaries showed his deep 
love for the sea, although this love sometimes appeared to be a welcome excuse to 
escape from his various duties in Vienna, Trieste or Milan. A poem Maximilian wrote 
on board of the steamer “Elisabeth” in November 1859 perfectly illustrated his wish to 
escape from his duties. One verse read: 
 
Entbunden der Paläste Haft / Frei von des Schreibpult’s Qual und Mühen / Da hebt 
sich frei des Geistes Kraft / Und der Begeist’rung Ströme glühen. 
 
[Released from the custody of the palaces / Liberated from the agony and pain of the 
writing desk / The powers of the mind are lifted / And the tide of enthusiasm is 
burning]167 
 
Nevertheless, in the following five years (and again from 1859 to 1864) Maximilian had 
his headquarters in Trieste and only went back to Vienna for the occasional visit. In 
Trieste he rented the rather luxurious Villa Lazorovich from a rich merchant; the villa 
was situated on one of the hills surrounding the town, consisted of several buildings and 
had a big park, which was made accessible to the public.168 However, Maximilian did 
not have much time to enjoy his ‘comfortable villa’ nor his ‘garden laden with fruits, 
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grapes, etc.’169 since his naval duties meant that he spent most of his time on board of 
several different ships cruising the Adriatic Sea. Fortunately, Maximilian kept journals 
and diaries about these journeys; it is thus possible to examine his experiences in 
foreign countries in the context of travel writing in the nineteenth century. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1. MAXIMILIAN’S TRAVEL ACCOUNTS AND TRAVEL WRITING IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 
 
 
 
Although people have travelled since time immemorial, it was at the end of the 
eighteenth century that it became possible and affordable for a wider public to travel. 
Later the steam engine revolutionised the way in which people travelled. By the mid-
nineteenth century most western European countries had networks of railway tracks, 
which did not only connect the major cities with each other but also made it possible to 
reach remote regions faster than ever before. Affordable transport combined with a 
rising level of prosperity of the bourgeoisie and their wish to imitate the tastes and 
habits of the nobility led to the development of a modern form of tourism by the end of  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the nineteenth century; the Grand Tour had always been a feature of the education of the 
nobility but now for the first time the middle class could experience foreign countries 
and cultures. Consequently, this led to a dramatic increase in travel writing and these 
published accounts of journeys also enjoyed great popularity amongst the wider public. 
These publications covered different literary genres, ranging from the numerous 
accounts of scientific expeditions into exotic countries to very personal descriptions of 
travels through Europe. Above all the latter made it possible for the reader to participate 
in acts of (inter-) cultural perceptions and cultural constructions, in processes of 
understanding and misunderstanding. However, as Edward Said has demonstrated, the 
way people imagine places is not simply a private, individual affair and people’s 
responses to these places when visiting them are not independent but are mediated by 
the culturally constructed representations they have previously encountered.170 
Therefore, these travel accounts were not a literal and objective record of journeys 
undertaken; they carried preconceptions that, even if challenged, provided a reference 
point through which the travelling subject was always also laid bare: travel accounts 
inevitably revealed the culture-specific and individual patterns of perception and 
knowledge.171 Thus these journals, diaries and published accounts often told the reader 
more about the author himself, about his background, his nationality, his education and 
about his own attitudes than about the country the author had travelled. However, many 
of these contemporary texts were stained by the belief in racial superiority, not just the 
imperialistic idea of the superiority of the European race over others but also the 
perception that northern European nations and people were superior to those in the 
south.172 For instance, most people in Austria in the nineteenth century considered 
                                                        
170 Said, E.W., Orientalism, Pantheon Books, New York, 1978, p. 113 - 166 
171 Korte, B., English travel writing, 2000, p. 5f. 
172 Youngs, T., Travel Writing in the 19th century – filling the blank spaces, Anthem Press, 
London, 2006, p. 20 
55 
 
themselves to be superior to the Slavs. This belief of superiority resulted in the fact that 
the Habsburgs did not only consider it their innate right to rule over the regions in the 
Balkans but they also believed that the Slavs benefitted from their rule as they were not 
advanced enough to govern themselves.173 However, neither should the travel accounts 
nor the misconceptions and racial slurs be dismissed with a wave from the distance of a 
century: the prejudices and (mis-) perceptions of nineteenth century writers and their 
audiences are deployed in print and the broadcast media still.174  
 
 
 
 
2.1.1. THE TRAVELLER MAXIMILIAN AND HIS EXPERIENCE OF 
“OTHERNESS” 
 
 
Maximilian gathered his experiences of foreign countries and different cultures on his 
various travels with the navy: in the autumn of 1850 on his last educational tour to 
Greece and Smyrna175; in the summer of 1851 on a cruise through the western 
Mediterranean visiting Sicily, Naples, Florence and Cadiz; from May till July 1852 he 
went on another tour through the western Mediterranean and the north-west Atlantic 
calling at Sicily, Spain, Portugal, Madeira, Tangiers, Algiers and Malta; and from June 
till November 1853 he cruised in the eastern Mediterranean visiting the Sultan of the  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Ottoman Empire as the Crimean war had already erupted between Turkey and Russia; 
and in 1859 he set foot onto the new world visiting Brazil. Bearing in mind that travel 
writing was never objective but was determined by such factors as the author’s 
nationality, education and cultural background, it is possible to examine Maximilian’s 
accounts of the numerous journeys he undertook in the context of some of these factors. 
In the case of Maximilian it has to be understood that his travel accounts were written 
from the position of a privileged traveller. Although the archduke often attempted to 
travel incognito, something in which he only rarely succeeded, the main purposes of 
Maximilian’s journeys was on the one hand to gain further nautical training on the sea 
voyage but on the other hand to represent the Habsburg Empire in the countries he 
visited. For instance, his journey to the Ottoman Empire in 1853 was a reaction to the 
political difficulties that the Crimean War, which was to become a large scale European 
conflict, presented. Maximilian’s visit was thus an innocuous way for the Austrian 
emperor of getting in touch with the Ottoman leadership and to gain some insight into 
their political plans and actions. However, apart from a brief note about a meeting with 
the Austrian diplomatic corps in Athens, not a word about any diplomatic missions 
during his journeys can be found in Maximilian’s notes.176 
Nevertheless, it was his privileged position that led Maximilian to make rather quick 
judgments about the places he visited and about the people he encountered. In Pisa he 
described the cathedral and the tower as an ‘architectural monstrosity’ and for his part 
‘wished that the tower would be straight’.177 Moreover, Maximilian did not only fancy 
himself a connoisseur of architecture but he felt that he could also comment on the 
people and customs of the country he visited. However, these comments revealed more 
                                                        
176 EH. Maximilian, Mein erster Ausflug. Wanderungen in Griechenland, Duncker & Humblot, 
Leipzig, 1868, p124 
177 EH. Maximilian, Aus meinem Leben. Reiseskizzen, Aphorism, Gedichte, Duncker & 
Humblot, Leipzig, 1867, Vol. I, p. 195 
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about Maximilian himself, his character and his upbringing and education as a German 
prince, than about the people he commented on. Some good examples of how 
Maximilian categorized people and how he attributed certain national stereotypes to 
them can be seen in Maximilian’s description of the Neapolitan fleet in the port of 
Palermo in 1852: 
 
(…); it is incredible what characteristic differences can be detected from the  bearing 
of a ship; in the northern I include the manners of the British, Danes, Swedes etc. and 
partly ourselves; in the southern prevails the distasteful, flawed, (…) nature of the 
Italians, Spanish and most of the French etc. – The north is affiliated with calmness, 
etiquette, strict discipline (…); the south with yelling, bonhomie and comedy; the 
northern sailor possess (…) bravery and has a fresh and clean appearance; the southern 
seaman has momentary bravery, (…) but otherwise he is slavish and low, and his 
unshaven face is neglected and savaged.178 
 
Maximilian clearly tried to define his own, Germanic character by pointing to 
stereotypes attributed to countries and people in southern Europe. However, as this 
quotation has shown he did not see these different national characteristics as trivial but 
he based his judgments on them, which led to the belief that some people and nations 
were naturally superior to others.  
However, as a member of the ruling house of a multi-national empire how could 
Maximilian believe in these ideas of superiority and inferiority? Weber has argued that 
it was the idea of the superiority of the Germanic race that gave the Habsburgs the 
justification to rule in the non-German parts of the empire179; as the German-speaking                                                         178 Quoted in: Weber, M.C., Italienbilder, 2008, p. 176 
179 Weber, M.C., Italienbild, 2008, p. 184f. 
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people were seen as superior to the other ethnic groups in the empire they were often 
regarded as the Staatsvolk, which meant that they could dominate the politics and 
economy of the empire and that ethnic groups should be subjugated to their interest and 
needs. It is possible to argue that Maximilian and Franz Joseph believed in the idea of a 
Staatsvolk as well as in the superiority of the Germanic race, as they both saw it as the 
mission of the Habsburgs ‘to civilise these people’;180 this also gave them a justification 
for Austrian rule in Italy. However, in Maximilian’s mind these ideas of the inferiority 
of Southern Europe only applied to the lower classes for when he met with the 
monarchs of the respective countries, to whom he was very often also related in some 
way or who were not actually southern but were members of northern European 
aristocratic families, he never mentioned these national stereotypes and perceived the 
aristocracy of these countries as equals.181  
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.2. HABSBURG PATRIOTISM AND THE IDEA TO BE DESTINED TO RULE 
 
 
Maximilian’s accounts of his travels also portrayed him as a man who was incredibly 
proud of his ancestry and the Habsburg dynasty and who had, despite his easy manners 
and vague liberal ideas, a very conservative attitude towards the concepts of monarchy. 
                                                        
180 Quoted in: Haslip, J., Imperial Adventurer, 1971, p. 93 
181 The best example for such monarch was Otto of Greece, who was a Wittelsbach cousin of 
Maximilian’s mother Archduchess Sophie. At the Convention of London in 1832 the Great 
Powers had decided that Greece should have a Bavarian prince as its sovereign. 
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These traits in Maximilian’s character are revealed in his description of van Dyck’s 
portrait of Charles V:  
 
He (…) must step before this picture, and he will be seized with respect and 
enthusiasm for this king of men. The “by the grace of God”, shines powerfully from 
the commanding, earnest face of the emperor, too great to feel flattered that humanity 
lies in the dust before him; (…) the eagle, chosen as the symbol of the House of 
Habsburg, floats over Charles to crown his majestic head with laurel.182 
 
Maximilian was definitely fascinated by the nimbus of the kings of old. Moreover, a 
visit to Spain also suggested that he longed for such an elevation for himself. The 
country held a special fascination for Maximilian; although the Spanish line of the 
Habsburg dynasty had long been extinguished Maximilian’s Habsburg ancestors had 
ruled Spain for almost two hundred years. As a consequence, he felt that ‘in Spain I was 
the nearest legitimate relative to the poor dead [Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain], nearer 
than the ruler and the princes of the country’.183 Standing in front of the sarcophagi of 
the “Catholic Kings” Ferdinand and Isabella in Granada, Maximilian not only indulged 
in dynastic pride aroused by the ancient glories of his house but he also revealed his 
innermost feelings and thoughts:  
 
Proudly and yet sadly I took in my hand the golden ring and the once powerful sword. 
Would it not be a brilliant dream to draw the latter in order to win the former?184 
 
                                                        
182 EH. Maximilian, Aus meinem Leben, 1867, p.258f 
183 EH. Maximilian, Aus meinem Leben, 1867, Vol. II, p. 161 
184 Ibid,  p.164 
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These comments show that Maximilian was not only incredibly proud of the legacy of 
the House of Habsburg but also that he dreamed of re-establishing and furthering the 
glory of his dynasty. However, as ‘a mere Corvette Captain’185 it would have been fairly 
difficult for Maximilian to gain any sort of distinction for his house. Thus he must have 
been keen to be promoted quickly through the ranks of the navy or to be appointed as 
governor of a part of the monarchy. Considering Maximilian’s fascination with 
Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain it can be assumed that he wondered why had fate had 
placed the Austrian crown upon his brother’s head, while he should go through life 
without one, just because he was two years younger?  In Seville, where a bullfight was 
given in his honour, Maximilian’s journal entries paint the picture of a young man 
revelling in reverence being paid to him as a member of the Habsburg dynasty. As a 
dying bull was granted the coup de grâce in Maximilian’s honour, he wrote in his 
journal: 
 
A strange feeling comes over me, for the looks of the whole arena are directed upon 
me; and a murmur runs through the multitude. I cannot deny that I felt flattered by this 
national homage. I even fancied myself back in the fine old times, when the 
Habsburgs were the rulers of this noble people.186 
 
These diary entries show Maximilian’s fascination with the kings of the Middle Ages 
and that he had a strong sense of dynastic pride. Moreover, the journals also suggest that 
Maximilian had aspirations to further the glory of his house and thus his comments can 
be regarded as the first signs of him being unhappy with his current position in life.  
Historians such as Joan Haslip have tended to regard Maximilian as a dreamer and a                                                         
185 Praschl- Bichler, G., Corvetten-Capitän, 2006, p.1 
186 EH. Maximilian, Aus meinem Leben, 1867, Vol. II, p.68 
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rather lethargic person, who did not possess the necessary desire to rule. These 
historians generally point towards Maximilian’s later wife Charlotte, whom he married 
in 1857, as the driving force behind his appointment as governor of Lombardy-Venetia 
as well as behind his acceptance of the Mexican throne.187 However, Maximilian’s 
notes in Spain proved that he was unhappy with the status quo and that he longed for a 
more powerful position for himself several years before he met his wife. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. THE ATTEMPT ON FRANZ JOSEPH’S LIFE IN 1853 AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES 
 
 
 
It was during one of these cruises in the Mediterrenean Sea that Maximilian was told 
that there had been an attempt on the life of his brother Franz Joseph. The political 
situation in the Habsburg Empire at the beginning of the 1850s was anything but stable; 
the revolutions in 1848 had been barely suppressed and resentments against Austrian 
rule were still widespread amongst the different nationalities in the Habsburg Empire 
and above all in the Hungarian and Italian provinces.188 The restoration of absolutism in 
the empire made independence of the provinces or even greater autonomy from                                                         
187 Haslip, J., Imperial Adventurer, 1971, p. 104 
188 Kann, R.A., A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918, University of California Press, 
Los Angeles, 1980, p. 374 
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Austrian rule appear to be an impossible goal that could not be achieved in the near 
future. This was the political background against which the Hungarian tailor’s assistant 
János Libényi attacked Franz Joseph on 18th February 1853. On that day Franz Joseph 
took a stroll on the ramparts of Vienna where Libényi attacked him with a knife; it was 
due to the bravery and presence of mind of Franz Joseph’s adjutant on duty O’Donnell, 
who flung himself on the attacker and disarmed him before the police arrived on the 
scene, that Libényi did not succeed. Moreover, the collar of Franz Joseph’s uniform 
deflected most of Libényi’s blow so that the emperor only suffered a minor wound to 
the back of the head.189 Maximilian, whose only source of information were the 
newspapers available in Trieste that reported that, although the wound was not fatal, 
Franz Joseph was nevertheless suffering from a high fever, was so alarmed by this news 
that he hurried to the capital.190 It was not until a few days later that Karl Ludwig’s 
more detailed letter reached him but at that point Maximilian was already on his way to 
Vienna.191 
Maximilian’s decision to see his brother in Vienna can be seen in very different ways 
and as such have caused quite a controversy amongst historians. Some, like Haslip, 
have stressed Maximilian’s good nature and loyalty towards Franz Joseph, arguing that 
his only concern was his brother’s health and well-being.192 On the other hand, Praschl-
Bichler and Weber have pointed out that Maximilian would have been the next emperor 
of the Habsburg Empire if Franz Joseph had died.193 Thus they suggested that 
Maximilian calculated that his brother would not survive the attempt on his life and that 
                                                        
189 Conte Corti, E.C.,  Kaiser Franz Joseph, 1960, p. 220 
190 Austrian Newspapers Online (ANNO): Wiener Zeitung, 19th February 1853, retrieved 12th 
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<http://anno.onb.ac.at/cgicontent/anno?apm=0&aid=wrz&datum=18530219&zoom=2> 
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in consequence he would ascend to the Habsburg throne. However, it is impossible to 
figure out from Maximilian’s letters and journals whether he journeyed to Vienna out of 
brotherly concern or out of a lust for power. Franz Joseph, though, must have been 
convinced that it was the latter; when Maximilian arrived at his bedside Franz Joseph 
was so angry at the sudden arrival of the heir-presumptive that he gave Maximilian a 
dressing-down for leaving the fleet without permission.194 Apparently, more 
conservative circles at court shared Franz Joseph’s view, for there exists a letter by 
Maximilian in which he complains that he was ‘very angry at W. Windischgraetz, who 
dares to spread such false news, which is a personal affront against me’.195 
Despite the rebuff, Maximilian showed himself deeply affected by the attempt on his 
brother’s life and on 27th February 1853 he launched an appeal for subscriptions to build 
a thanksgiving church, close to the site of Libényi’s attack.196 The appeal revealed how 
closely knitted the ideas of Catholicism, monarchy and the Habsburg dynasty were in 
Maximilian’s mind; in the appeal he stressed the ties between Austrian-Habsburg 
patriotism and Catholicism: ‘A church will be the most beautiful memorial for Austria 
to proclaim her gratitude (…) to the world’.197 However, Maximilian did not live to see 
the completion of the neo-gothic Votivkirche, which was inaugurated on 24th April 1879 
on the occasion of the silver jubilee of the imperial couple twelve years after 
Maximilian’s death.198 Upon the inauguration Franz Joseph donated a stained-glass 
window to commemorate Maximilian as the Emperor of Mexico - a tribute perhaps of 
love but most certainly of remorse.  
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196 Since Maximilian spent most of his time away from Vienna, he entrusted the handling of the 
day-to-day work concerning the construction of the Votivkirche to his brother Karl Ludwig. 
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2.3. THE AUSTRIAN NAVY 
 
 
 
Feeling even more like persona non grata at the court in Vienna after the assassination 
attempt on Franz Joseph, Maximilian sought refuge in his work in the navy. It is hardly 
surprising that at the beginning there were many in the officer corps, which consisted 
mainly of Italian officers, who were less than thrilled to have the younger brother of the 
emperor joining their ranks. However, Maximilian’s open character and his easy 
manners guaranteed that he was well liked amongst his comrades, who were ‘surprised 
by his friendliness’199 and Maximilian soon found a group of friends amongst the 
officers. Apparently Maximilian was meant to be a sailor; he had settled into this new 
life easily and had shown equal if not more eagerness and commitment to his training 
than most other recruits. On a visit to the port in Venice even Franz Joseph could see 
that Maximilian was happy with his career choice and perhaps more importantly that his 
tasks kept him busy enough as not to interfere with politics in the capital. Therefore, 
Franz Joseph commented in a letter to his mother that ‘Max is flourishing, strong as a 
bear, as gay as ever, always to be found on board of the ship. And apart from all this he 
seems to be working hard’.200 Franz Joseph’s intentions in writing this letter might have 
been, on the one hand, to calm Archduchess Sophie’s fears about the well-being of her 
favourite son and, on the other hand, to prove to her that the relationship between him 
and his brother had not deteriorated further. Consequently, Maximilian was promoted 
quickly through to the rank of captain and given a command over the corvette Minerva,                                                         199 Sterneck, M., Erinnerungen aus den Jahren 1847-1897. Herausgegeben von seiner Witwe, 
Hartleben, Vienna, 1901, p. 91 
200 Schnürer, F., (ed.), Briefe Kaiser Franz Josephs an seine Mutter, 1838-1872, Kosel & Pustet, 
Munich, 1930, p. 62 
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which under his command won the recognition of a model ship.201 Two years after 
Maximilian had entered the service, one officer noted that ‘it is inconceivable to us, 
how he has acquired so much maritime knowledge (…) in such a short time’.202 
However, Maximilian did not only pick up a lot of nautical skills in those two years but 
he also saw very clearly the financial, personnel and material deficits the navy was 
suffering from. As most of them had their roots in the past it is worth looking briefly at 
the history of the Austrian navy. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.1. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
 
Since the annexation of Trieste in 1382, the Habsburg Empire had direct access to the 
Adriatic Sea, but this was too small a basis to develop a large-scale navy against the 
superior strength of the Venetians. Later attempts by the government in Vienna to 
realize maritime projects, like the creation of an East Indian Company in Ostende 
during the reign of Charles VI and Maria Theresa’s attempts to establish colonies in 
India and the Nicobar Islands, failed due to various political and economic reasons.203 It 
was only when the Republic of Venice broke apart during the French Revolutionary 
Wars and the former Venetian territory became part of the Habsburg Empire in the                                                         201 Praschl-Bichler, G., Corvetten-Capitän, 2006, p. 127 202 Sterneck, M:; (1901), p. 91 
203 Braun, Th., Österreichische Kolonialbestrebungen. In: Marine-Rundschau, Issue 33, Vienna, 
1928, p. 508ff. 
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Treaty of Campo Formio in 1797 that Austria did have the means to develop and 
enlarge her naval forces. Austria’s inheritance included five ships of the line, two 
frigates, one corvette, twelve cannon boats and several barges.204 However, due to the 
lack of interest in maritime matters of the Viennese government and Austria’s other 
military commitments in Europe, which required large sums of money to adequately 
equip the army, most of the ships were dismantled and the timber sold. Austria thus did 
not take the chance to gain naval hegemony in the Mediterranean; a fact that was also 
reflected that in 1848 the fleet was reduced to three frigates, six corvettes, seven brigs 
and two small transport steamers.205 
As the Austrian navy was exclusively based in the Italian provinces it had essentially 
remained Venetian; the administrative authorities of the navy were located in Venice, 
the officer’s corps and most of the crews were from Venice and from Dalmatia and the 
command language on board of the ships was Italian. Under these circumstances the 
outbreak of the revolution in Venice on 22nd March 1848 proved to be a real crisis for 
the Austrian navy. The revolutionaries arrested the commander of the navy, vice 
admiral Martini, killed another of the commanding officers and when the Austrian 
governor of Venice handed over the city to them many sailors of the Austrian navy 
joined the insurgents.206 Fortunately for the Habsburg Empire, the main part of the fleet 
was not in Venice when the revolution broke out; the fleet gathered in Trieste where it 
was safe from attacks of the Sardinian or Neapolitan navy, for Trieste was on the 
territory of the German Confederation and the Italian states did not want to go to war 
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with the confederation.207 After the Austrian forces recaptured Venice and order was 
restored, the central government in Vienna pardoned most of the disloyal sailors, but as 
the Italians in the navy were seen as a possible source for mutiny, a process of 
Germanisation of the officer’s corps and the crews began.208 Since many of the 
commanding officers had been Italian the Viennese government struggled to find an 
adequate commander for the navy. In 1849 Dahlerup, a Dane with considerable nautical 
experience, took over command but only two years later Count Wimpffen, who as a 
field marshal lieutenant had very little maritime knowledge, replaced him. However, 
Dahlerup and Wimpffen failed to modernise the navy and in many ways both were only 
an interim solution.209 In 1854 Franz Joseph appointed Maximilian as the new 
commander-in-chief of the navy and although Maximilian did not a direct mandate from 
the emperor to modernise the navy, he began to turn the Austrian navy into a modern 
fleet.210 
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2.3.2. MAXIMILIAN AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE NAVY 
 
 
In sending Maximilian to the littoral, the Emperor gave him a task that needed to be 
done and a challenge great enough to test his abilities. The command over the navy was 
a daunting task indeed; the navy had remained essentially Venetian, ships and 
equipment were outdated, training for the sailors was inadequate, morale was poor and 
the crews were prone to mutiny. It was therefore not a miracle that upon taking 
command Maximilian assured Radetzky that ‘in the future the navy, like the army, shall 
have as its foundation strict discipline [and would] develop into a useful corps 
dependable in times of crisis and animated with a good spirit’.211 Maximilian’s tactful 
reference to the army’s good example did not reflect his true feelings, however. 
Throughout his time as commander of the navy, Maximilian always sought to assert 
both his own independence and that of the navy, which in theory was subordinate to the 
army’s high command, the so-called Armeeoberkommando. His striving for 
independence was helped by the muddled state of the Habsburg military administration. 
Following the Silvester Patent of 31st December 1851, Franz Joseph ruled the Austrian 
Empire as an absolute monarch.212 In 1853 he subordinated the war ministry to the 
Armeeoberkommando, thereafter the Emperor in effect let the army administer itself, 
which he personally represented in the conference of ministers.213 His general adjutant, 
Field Marshall Count Grünne subsequently exercised great influence over military 
matters. It was the camarilla around Count Grünne and his protégé Baron Wimpffen, 
whom Maximilian replaced as commander of the navy, in which Maximilian’s  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appointment was criticized the hardest on the grounds that the Archduke was too young 
and inexperienced.214 
Nevertheless, naval circles in Trieste were delighted with Maximilian’s appointment. 
As Admiral Tegetthoff rightly remarked in a letter to his father: ‘the Archduke may be 
young and inexperienced, but he has the interests of the navy really at heart’.215 
However, the events in 1848 and the outbreak of the Crimean War had changed the 
interest of the Habsburg Empire, and therefore of her navy, considerably. Before the 
revolution the main tasks of the Austrian navy had been to show her flag in the 
Mediterranean and to protect Austria’s trade interests in the Levant by stationing ships 
in Constantinople. However, the Crimean War had proved that Sardinia-Piedmont 
possessed a navy that was superior to that of Austria and that the government of Victor 
Emmanuel II still harboured the idea of unifying Italy under its leadership, although to 
achieve this aim the Sardinians would have to enlist the support of a great power such 
as France. As a result of these changed circumstances, the task of the Austrian navy 
now became twofold: firstly, to prevent any revolutionary spark from spreading from 
Italy to other provinces of the empire; and secondly, to defend the coastal regions since 
the government in Vienna assumed that the navy would not be able to fight the superior 
forces of naval powers like France and Britain in the open sea.216  
Moreover, Maximilian also understood that in addition to these military tasks the 
Habsburg Empire had to “show the flag” overseas in order to fulfil economic and 
scientific aims. Thus Maximilian initiated a large-scale scientific expedition during 
which the frigate Novara became the first Austrian warship to circumnavigate the 
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globe.217 The fact that Maximilian promoted scientific voyages was also part of the 
wider rivalry between Prussia and Austria for the mastery of Germany. The German 
Confederation had sold off most of its fleet in 1853,218 however, Prussia had retained 
and expanded its own fleet. By 1860 the Prussian force reached fifty-five ships and was 
thus rivalling the size of the Austrian fleet.219 Thus the scientific voyages did not only 
serve to raise the prestige of the Austrian navy but also asserted Habsburg protection for 
Germans overseas.  
However, in order to be able to surpass the Prussian force and to defend the coastal 
regions of the empire it was necessary to reform the training of the officers and the 
crews and to modernise the fleet. The former was the easier issue to tackle and 
Maximilian relocated the Imperial Navy Academy to Fiume on the grounds that the old 
academy in Trieste had become too small and that the training provided there had been 
too much in line with the principles of the army and land warfare.220 In addition, 
Maximilian actively promoted the Germanisation of the fleet; this process had already 
begun for political reasons after the mutiny of six out of seven Habsburg naval 
personnel in 1848.221 As a consequence Italian sailors were seen as unreliable and in the 
following years Italians were system replaced by Germans and Austrians. Following the 
example of the army, Maximilian also made German the language of command in 
1858.222 All these measures combined gave the Habsburg fleet an appearance of being 
truly German, which was important in the rivalry with Prussia for mastery over 
Germany.  
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However, modernising the fleet proved to be a much harder task to realize; by the mid-
1850s Austria still relied almost entirely on sailing ships to show her flag in the 
Mediterranean, supplemented by a handful of paddle steamers, whereas during the 
Crimean War the British deployed a fleet consisting completely of modern screw-
powered warships not just in the Black Sea but also in the Baltic.223 More importantly, 
the Sardinians had deployed an all-steam squadron in support of their expeditionary 
corps in the Crimea, a fact that definitely posed a threat to the Austrian provinces of 
Lombardy and Venetia.224  
It was thus necessary to modernise the fleet as quickly as possible. Until this point 
Austria largely relied on ships being constructed abroad, mainly in Britain, a 
dependencing on foreign know-how and on foreign capacities to build the required 
amount of ships. Moreover, fears that British authorities would seize the screw-frigate 
Radetzky, which had been built in Britain, for use in their war effort against Russia in 
the Crimean War also underscored the dangers of such dependence. Consequently, 
Franz Joseph, on Maximilian’s insistence, ordered the construction of a new dry dock in 
Pola and Maximilian also did not hesitate to build ships in Venice as well.225 By the 
spring of 1855 the Habsburg Empire had four frigates, four corvettes and two paddle 
steamers on patrol in the Mediterranean.226 It is in the light of these achievements that 
Tegetthoff’s praise of Maximilian has to be understood: 
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The Archduke has set to work with energy and zeal. He goes into every detail and I 
feel he will at last bring about a thorough re-organisation of the service which 
Dahlerup and Wimpffen [Maximilian’s predecessors] merely bungled with their 
superficial policy.227 
 
Although Maximilian had set the Austrian navy on the long and tedious process of 
modernisation, his achievements nevertheless paled in comparison to the forces of 
Britain, France, or even Sardinia-Piedmont. Austria was just catching up on the last 
round of technological advances, when the next break-through in naval technology just 
lay over the horizon. In October 1855 the French had successfully used armor-plated 
floating batteries to bombard Russia’s Black Sea forts. The invention of iron-clad 
warships involved unprecedented expenditure for all European powers.228  
Nevertheless, Maximilian managed to obtain Franz Joseph’s permission to replace some 
old sailing brigs with modern warships.229 However, the disposal of the old ships only 
covered a fraction of the cost of the new ones. As a consequence, Maximilian’s reform 
and modernisation of the fleet was extremely expensive and naval spending exceeded 
the legal limit every year after 1850; in 1856 the service received more than double the 
authorized sum, prompting Count Grünne to protest on the army’s behalf.230 
Throughout his time as commander-in-chief of the navy Maximilian had to struggle to 
secure adequate funding for the navy against the opposition of a series of government 
ministers. From the opposition of Count Schwarzenberg in the 1850’s to that of Count 
Rechberg in the 1860’s, most government ministers considered the navy a needless 
luxury that a financially strapped Habsburg state could ill afford. Moreover, Franz 
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Joseph had a rather distant relationship to the navy; for all of his life he considered 
himself the ruler of a continental power.231 It was thus Maximilian’s direct access to the 
Emperor that prevented any cuts ‘in the promised [funds, which were supposed to be] 
used for development’.232 The level of independence from the Armeeoberkommando 
that Maximilian had exercised ever since taking command of the fleet became official in 
August 1856 when Franz Joseph formally decreed the separation of the navy from the 
army effective at the start of the 1857 fiscal year and the establishment of a navy 
ministry independent of the army’s high command. Maximilian’s policies during the 
1850s provided the fleet with better personnel and facilities, but the high costs 
ultimately were to cause a backlash against the navy in the 1860s. 
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2.4. MIRAMAR 
 
 
 
When Maximilian went to Trieste in order to begin his naval training he had rented the 
Villa Lazarovich; although the villa consisted of several luxurious buildings and was 
surrounded by a big park, Maximilian thought that after his appointment of commander 
of the navy the villa was too small and did not adequately reflect the prestige of his new 
position. Consequently, Maximilian was looking for a place where he could build a 
suitable residence for himself in Trieste and the surrounding area; in the end he found 
the rocky promontory of Grignano northwest of Trieste. In the winter of 1855/56 the 
architect Carl Junker began drawing up construction plans, at the beginning of 1856 
Maximilian bought the grounds and in March of the same year construction works 
began. The interior design was done by Julius Hoffmann and the twenty-two hectare big 
park was planned by the court gardener Laube and by his successor Jelinek.233 After a 
construction time of four years Maximilian and his wife could move into the ground 
floor of the castle. In constructing Miramar Maximilian had evoked his childhood 
dream of ‘a beautiful house with a garden by the sea’;234 the castle with its whitewashed 
towers and granite terraces stood on a rocky promontory above the Adriatic Sea; this 
unique position gave it the impression of rising directly out of the sea without any 
connection to the earth. Maximilian envisaged Miramar as a fairytale castle: 
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Aus blauer Fluth zum Himmelsblau / In Blüthenduft emporgestiegen / Ist Miramar ein 
Märchenbau / Des Dichters Herz in Lust zu wiegen. 
 
[Out of the blue tide to the blue of the heavens / Rising with the scent of flowers / Is 
Miramar a fairytale castle / To fill a poets heart with joy.]235 
 
The idea behind the romanticised vision of a fairytale castle was that the owner could 
create his own world, in which he could escape from the real world and its banalities. 
Maximilian imagined that in his own world in Miramar he could ‘renounce the vanities 
of the world, to live far removed from the deceit, the weariness and the fraud (…), 
content to retire to a serene and sunny climate, studying the arts and sciences and 
cultivating my garden’.236 Since Miramar had been constructed in accordance to the 
wishes and ideas of Maximilian, who had taken a lively interest in the planning of the 
castle and who had been informed and consulted about every stage of its construction, it 
is necessary to look at Miramar at greater detail. 
 
 
 
2.4.1. THE ARCHITECTUAL STYLE 
 
 
It proved to be rather difficult to identify the predominant architectural style in the 
nineteenth century; the classical style that had prevailed in the second half of the 
eighteenth century was slowly being replaced by other architectural styles such as neo- 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renaissance and neo-gothic. Although Miramar incorporated classical as well as 
byzantine elements, the castle was mainly built in a Norman style, a contemporary term 
for neo-gothic architecture. The Norman style represented the historical revival of 
eleventh century English and Italian architectural features. In the construction of 
Miramar several Norman elements were used: the simplicity of the building, the square 
tower and the pointed arches.237 The emphasis of the Norman style with its connotations 
of German / Nordic ideals of austerity, reserve and melancholy can also be interpreted 
as a symbol of the claim to power of the Austrians over the Italian population and in 
consequence of the Habsburg dynasty’s right to rule in Northern Italy.238 Maximilian’s 
conviction that it was the Habsburgs’ right to rule over Northern Italy was furthermore 
demonstrated in the fact that battlements and defence towers gave Miramar the 
impression of a well-fortified castle; such defence fortifications were no longer 
necessary in the nineteenth century but they gave the castle and the Habsburgs’ rule in 
Northern Italy a certain sense of legitimacy and continuity dating back to the Middle 
Ages.239  
 
 
 
2.4.2. THE INTERIOR DESIGN 
 
 
Although the exterior of Miramar already displayed the Habsburg dynasty’s right to 
rule, it is in the interior of Miramar that Maximilian attempted to legitimize the 
Habsburg as well as his claim to power. Throughout the interior design of Miramar  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there are constant historical references and above all the paintings refer to the 
archduke’s perception of himself as a member of Habsburg family. For instance, 
Maximilian commissioned a large-scale genealogical tree beginning with Rudolf I and 
ending with the medallions of Charlotte and himself.240 For the “Hall of the Monarchs” 
Maximilian commissioned fifteen portraits of contemporary monarchs such as 
Napoleon III and Ludwig II of Bavaria; initially the centrepiece of this gallery should 
have a portrait of Franz Joseph in full regalia but after Maximilian had accepted the 
Mexican throne in 1864 it was replaced by a portrait of himself as emperor of 
Mexico.241 Thus Maximilian legitimized his (future) position by placing himself in the 
centre of these other currently ruling monarchs. The fact that Maximilian saw himself as 
a member in the traditions of the Habsburg dynasty culminated in the “Historical Hall”, 
where a portrait completed in 1867 depicted Maximilian with the regalia of a medieval 
king: the crimson cloak; the eagle that hovers over his head; the personifications of 
three continents (Europe, Africa and America) that offer him their treasures; and the 
personifications of the fine arts that listen to his words.242 Of course, this mystical 
portrait raises the question whether the often quoted picture of Maximilian as a liberal 
and enlightened archduke is actually true or whether Maximilian was unable to liberate 
himself from the Catholic-conservative ideological corset of his education. It is a 
question that keeps cropping up throughout Maximilian’s life and will be examined 
again and again in this thesis. 
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2.5. MAXIMILIAN’S DIPLOMATIC MISSION TO PARIS IN 1856 
 
 
 
In the spring of 1856 the emperor sent Maximilian on his first diplomatic mission to 
Paris to assess the atmosphere at the court of Napoleon III after the Crimean War. 
Austria’s policy of armed neutrality had left her in an awkward political and diplomatic 
position; at the conference in Paris in 1856 the former enemies had been united against 
the peacemonger Austria. The new Russian Tsar Alexander II could not forgive Franz 
Joseph for not coming to his aid, while Russia had helped Austria crushing the 
revolution in Hungary in 1849; and Britain and France could not bring themselves to 
trust an ally, who had remained sitting on the fence. Most historians have passed severe 
judgement on the policy followed by Franz Joseph and his advisor Count Buol during 
the Crimean War.243 According to some, Austria should have associated herself with 
Russia to preserve the alliance between absolutist monarchs that saved her in 1849. 
According to others, she should have cast her lot with the Western powers, when she 
would have emerged with allies and with her prestige unimpaired. As it was, she had 
placed herself between two chairs, since her policy of armed neutrality was essentially a 
defensive calculation due to the possible threat of revolution within the empire. 
Moreover, the cost of raising and equipping an army would have put even more fiscal 
pressure on Austria as her financial situation was already very weak. Count Buols’s 
question to friend and foe alike summed up the awkward situation Austria found herself 
in: ‘Did you really believe that Austria could have risked joining the war without 
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Press, Los Angeles, 1980; Baumgart, W., The Crimean War, 1853-1856, Oxford University 
Press, London, 1999 
79 
 
risking universal war and revolution and thus the final ruin of the Empire?’244. In the 
context of this political climate the Austrian ambassador to Paris Count Hübner 
suggested that the only way to retrieve the situation was to send an Archduke to Paris as 
this would flatter the vanity of Napoleon III and his upstart court and would pave the 
way to a better understanding between the governments in Paris and Vienna.245 Thus the 
birth of an heir to the French crown provided Franz Joseph with an excellent 
opportunity to send Maximilian to Paris with a personal message of congratulations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5.1. THE PARVENU EMPEROR NAPOLEON III 
 
 
As already demonstrated in this thesis, Maximilian had been conservative and 
nationalistic, which led him to harbour preconceived notions and prejudices about 
people and nations that were foreign to him; in the case of France it can be argued that 
Maximilian’s upbringing had been strictly anti-French. Archduchess Sophie, along with 
most of the nobility and the Austrian population, were bitterly anti-French and regarded  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Paris as the origin of all the troubles in Europe during the last seventy years. 
Maximilian was thus highly prejudiced against Napoleon III before he even met him; in 
his private letters to Franz Joseph Maximilian showed himself highly biased against 
Napoleon III, whom he repeatedly called a parvenu and who in Maximilian’s opinion 
was ‘utterly lacking in nobility’.246 Maximilian’s negative opinion about Napoleon III 
derived partly from the fact that most European ruling dynasties regarded the Bonaparte 
family as an usurper, which was reflected by refusal of several Swedish and German 
noble families to marry their daughters to Louis Napoleon Bonaparte and partly from 
Maximilian’s conviction that the Habsburg dynasty was superior to the Bonaparte 
dynasty. The reasons for these convictions were manifold: the Habsburgs were the 
longest reigning dynasty in Europe, whereas Napoleon I had become emperor only 
recently in 1804; Louis Napoleon had crowned himself emperor of the French thus 
stressing the fact that he ruled by the will of the people, whereas the Habsburg emperors 
ruled by the grace of God; and finally that unlike at the court of Vienna where the 
Spanish etiquette decreed that only the highest ranks of the nobility had access to court, 
the rules at the French court were much more relaxed and access was granted to those 
who had gained noble titles during the reign of Napoleon I. Bearing these different ideas 
of royalty in mind, Maximilian’s less than favourable assessment of Napoleon’s court 
becomes understandable; in his opinion it was a court where ‘the company was (…) 
distinguished by their disgusting dress and tasteless behaviour [and for the courtiers it 
was] often (…) hard to maintain themselves on a proper level’.247 
However, within a week the tone of Maximilian’s letters changed; he seemed to have 
overcome his suspicions and prejudices against the French emperor. Most 
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contemporaries agree that Napoleon III possessed a certain charm and it appeared that 
Maximilian also slowly succumbed to this charm: 
 
I breakfast every day with the Emperor and the Empress. Napoleon is one of these 
men, whose personality does not attract at first but who gains on knowing through his 
quiet charm and great simplicity of manner (…). Once he got over his shyness, he 
becomes very expansive and the more I get to know him, the more I feel he trusts 
me.248 
 
This trust and sympathy must have been mutual for at the intimate breakfast parties at 
St. Cloud the hosts and guest chatted without reserve even about such explosive topics 
as the Italian Question. After the revolution in 1848 Austria had retained the two 
provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, a fact that had in effect ended the project of Italian 
unification for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the Austrian government feared that 
Louis Napoleon was sympathetic to the ideal of Italian nationalism.249 This fear was 
indeed justified as the Italian Question was of great interest to Napoleon from 1857 
onwards and the left-wing opposition in the Corps Législatif was also passionately in 
favour of Italian unification.250 In the end, Maximilian’s mission was a success with 
regards to re-establishing relations with the French court but he was unable to extract 
the promise of Napoleon III not to interfere in Italy. With hindsight the visit was later to 
have fateful consequences; if those two ambitious dreamers Maximilian and Louis 
Napoleon had never met and been mutually attracted to each other, the former might                                                         248 The shyness that Maximilian noted may have been due to the fact that Napoleon III was 
aware of the rumours surrounding Maximilian’s birth; for if those were true than Maximilian 
and not Louis Napoleon would have been the rightful heir to the French throne. 
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have never got involved in the ill-fated Mexican adventure. As it was, Maximilian left 
Paris with a feeling of sympathy and admiration for Napoleon III. Moreover, he was 
probably far more impressed by his visit than he would have ever admitted in his letters 
to Vienna, in which he expressed his happiness ‘to turn the back on this centre of 
civilisation’.251 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6. MAXIMILIAN’S MARRIAGE TO CHARLOTTE OF BELGIUM 
 
 
 
With his diplomatic mission in Paris completed, Maximilian proceeded to Belgium, 
ostensibly to pay a courtesy visit to King Leopold I. However, a letter written by 
Archduchess Sophie suggested that at that point in time Maximilian was beginning to 
consider whom he should marry: ‘I [Archduchess Sophie] told the Emperor yesterday in 
the theatre about your marriage intentions, which he did not reject, though he cannot 
understand why you would look for [this princess] in England or Spain’.252 The crucial 
point in Maximilian’s considerations about marriage were surely the fact that his 
brother Franz Joseph had married the Princess Elisabeth in 1856 and that any male  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offspring of this marriage would replace him as the next in line to the Habsburg throne. 
Moreover, Archduchess Sophie’s letter pointed out that Maximilian had apparently no 
idea whom he should marry; his only requirement seemed to have been that his future 
wife should be from one of the leading and most influential dynasties in Europe. To 
what extent Maximilian was actually looking for a wife in Brussels cannot be deduced 
from his correspondence but it can be assumed that Maximilian was aware that King 
Leopold had a sixteen-years old daughter, who he claimed ‘promised to be the most 
beautiful princess in Europe’.253 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6.1.  A DYNASTIC MARRIAGE? 
 
 
Charlotte for her part clearly preferred Maximilian to all her other suitors; her letters 
and her dairies showed that she very quickly fell in love with the young and handsome 
archduke, whom she called ‘charming in every way’.254 This appeared to be rather 
uncharacteristic of the sixteen-year-old princess, whom contemporaries described as 
intelligent but serious and as hard and critical of herself as she was of others. King 
Leopold regarded a possible marriage of his daughter with an Austrian archduke 
favourably: on the one hand the marriage between Charlotte and Maximilian would 
strengthen Belgium’s ties with Austria, which could be beneficial in the event that the  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French emperor Napoleon III ever tried to annex the small neighbour country; on the 
other hand having the younger brother of the Austrian emperor as a son-in-law would 
have greatly enhanced the prestige of the House of Saxe-Coburg, which had become 
one of the leading dynasties in Europe only recently, and thus fitted perfectly into 
Leopold’s political schemes. It was not without reason that journalists called Leopold 
the “Nestor of Europe”; by a combination of astuteness and diplomacy, he had 
succeeded in raising his small country to the rank of a European power and in turning it 
into a model of a constitutional monarchy with freedom of speech, a free press and free 
elections, though the suffrage was limited. Moreover, Leopold’s marriage policy had 
elevated the House of Saxe-Coburg to princes of the blood, related to half the ruling 
families in Europe. For instance, Leopold’s sister was Queen Victoria’s mother and his 
brother was the father of Victoria’s husband, Prince Albert. These relations offered him 
the possibility to give shrewd political advice to his relatives in the European royal 
family.  
Maybe Maximilian had some hesitations about having such a shrewd diplomatic player 
as a father-in-law, for he did not ask for Charlotte’s hand in marriage before October 
1856 and their engagement was officially announced in November 1856.255 However, it 
is not only the long time span between the first encounter between Maximilian and 
Charlotte and him asking for her hand in marriage that raises questions as to whether 
Maximilian was actually ever in love with Charlotte or whether it was a marriage of 
convenience for him. There is some reason to suggest that Maximilian married 
Charlotte for financial reasons: by 1856 Maximilian was spending considerably more 
than his apanage. Above all, his building project in Miramar cost a fortune. This would 
also explain Maximilian’s rather undignified haggling for a higher dowry. As Belgium                                                         
255 Even King Leopold thought that Maximilian’s hesitations were due to the fact that he 
regarded him as a ‘great diplomat, who always has political reasons for every step he takes’ -  
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was a constitutional state the amount of the dowry could not be settled merely by 
bargaining between the Austrian and Belgian Foreign Offices; the deputies of the 
Belgian parliament had to be convinced that the dowry was not excessive. Maximilian 
called the ‘whole affair [a way] to inspire the unprejudiced observer with a profound 
disgust for constitutional shams’,256 a rather odd comment for a Habsburg prince who 
was supposed to harbour liberal and enlightened ideas. After a lot of negotiations the 
amount of the dowry was settled: Charlotte received 100.000 florins and further yearly 
20.000 florins as needle money [à titre d’épingles] and Franz Joseph for his part granted 
140.000 florins as a wedding gift.257 Moreover, it is rather telling that in none of his 
letters to Franz Joseph during his first stay in Brussels in May 1856 is Charlotte 
mentioned nor did he send a report about his marriage to Charlotte on 27th July 1857 to 
Vienna. The only time Maximilian’s mentioned Charlotte was in a letter to his brother 
Karl Ludwig in which he described his wife-to-be; however, the description does not 
give the impression of a man in love: ‘She is small, I am tall, which is as it should be. 
She is brunette and I am fair, which is also good. She is very clever, which is a bit 
worrying, but no doubt I will get over that’258. Although this description was probably a 
joke between brothers, it also raises the wider question of Maximilian’s view of women. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
256 Quoted in. Ridley, J., Maximilian and Juárez, 1992, p. 55 
257 Anders, F. & Eggert, K., Maximilian von Mexiko, 1982, p. 31 
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2.6.2. MAXIMILIAN’S VIEW OF WOMEN  
 
 
Maximilian’s comment about the intelligence of his wife, which he had no doubt that he 
would overcome, reflected the attitude of society towards women and their role in 
society in the nineteenth century. The prevalent view was that women were the weaker, 
less able and less intelligent sex, whose place was in the home, whereas men dealt with 
the complex matters of the outside world.259 During his journey to Brazil in 1859 
Maximilian revealed in his letters to Charlotte that he believed in the idea that women 
were the physically weaker sex, who should stay at home while men explored the 
world. Maximilian wrote that he was glad that Charlotte had stayed behind on Madeira 
for he was sure that ‘the journey would have been too exhausting [and] the country for a 
woman almost impossible’260 and that ‘only a man, who can overcome the greatest 
difficulties and deprivations, can achieve things’.261  In the nineteenth century women 
were not only regarded as physically inferior to men but they were also seen to be 
essentially different in character from men; they were seen as less rational and less 
intelligent.262 As a consequence, a husband was supposed to be responsible for his wife, 
while her duty was to obey him. Maximilian’s ideas about the place of women in 
society appeared to have concurred with the view in society at large, for on a visit to 
Gibraltar he commented on the British custom, which required the ladies to retire after 
dinner: 
 
                                                        
259D’Cruze, S., ‘Woman and the Family’; In: Women’s History in Britain – an Introduction, 
1850-1945, Oxford University Press, London, 1995, p.53 
260 Ratz, K. Vor Sehnsucht nach dir vergehend. Der private Briefwechsel zwischen Maximilian 
von Mexiko und seiner Frau Charlotte, Amalthea, Vienna, 2000, p. 50 
261 Ratz, K., Sehnsucht , 2000, p. 51 
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After the toasts, the ladies left the table to await the arrival of the gentlemen in the 
saloon, who still comfortably gave themselves up to wine and conversation. It seems 
strange when the ladies, at the desire of the gentlemen, humbly march away from the 
table. Many blame this habit as barbarous; I like it. The ladies ought to learn that they 
have to obey the men.263 
 
Maximilian’s opinion on the role of women in society did not only reflect the prevalent 
view of society but were also in accordance with his Catholic upbringing and the 
teachings of the Catholic Church. For centuries the Catholic Church regarded women as 
inferior to men both by nature and by law, a conviction that was mainly based on the 
role of Eve in the Fall of Man.264 However, Maximilian’s view of the place of women in 
society was rather at odds with the roles Archduchess Sophie and his wife Charlotte 
played in his life. The former clearly dominated her husband Franz Karl and was 
definitely the centre of the imperial family, whereas the latter was the more decisive 
character in their marriage as well as the driving force behind Maximilian’s actions, 
although he was probably not aware of her influence on his decisions. Nevertheless, 
Maximilian owed his promotion to governor of Lombardy-Venetia on 28th February 
1857 at least partly to his wife; her father King Leopold had asked Franz Joseph to give 
his new son-in-law ‘a position (…), worthy of his high birth and which [would] give 
him at the same time a great scope for action’.265 
 
 
 
                                                        
263 EH. Maximilian, Aus meinem Leben, 1867, Vol. II, p. 128 
264 Henderson, R., Tradition and status of women in the Catholic Church, In: Australian 
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2.7. GOVERNOR OF LOMBARDY-VENETIA 
 
 
 
It was not only the influence of his father-in-law King Leopold I that secured 
Maximilian his new position as governor general of the Lombard-Venetian Kingdom 
but also the fact that Franz Joseph realized that he had to relax the severity in his Italian 
provinces. During the journey of the emperor and the empress through Lombardy-
Venetia in the winter of 1855/56, Franz Joseph had shown himself shocked with the 
degree of open hostility that met the imperial couple, due in part to field marshal 
Radetzky’s harsh and oppressive rule anti-Austrian feelings were running high in the 
two provinces.  A report to the British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston stated ‘that His 
Imperial Majesty was greeted rather coolly by his subjects in Lombardy’.266 However, if 
Franz Joseph was to pursue a more liberal policy in Lombardy-Venetia, it was 
necessary to replace Radetzky with a less hated ruler. Radetzky, who was now ninety 
years old, could be retired on the grounds of age with due thanks for his service.267 As 
Maximilian was generally regarded as having liberal leanings and as he had already 
lived in Trieste for several years and had thus gained some insight into Italian society, 
Franz Joseph appointed Maximilian as governor general of Lombardy-Venetia268 for he 
regarded ‘no one as more fitting [than Maximilian] for this country’.269 
                                                        266 HHSTA, Nachlass Conte Corti, cart. 32 267 After Radetzky’S death in 1858 it was even considered by the imperial family to lay him to 
rest in the Capuchin vaults in Vienna; an honour that was only granted to members of the 
imperial family. 
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2.7.1. THE KINGDOM OF LOMBARDY-VENETIA 
 
 
Although both Lombardy and Venetia had been part of the Habsburg Empire before the 
Napoleonic period, Lombardy since 1714 and Venice since the collapse of the Venetian 
republic in 1797, it was nevertheless at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 that the 
kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia was established.270 Since such a kingdom had never 
existed before, it was a political construct based on the idea of continuity of Habsburg 
rule in the region from the sixteenth century onwards and was consequently used to 
legitimatize Austrian hegemony in northern Italy. Moreover, in order to bind the people 
of Lombardy-Venetia closer to the House of Habsburg emperor Francis I (II) appointed 
members of the imperial family, Archduke Anton Victor (1816-1818) and Archduke 
Rainer (1818-1848), as viceroy. As the representative of the emperor, the main task was 
to incorporate the social elites in Lombardy and Venetia into the social structure of the 
Habsburg Empire and thus to increase their loyalty to the ruling dynasty, a task at which 
both viceroys failed. The social elites, both from the nobility and from the bourgeoisie, 
felt excluded from administrative bodies of the kingdom for in their opinion most of the 
personnel consisted of Austrians or Italian-speaking officers from South Tyrol; thus 
these elites felt they lacked the necessary access to the political institutions to push 
through their agendas.271 The nobility was alienated even further from the state by the 
fact that many titles that had been granted in the Napoleonic era were not recognized by 
the Austrian regime. Therefore, many members of the Lombard and Venetian nobility 
                                                        270 Toelle, J. Das tanzende General-Gouvernement. Die kulturpolitischen Ideen des Erzherzogs 
Ferdinand Maximilians als Generalgouverneur des Lombardo-Venetischen Königreiches, 1857-
1859. In: Römische Historische Mitteilungen, Vienna, 2007, p. 417 271 Merrigi, M., Amministrazione e classi sociale nel Lombardo-Veneto, Edizioni Studio Tesi, 
Turin, 1987, p. 119 
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were not received at the court of Archduke Rainer and as a result “rival courts” sprang 
up in both provinces.272  
These latent resentments against Austrian rule finally unloaded themselves in several 
riots: in November 1847 there was an uprising in Milan, in Padua there were student 
demonstrations and the year 1848 began with the sciopero del fumo, a boycott of 
smoking that was directed against the Austrian monopoly on tobacco. The government 
in Vienna reacted to these developments with increasingly severe repressions, 
reinforced the troops in northern Italy and on 22nd February martial law was declared.273 
The wave of revolutions that spread through Europe also reached the kingdom of 
Lombardy-Venetia: on the 18th March 1848 the Milanese population rose against the 
Habsburg government and after five days of intense street fighting, forced the Austrian 
troops to evacuate the city and created a provisional government; and on 21st March a 
popular revolt drove the Austrians out and a Venetian republic was declared. However, 
apart from the desire to overthrow Austrian rule there was little agreement amongst the 
revolutionaries. The republicans favoured an independent state, whereas the nobility 
and the larger part of the bourgeoisie were mainly concerned with protecting their own 
interests. These elites therefore supported an intervention by the king of Sardinia-
Piedmont Charles Albert in order to control the republican movement; on 26th March 
1848 the Piedmontese forces entered Milan. Charles Albert's hesitations led, however, 
to a very indecisive military campaign and an opportunity to eliminate Radetzky's 
retreating army was missed. The Austrians withdrew to the Quadrilateral where they 
could rest and wait for reinforcements.274 Bearing this situation in mind it is hardly 
surprising that referenda held in the Venetian provinces in May and in June in 
Lombardy produced the result that 99.9 per cent of the population supported an                                                         272 Merrigi, M., Amministrazione, 1987 p. 122-127 273 Ibid, p. 327f. 274 Ibid, p. 333f. 
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annexation of the two provinces by Piedmont.275 Piedmont's territorial expansion was, 
however, very short lived. In June Marshal Radetzky, with the help of reinforcements, 
was able to capture all of Venetia and made preparations to enter Lombardy. Charles 
Albert, on the other hand, had no real plan of action; his army was ill supplied and led 
by poor officers. In July Radetzky received another 20,000 soldiers and was superior to 
his opponents in army size and firepower. As he advanced, Radetzky was welcomed by 
many peasants who were disillusioned with the provisional government, which kept 
some of the heaviest taxes and imposed on them a greater burden of the war costs than 
on the great landowners.276 On 22nd July Radetzky attacked the Piedmontese forces and, 
after five days of fighting, defeated them in the battle of Custoza. On 7th August 
Radetzky's troops entered Milan.277 The defeat at Custoza effectively eliminated the 
union of Piedmont and Venice; throughout the winter of 1848/49 Venice was besieged 
by the Austrians.278 In March 1849 the Piedmontese government renewed the hostilities 
with Austria but was defeated decisively at the battle of Novara after less than a week of 
fighting and had to seek peace.279 Following Novara, the Austrians appealed to Venice 
to surrender but the Venetians refused. In the long run, however, Venice could not 
resist; the Austrians bombarded it, supplies ran short, famine spread, and epidemics 
broke out. After some negotiations, the city surrendered on 22nd August 1849.280 
The experiences during the 1848 revolution had irrevocably altered the relationship 
between the elites and the state: the former now actively supported independence from 
Habsburg rule and the latter mistrusted its Italian subjects, enforcing more and more 
restrictive and oppressive policies. Of course, these measures did not only apply to the                                                         
275 Weber, M.C., Italienbild, 2008, p. 94 
276 Ibid, p. 94 
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Italian provinces of the Habsburg Empire but they were also enforced in those regions 
that had revolted against Austrian rule in 1848, such as Hungary and Bohemia. These 
policies did not only restrict civil rights such as free speech and increase censorship but 
they also limited the autonomy of the two provinces even further by transferring 
administrative responsibilities and institutions to Vienna. However, this was a common 
occurrence in all the provinces the Habsburg Empire after 1848, since the neo-absolutist 
regime attempted to centralize the administrative structure of the empire; the resulting 
administrative became known as the Bach system.281 Moreover, the economic and tax 
obligations towards Vienna that the Lombard-Venetian kingdom had to honour were 
immense; in 1850 and again in 1854 the central government imposed bonds on 
property, trade and industry, which brought a revenue of 38 million florins in Lombardy 
and 24,3 million florins in Venetia in 1854.282 Radetzky, who was appointed governor 
of Lombardy-Venetia after the revolution in 1848, was above all a military commander 
and although he was responsible for any military and civilian matters concerning the 
kingdom, he nevertheless emphasised the military aspects of the administration and 
disregarded the civil ones. In Radetzky’s opinion the civilian administration was too 
lenient with the Italians and the opposition; Radetzky and the military high command 
therefore reacted against any opposition with brutal force, which was possible under the 
provisions of martial law that was imposed on Lombardy-Venetia until 1854. For 
instance, in February 1853 republicans around Mazzini and the Young Italy movement 
organised a small uprising in Milan. Although the insurgency was crushed quickly, 
Radetzky arrested four hundred revolutionaries of whom sixteen were executed.283 
These actions of course increased the unpopularity of Radetzky and Habsburg rule: just 
how much the population despised Radetzky was illustrated by a scene in the theatre,                                                         281 Meriggi, M., Amministrazione, 1987, p. 315 282 Weber, M. C., Italienbild, 2008, p. 96 283 Pesendorfer, F., Eiserne Krone, 1998, p. 261 
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where he got hissed at upon entering.284 In order to relax the situation in Lombardy-
Venetia it was therefore necessary to remove Radetzky from his post and replace him 
by a more moderate governor, who did not have any connections with the reprisals after 
the1848 revolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.7.2. MAXIMILIAN’S NEW POSITION AS GOVERNOR GENERAL OF 
LOMBARDY-VENETIA 
 
 
After Radetzky, the symbol of Austrian suppression in Italy, had retired in December 
1856, Franz Joseph appointed Maximilian as governor of the Lombard-Venetian 
kingdom on 28th February 1857.285 There was widespread disagreement with the 
Viennese government as to how the newly appointed governor should run the two 
provinces: some, like the minister of the interior, argued that Maximilian should hold a 
brilliant court respectively in Milan and Venice for he thought that a governor holding a 
grandiose court could impress and bind the Italians to the government in Vienna. Others 
took a more theological approach and saw Maximilian as the providence of the two 
provinces; and Baron von Bruck recommended that the archduke should establish a 
strong government that could exercise relative independence from the central authorities 
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in Vienna.286 However, as the Bach administration in Vienna was centralising 
administrative structures and institutions throughout the empire, von Bruck’s suggestion 
was unlikely to be fulfilled. Indeed Franz Joseph strictly specified and regulated the 
powers of the governor in the ‘Regulations about the sphere of influence of the 
Governor in the Lombard-Venetian Kingdom’.287 Although Maximilian was the 
‘representative of his Imperial Majesty’ controlling ‘all branches of the civil 
administration in the Lombard-Venetian Kingdom’,288 Franz Joseph nevertheless only 
assigned to him a superficial position, whose ostensible importance was undermined by 
the allocation of powers in the agencies subordinated to the governor. The crucial parts 
of the regulations were the paragraphs four and five, which declared that: ‘The 
Governor is authorized to take all decisions concerning the civil administration’289(§4), 
with the exceptions stated in paragraph five. This exception paragraph, which 
comprised almost half of the regulations, excluded almost all important areas of trade 
from the control of the governor and transferred them to the central authorities in 
Vienna. This included the entire legislature, any alteration of laws or deviations from 
existing regulations as well as any affairs concerning the treasury or foreign relations. In 
more general terms Maximilian was not responsible for ‘any orders of special (…) 
importance’.290 Therefore, Maximilian’s scope for action was comparable to that of 
Archduke Rainer as viceroy before the revolution in 1848; his main purpose was to 
represent and embody the emperor in Lombardy-Venetia in a dignified manner.291 
Maximilian thus represented the glory and power of the house of Habsburg but had in 
effect little administrative powers as most policies were drawn up in Vienna. However,  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this was a stark contrast to the powers that Radetzky possessed; as the General, Civil- 
and Military Governor Radetzky had been able to set the political agenda himself 
without much interference from the central government in Vienna, which meant that he 
had possessed and exercised real power in Lombardy-Venetia. However, unlike in the 
case of Radetzky Maximilian’s scope for action was not only limited in the area of 
civilian administration but he also lacked the command over the army. After the 
dismissal of Radetzky the command of the Austrian army in Italy had been given to 
Count Gyulai, which meant that in effect there now existed a strict separation between 
the civil and the military power.292 The new governor thus possessed neither the 
military power, which Radetzky had had, nor the prestige and authority of a viceroy, 
which had distinguished the last viceroy, Archduke Rainer. Maximilian was painfully 
aware of these limitations of his position as governor when he complained that ‘upon 
being appointed as governor of the Lombard-Venetian Kingdom His Majesty has not 
given me a ministry but a chancellery’.293 It was not an office that could act 
independently but could only execute direct orders from the central government in 
Vienna. In short the position of governor held a lot of prestige for Maximilian but only 
little real power; a fact that was partly a result of the fears of Franz Joseph and his 
ministers that Maximilian might interfere in the politics of the central government and 
partly a consequence of the Bach system, which limited the authority of the governors 
and centralised power in the government in Vienna. 
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2.7.3. ‘LA GUERRE DE LA COQUETTERIE’ 
 
 
If Franz Joseph and the Viennese government had believed that it would be enough to 
merely replace Radetzky with the young and supposedly liberal archduke then 
Maximilian’s entry in Venice proved them wrong. Instead of cheering crowds the new 
governor was greeted by ‘many gondolas [that waited] in the port of San Marco; but the 
people in them were cold like the unfriendly March evening; only a few cheers could be 
heard and [even] those sounded forced’.294 This frosty reception showed Maximilian 
that in order to establish a successful government in Lombardy-Venetia it was necessary 
for him to bind those circles of Milanese and Venetian society that were opposed to 
Austrian rule to his court and ultimately to the government in Vienna. In order to 
achieve this aim Maximilian began what he called a ‘guerre de la coquetterie’295 against 
the nobility and the social elites. The idea that it would be possible to create a sense of 
dynastic loyalty amongst the aristocracy and the local elites by granting favours and 
giving them access to court was based on Maximilian’s belief in certain stereotypes and 
national characteristics concerning Italy and the Italians. From his travels in Italy he had 
concluded that ‘flattery is a characteristic of Italy’;296 consequently, it was necessary to 
flatter the Italians in order to prevent the rise of ‘the Italian’s original sin – the lust to 
conspire’297 against Habsburg rule. 
Therefore, it was of pivotal importance for Maximilian to create a brilliant court; this 
would enhance his own standing and prestige, giving him the power to grant favours 
such as attendance at balls and dinners, which in return the Milanese and Venetian 
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nobility would regard as a privilege. He believed that ‘once the court is the centre of 
(…) the elegant Milanese society (…) then the lines of resistance will thin out’.298 In 
accordance with this concept, Maximilian began to gradually widen access to court; 
many members of the nobility in the past had been denied attendance at court due to the 
fact that titles which had been granted during the Napoleonic era were not recognised 
by the Austrian government or due to a marriage outside the highest circles of society of 
one of their ancestors.299 However, as it appeared to be impossible to disentangle the 
complex family structures within the Milanese and Venetian aristocracy, Maximilian in 
the end granted access to court to all noblemen and their wives.300 Moreover, at the 
regular court dinners and balls Maximilian deviated from etiquette and opened the 
access to court beyond the ordinary circles; he consciously included not only the 
aristocracy but also the new elites in his invitations. The description of a ball given by 
Maximilian during the carnival season of 1858 illustrated his attempts to widen the 
access to court: 
 
The ball was attended by 210 gentlemen and 70 ladies of the Italian aristocracy, by 
more than 100 [people] in the fields of industry, commerce, science, the arts and by 
229 lawyers and their wives; and everyone acted jovially, unceremoniously and 
contently next to the numerous representatives of the bureaucracy and of the soldiers, 
who were also present. On this evening there was an atmosphere of true harmony and 
of that liberal spirit of mutual civility that the Archduke had always intended for these 
social circles; it was a mirror of the Parisian society where the different parties were 
brought together in a Salon by intellect and decency.301 
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This brief description of the ball revealed Maximilian’s elitist-conservative concept of 
society: for Maximilian the representatives all classes were synonymous with those who 
possessed intellect and decency, which of course were synonymous with the members 
of the aristocracy and the social elites; thus, he did not consider anyone else fit for 
admission into the higher circles of society. Moreover, the fact that access to court was 
not only given to the aristocracy but also to others appeared to be a revolutionary deed, 
although the Archduke supposedly entertained liberal ideas: ‘not only the gentry but 
also the nobles in the fields of intellect, (…) of science and the arts, as well as the 
nobles of the civil life were welcome at the court of the Archduke’.302 
However, not everyone viewed Maximilian’s ‘guerre de la coquetterie’ with pleasure. 
The Austrian officers stationed in Lombardy-Venetia resented Maximilian’s pro-Italian 
course that found them ‘excluded from the balls (…) for fear that the sight of their 
uniform might offend the delicate susceptibilities of the Italian ladies’.303 Nor did the 
aristocracy in Venice or Milan show themselves impressed by the efforts of the 
archduke. The creation of a brilliant court in Milan and Venice might have appeased the 
Italian nobility some twenty years earlier but in 1857 they did not only demand access 
to the high society but also to the high offices of the state, which were often denied to 
them and given to German officials. Maximilian thus failed to bind the social elites to 
the court and he had to admit that the majority of the nobility ‘remained in a more or 
less unchanged hostile position’304 towards Habsburg rule in Lombardy-Venetia.  
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2.7.4. MAXIMILIAN’S PROPOSALS FOR POLITICAL REFORMS IN 
LOMBARDY-VENETIA 
 
 
As already indicated, Maximilian’s powers as governor of Lombardy-Venetia were 
relatively limited; his main purpose was to represent the emperor in the two provinces. 
Nevertheless, despite his limited range for action, Maximilian attempted to change the 
political situation in the kingdom by stressing the civilian aspects of the administration. 
Under Radetzky the Lombard-Venetian kingdom had been turned into merely a military 
ministry that governed the provinces according to military needs and concerns thus 
giving the military the chance to exercise both military and civilian powers.305 
Therefore, it was of critical importance for Maximilian to establish his authority over 
that of the military in civil matters and thus to create a civil government. His attempts to 
bind the local elites to his court can be seen as a move towards civilian government as 
well as the fact that he invited various jurists and economists to take part in the 
reorganisation of the provinces, which years of military government had reduced to the 
state of economic depression. A direct consequence of this measure was the 
establishment of a discount bank granting small loans to manufacturers of silk, which in 
those days provided the chief means of livelihood in Lombardy. Maximilian saw to it 
that Milan, like Paris and Vienna, was given a public works programme, with a new 
square in front of the Teatro dell Scala, and plans for setting off to greater advantage the 
facade of the cathedral by more than doubling the seize of the Piazza del Duomo. The 
new governor also encouraged agrarian enterprises such as the drainage schemes of the 
Piano di Spagna marshlands at the head of Lake Como or in the Po valley.306 Moreover,  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Maximilian inaugurated a public lottery in aid of the distressed area of Valtellina and he 
was the first to arrive at the scene of disaster when floods devastated whole districts of 
the Po valley in October 1857, leaving thousands of people homeless.307 The record of 
Maximilian’s first nine months was impressive, not least because of his skill in 
persuading the Emperor to sign over one hundred political pardons outside the 
provisions of earlier amnesties and did everything in his power to expedite the 
repatriation of political exiles, whereas Count Gyulai refused to apply for any pardons 
for deserters or any Lombard, who had fought on the side of Piedmont in 1848.308  
Although his record was impressive, Maximilian was nevertheless not satisfied with his 
achievements; as in the case of the navy Maximilian attempted to gain greater 
independence from the central government in Vienna for himself and for the kingdom 
of Lombardy-Venetia. In July 1858 Maximilian came to Vienna with proposals for 
giving Lombardy-Venetia autonomy unknown anywhere else in the empire since ‘after 
a one-year (…) assessment [he thought that] the country had reason to complain’.309 
Maximilian’s concept comprised the ideas of both federalism and the principal of 
subsidiarity for he argued that ‘the principle of administrative unity of the empire 
should be openly and decidedly abandoned’310 and that ‘all administrative matters [that 
only concerned Lombardy-Venetia but not the whole empire should be treated] as 
internal affairs of the Italian provinces and should be ceded  (…) to the local 
authorities’.311 Maximilian’s ideas were the complete opposite of the highly centralised 
Bach system; in effect he proposed a federal reform of the administrative structure of 
the neo-absolutist regime in the Habsburg Empire, which ever since the time of Joseph 
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II had been aiming to centralize the administration in the hands of the government in 
Vienna. 
At first glance Maximilian’s proposals appeared to be based on liberal and enlightened 
ideas of government; but his ideas concerning the establishment of a senate revealed his 
conservative view of government. The senate was supposed to be made up of 
representatives of the Catholic Church, the nobility and wealthy landowners, which 
handed power to the old elites and practically excluded all members of the bourgeoisie 
unless they were wealthy landowners.312 However, even if the senate had been founded 
on a broader basis, its powers would nevertheless have been rather limited as 
Maximilian envisioned it more to be a consultative institution. According to his 
proposal the senate would possess the right to ‘make suggestions about all policies and 
institutions’ concerning Lombardy-Venetia and ‘to give reports about issues’313 but only 
if asked by the government to do so. Therefore, this senate would have been almost 
powerless, as it could not suggest any policies without the permission of the executive 
and as none of its decisions were binding for the government.314 However, this raises 
the question of who actually would have benefitted from the reforms? Unsurprisingly, it 
would have been the governor of Lombardy-Venetia himself. Maximilian’s proposals 
would have increased the power of the governor immensely by uniting all aspects of 
civilian government in the hands of the governor; this included all affairs concerning the 
police, the justice system, censorship, education and taxation.315 The only aspect of 
government that would have been untouched by that reform would have been the 
relation between Lombardy-Venetia and the foreign ministry. A newly created ministry 
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for Lombardy-Venetia would have acted as a liaison between the governor in Milan or 
Venice and the Emperor in Vienna.316  
Although Maximilian’s suggestions for an autonomous Lombard-Venetian Kingdom 
were rather complex and abstract, they were nevertheless considered serious enough by 
the treasury to protest against such a reform.317 The main reason the treasury was 
against a federal reform of the administration was the fact that the central government in 
Vienna would lose a considerable amount of tax from Lombardy-Venetia, which were 
two of the most wealthy and prosperous provinces of the empire. However, any reform 
of the structure of the administration of the Habsburg Empire was made impossible by 
the fact that Franz Joseph was relying strongly on the advice of Count Grünne and 
Count Buol, who were both committed to the old unilateral system. They thus 
convinced the Emperor that any major political concessions made in Lombardy-Venetia 
would prompt similar demands from Magyars, Poles, Czechs and every other 
nationality, making it impossible to prevent the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire. 
Consequently, Franz Joseph was once again unsympathetic to his brother’s 
recommendations arguing that  
 
Neither now nor ever can there be any question of the Italian provinces being 
governed independently from Vienna. Such a thing might have been possible a 
hundred years ago, but now it would weaken the monarchy and encourage revolution. 
Our interests in Italy cannot be judged purely from the Italian point of view.318 
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In many ways Franz Joseph was right; granting autonomy to Lombardy-Venetia would 
probably have destabilized the Habsburg Empire. Moreover, the population in the two 
provinces would not have been satisfied by mere autonomy but would have seen it as a 
step towards the end of the Habsburg regime in northern Italy and towards Italian 
unification. Therefore, Maximilian’s proposals for autonomy might have been 
successful in 1815 when the majority of the nobility and the elites had only wanted 
greater influence and a voice in political matters but had not been completely opposed 
to Habsburg rule.319 But now not only the population in Lombardy-Venetia wanted to 
get rid of the Austrians but the international situation also began to turn against 
Maximilian and Habsburg rule in northern Italy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.8. MAXIMILIAN’S DISMISSAL AS GOVERNOR GENERAL OF 
LOMBARDY-VENETIA 
 
 
 
Maximilian’s attempts to overcome the problems and troubles in Lombardy-Venetia 
had largely been an internal affair of the Habsburg Empire until 14th January 1858,  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when three bombs thrown by the Italian liberal Felice Orsini outside the Paris opera 
house directed the attention of the world to the “Italian Question”. The French Emperor 
and Empress escaped the attempt on their lives with only a few scratches but eight 
people were killed and a hundred and fifty of the mounted escort and spectators 
wounded. Orsini’s open letter, which he wrote in prison to Napoleon, accused the 
French emperor of having broken the promises he had made to the cause of Italian 
freedom and appealed to him to follow his uncle’s example and liberate Italy from 
Austrian rule.320 The publication of this letter did not save Orsini from execution but it 
made him a patriotic martyr throughout the peninsula; printed copies of Orsini’s letter 
were being smuggled into Lombardy-Venetia and circulated throughout all classes of 
the population. 321 
Unfortunately, Orsini’s trial coincided with the anniversary of the cinque giornate, the 
tenth anniversary of the 1848 revolution in Milan. The situation in the two biggest cities 
in the provinces remained relatively calm and Maximilian did his best to minimize the 
demonstrations that took place both in Milan and Venice. The demonstrators were 
supposed:  
 
To avoid the Imperial Gardens and make St Mark’s Square into the target of 
demonstrative walks. (…) I took Charlotte by the arm and walked with her alone, 
without the any attendants or entourage, in the boulevard of the Imperial Gardens. It 
was really very empty, whereas the piazetta was crowded. We walked straight at these 
people and across the piazetta; there we walked up and down three times to give the 
saluting people time to come together. When it became very crowded, when everyone 
saluted and thus every demonstration was made impossible, we walked with the whole  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population in tow (…) to the outer parts of the city. With our avalanche behind us 
even the most ill-disposed in the cafés were forced to get up and salute us.322  
 
However, the anniversary put the military authorities into a panic, despite Maximilian’s 
efforts, and he was unable to prevent them from reporting to Vienna the most trivial of 
demonstrations. There was a renewal of searches and arrests; people who applauded too 
loudly at Italian scenes in the theatre were reported to the central government in Vienna, 
race meetings held on a private property were broken up by the police and all of 
Maximilian’s protests were ignored by Franz Joseph.323 These incidents highlighted on 
the one hand the fact that the government in Vienna had no idea as how to react to the 
demands for Italian unity and on the other hand it showed that neither Maximilian’s 
political ideas for reform nor his ‘guerre de la coquetterie’ had produced any results; the 
elites and the population of the Lombard-Venetian kingdom remained hostile towards 
Austrian rule. Moreover, the demonstrations once again showed that the powers of the 
governor were severely limited: without control over the army and the police 
Maximilian could neither prevent nor break up these demonstrations.  
However, Maximilian’s time as governor of Lombardy-Venetia was running out; 
impressed by Orsini’s appeal to him to liberate Italy and dreaming of Imperial grandeur, 
Napoleon III had met Cavour, the Sardinian prime minister, at Plombières where both 
had discussed the future of Italy.324 In the end Cavour and the Emperor of the French 
had agreed that the Austrians should be expelled from Northern Italy, creating a united 
Italian Kingdom in the north under Sardinian leadership and that Sardinia-Piedmont 
would cede Nice and Savoy to France as a thank-you for Napoleon’s alliance in a war 
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with Austria.325 However, Napoleon insisted that neither France nor Sardinia-Piedmont 
must appear as the aggressor as long as Britain still cherished the hope of resolving the 
Italian Question with diplomatic means; Napoleon’s and Cavour’s plan was in direct 
violation of the agreements reached at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and thus the two 
countries should not appear to initiate hostilities.326 Consequently, Britain suggested a 
congress of the European powers in order to solve the Italian Question but Austria 
demanded the disarmament of Piedmont as the price of its participation and Piedmont 
ignored these demands.  
Still suspicious of his brother’s intentions, Maximilian had asked the Emperor for both 
civilian and military powers in order to preserve ‘what [he] had tried to achieve in the 
last two years’.327 Franz Joseph relieved Maximilian in a very short note of his position 
as governor on 19th April 1859.328 The powers Maximilian had asked for himself, such 
as the command over the army, were now entrusted to Count Gyulai; it was obvious that 
Gyulai had retained the Emperor’s confidence, whereas Maximilian had lost his trust. 
Nevertheless, the reaction of Cavour to the news of Maximilian’s dismissal showed how 
much he had achieved in the eighteen months as governor: 
 
At last we can breathe again. The man who was our worst enemy in Lombardy, whom 
we feared the most, and of whom every day we watched the progress, has been 
dismissed. Already his perseverance, his fair and liberal spirit, had won him many of 
our supporters. Lombardy had never been so prosperous, so well administered. Then, 
thank God, the dear Viennese government intervenes, and in its usual way manages to 
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make a mess of everything and to ruin its chances by recalling the Emperor’s brother, 
because his wise reforms had displeased the old die-hards in Vienna.329 
 
Two days after Maximilian’s dismissal, Austria and Piedmont-Sardinia were at war. 
Overconfident in the strength of his armies, Franz Joseph had issued an ultimatum 
calling on Sardinia-Piedmont to disarm within three days, giving France and Piedmont a 
casus belli without appearing to be the aggressor. Part of Franz Joseph’s and his foreign 
minister’s, Count Buol’s, reason for that ultimatum was the hope that Piedmont would 
be cowed by the Austrian bullying and so war would be avoided altogether. On the 
other hand, Piedmont’s provocative claims and its military mobilisation were well 
designed to rouse Franz Joseph’s rigid sense of honour and dynastic prestige, which of 
course had been part of the plan with France.  
However, Habsburg pride was to suffer several humiliations during this war; the first 
one came on 4th June 1859 with the defeat of the Austrian troops at Magenta. It was a 
battle irrevocably lost by the Austrians, not so much on account of a military defeat as 
because of the fact that Gyulai completely lost his head and ordered an unnecessary 
retreat. Consequently, most historians have passed severe judgement on Gyulai since for 
the relatively short time that he had been in command of the army in Italy the once well-
disciplined army of Radetzky had sunk into chaos. An Austrian general commented in 
1858 that ‘if the French attack us now then we are bound to be defeated due to our (…) 
leadership’.330 Nevertheless, the defeat at Magenta left the whole of Lombardy open to 
the attack of French and Piemontese troops, a fact of which Maximilian had warned the 
Emperor would happen when a war broke out between the Habsburg Empire and 
Piedmont: ‘if the Imperial government (…) saw the Lombard-Venetian kingdom as a                                                         
329 Quoted in: Haslip, J., Imperial Adventurer, 1971, p.118 
330 Quoted in: Millinary, A., Sechsundvierzig Jahre im östereichisch-ungarischen Heer 1833-
1879, Zurich, 1905, p. 12 
108 
 
mere military camp (…) and that above all Milan [and the whole region around it] 
would be relinquished to the enemy without a fight’.331 Austrian rule in northern Italy 
depended mainly on the four fortresses of Mantua, Peschiera, Verona and Legnago, 
which became known as the Quadrilateral. The value of these fortresses was that 
Austrian troops could retreat to them, that they were almost impossible to conquer and 
that troops and supplies could be easily poured into these fortified towns from Austria 
to the north.332 Throughout Radetzky’s time as governor a great number of troops had 
been stationed in Lombardy-Venetia in order to suppress any uprisings; but crucially the 
Austrians had failed to build any fortifications in the region apart from the existing 
Quadrilateral. During the war against France and Piedmont the Austrian troops could 
not retreat to any fortifications in the area around Milan and, as a consequence, they 
could not defend their position against the advancing French and Piedmontese troops. 
Thus the Austrian army was forced to retreat further to the traditional strongholds of the 
Quadrilateral.333  
Maximilian had been entrusted with the task of commanding the Austrian navy in case 
of a French attack on the ports and coast towns. However, throughout the war the 
French never attacked the Austrian ports and the command of the Austrian navy did not 
consider the fleet to be strong enough to engage in battle with the French in the open 
sea. After the war many domestic observers thus claimed that the performance of the 
fleet did not measure up to the unprecedented sums of money it had consumed over the 
past decade.334 Nevertheless, after the defeat of Magenta Maximilian joined the 
Emperor at his headquarters at Vallegio. He was thus there to witness one of Franz 
Joseph’s greatest personal defeats; after the defeat at Magenta Franz Joseph had 
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dismissed Gyulai and had taken personal command of his armies.335 Unfortunately, the 
Emperor did not possess the military genius of either Radetzky or Napoleon Bonaparte 
and as a consequence, the Austrian high command lacked above all co-ordination. At a 
moment when the battle of Solferino was still undecided, the Emperor, seeing that the 
French had penetrated the left flank of his armies and thinking all was lost, ordered a 
retreat that turned into a rout. Maximilian described the aftermath of the battle of which 
he ‘had never much hope of the outcome, but I did not imagine it would come so swiftly 
and would be so overwhelming. The retreat in the evening presented a scene of 
desolation I will never forget. The sight of the wounded was terrible’.336 
In the end it was the high number of losses combined with an alarming wave of 
revolutionary enthusiasm, which swept though central Italy, that led Napoleon to break 
his promise to expel the Austrian from Italian soil and seek a quick preliminary peace 
settlement. Napoleon was also alarmed by the concentration of Prussian troops along 
the Rhine; he feared that if the war continued, it might turn into a revolutionary war that 
would give to much encouragement to the radicals.337 Therefore the two emperors met 
in Villafranca to discuss the peace terms by which Austria retained Venice but ceded 
Lombardy to France that in return gave it to Piedmont. At the end of the war 
Maximilian was completely disillusioned with the Emperor and the government in 
Vienna, who were ‘sinking [the Habsburg monarchy] lower and lower through 
incompetence, misunderstanding and muddle-headedness for which there is neither 
excuse nor explanation’.338 Moreover, Maximilian understood that due to his outspoken 
opposition to his brother’s policies in Lombardy-Venetia it would be a long time before 
he would be offered another prominent position by Franz Joseph again.  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CHAPTER THREE 
The Mexican throne beckons 
— 
‘Out of the blue the Mexican crown was offered to me and with it the opportunity to end 
in a honourable and lawful manner my unemployed existence forever’ 
Archduke Maximilian, 1863 
 
 
 
 
 
Until the end of the Italian War the Habsburg Empire had been a neo-absolutist state, 
ruled in principle by an absolute monarch directly from Vienna. The calamities of the 
summer of 1859, however, exposed the deficiencies of this system: the truth was that 
the bureaucratic-centralist structure of the Habsburg Empire had failed to cope 
adequately with the threats posed by Napoleon III and Sardinia-Piedmont; it had also 
become apparent that Franz Joseph was not experienced enough or far-sighted enough 
to be the absolute monarch he styled himself to be; nor was the Habsburg monarchy 
strong or rich enough to perform the role of a Great Power that he and his advisors, and 
Habsburg tradition, demanded of it. This situation had created a general sense of 
discontent amongst the different people of the empire: the Czechs increasingly resented 
German hegemony in Bohemia; the Polish noble leadership resented Galicia being run 
like a German province; and the Magyars had long been opposed to the centralist 
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system.339 All these factors began to challenge Franz Joseph’s absolutist rule and 
increased inner political pressure on the emperor considerably.  
Instead of implementing reforms Franz Joseph tried, first of all, to save his throne by 
sacrificing his ministers; Buol had already been sacked in May and Bach, Kempen and 
Grünne followed by the end of the year. However, in the end it was the financial crisis, 
greatly exacerbated by the war’s events, which was the main impetus for change. Franz 
Joseph realized that a situation had transpired in which he was forced to improvise some 
new form of government. This would have to placate society, above all the dissatisfied 
Magyars, and more importantly satisfy the financial interests at home and abroad, for it 
had proved to be impossible for the Austrian government to raise any more foreign 
loans. Therefore, the emperor decided that the Habsburg Empire was ‘going to have a 
little parliamentarism’;340 and the result was the October Diploma. In many ways the 
October Diploma was the first step towards a constitutional form of government as it 
increased the authority of the imperial parliament, the Reichsrat, which had already 
been established in 1851. The Reichsrat was bolstered by extraordinary members, and it 
was given advisory, though not decision-making, functions with respect to the national 
budget and major bills of general legislation.341 However, the Reichsrat still had no 
right to initiate laws and even more importantly Franz Joseph attempted to reserve 
important state functions such as foreign policy and military affairs as his prerogative. 
However, the October Diploma failed to please either side: the German nobility saw the 
unity of the empire threatened, which they regarded as their historic possession, 
whereas the Magyars insisted on their ancient rights that guaranteed them at least a 
certain level of autonomy. As the October Diploma did not manage to satisfy the 
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demands of the different national groups and as it failed to establish order within the 
empire, Franz Joseph ordered Anton von Schmerling to draft a new constitution, the so-
called February Patent. This established in the Habsburg Empire a bicameral imperial 
parliament, still called the Reichsrat, with an upper chamber appointed by the emperor 
and an indirectly elected lower chamber. The members of the upper chamber were 
appointed for life and included all the adult archdukes, prominent bishops, heads of 
noble families, and great citizens; whereas the lower chamber comprised the three 
hundred and thirty four delegates sent from the diets, which had been restored in the 
same year. Under the February Patent, the Reichsrat was given legislative power over 
all subjects not expressively reserved by the diets of the different Habsburg lands. 
Moreover, the emperor still had the prerogative over foreign policy and military affairs 
and he could still pass legislation when parliament was not in session.342 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1. MAXIMILIAN’S FUTURE PROSPECTS 
 
 
 
The disastrous Italian campaign in 1859 had damaged the prestige and standing both of 
the military and the emperor; the bankers, the intellectuals and the heads of industry  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openly said that it was the arrogant complacency of the aristocratic military caste that 
had lost the war and that it was due to the ineptitude of Franz Joseph that the troops had 
been sacrificed at Solferino. Upon his return from Italy the emperor had been hissed at 
in the streets and there had been some voices calling for his abdication and shouting 
‘Long live Archduke Max!’.343 It was thus hardly surprising that Franz Joseph did not 
want his brother anywhere near the court in Vienna for he feared that Maximilian could 
become a rallying point for those at court and in society dissatisfied with his rule. Nor 
did Franz Joseph think he could entrust Maximilian with the governorship of some 
province of the empire; the latter’s “liberal” policies in Italy and his plans for the 
creation of a virtually independent Lombard-Venetian kingdom had made this 
impossible. Thus Maximilian was condemned to lead the kind of life he had always 
despised: the life of a ‘prince receiving an apanage’.344 
 
 
 
 
3.1.1. A POLITICAL PENSIONER? 
 
 
Austria’s defeat in the Italian war and the resulting struggle for political representation 
and a sort of constitution within the Habsburg Empire had left Maximilian so 
disillusioned that he ‘found the condition of our poor country, as I expected, tangled and 
gloomy’.345 This comment suggests that he neither approved of October Diploma nor of 
the February Patent and that he was in fact not a liberal but a conservative.  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Maximilian’s own prospects appeared just as bleak for the cheers that greeted him in the 
streets during a visit to Vienna and the tributes of the foreign press had closed the doors 
to all further promotions, leaving Maximilian with the idea that he had no other future 
in Austria than that of a pensioner at the age of twenty-eight. Most historians seem to 
agree with this pessimistic view; they tended to regard the period between Maximilian’s 
dismissal as governor of Lombardy-Venetia and his acceptance of the crown of Mexico 
as a time when Maximilian practically lived the life of a pensioner, tending to his birds 
and planting magnolias in his garden in Miramar.346  
However, examining the regular reports in the Wiener Zeitung, which reported regularly 
about the different social and charitable activities of the members of the imperial 
family, about Maximilian’s activities in the year 1860 it becomes obvious that the 
Archduke led anything but a quiet life. In the winter of 1859 he embarked on a journey 
to Brazil, which he tried to keep as unconventional as possible by leaving the 
constraints and boundaries of civilisation behind him and by exploring the untouched 
wilderness of the Brazilian jungle. Upon his return from Brazil he visited together with 
Charlotte and her brother, the Duke of Brabant, an exhibition about the 
circumnavigation of the Novara in Vienna. At the beginning of June 1860 Maximilian 
paid a visit to his godfather, the former Emperor Ferdinand I, on his estate in Bohemia; 
on 7th June Maximilian and Charlotte were back in Trieste only to embark on a journey 
to Ragusa the next day. On 10th September 1860 Maximilian visited the 
Küstenländische Gartenbau-Gesellschaft in Trieste and on 26th November he went to 
see an archaeological exhibition in Vienna.347 In addition the Wiener Zeitung reported 
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repeatedly that Maximilian donated money to charitable organisations, such as for the 
restoration of the parish church in Possabro in Venetia.348 Looking at this twelve-month 
period in Maximilian’s life the picture of a young man leading a rather active, and in 
comparison to some other Archdukes, even hectic lifestyle emerges. Bearing all these 
activities as well as his duties as Admiral of the fleet in mind, it is a rather big 
misconception to describe Maximilian as a pensioner.  
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.2. MAXIMILIAN, THE REICHSRAT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FLEET 
 
 
Until this point Maximilian had managed to secure the necessary funds for the 
development and expansion of the Austrian fleet; a fact that was mainly due to his direct 
access to the emperor. However, the October Diploma of 1860 and the February Patent 
of 1861 completely changed the way in which the budget for the navy was granted; 
from now on it was the Reichsrat and not the emperor that had to approve the budget for 
the navy. When Maximilian attempted in the spring of 1862 to secure the necessary 
funds for the construction of two ironclad ships and another ship of the line, which 
would have amounted to an additional 8.5 million florins on top of the already granted 
navy budget, he encountered opposition not only from cabinet ministers but also from 
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members of the Reichsrat. In the cabinet Plener, the finance minister, argued that the 
modernisation of the fleet had been extremely expensive with naval spending exceeding 
the legal limit every year after 1850 and that he and most of his fellow cabinet members 
considered the navy a needless luxury that the financially strapped Habsburg state could 
ill afford.349  
The heated debate in the Reichsrat that followed Maximilian’s proposition for a higher 
budget was one of the first domestic controversies in the newly created constitutional-
parliamentary system. Generally speaking the members of parliament fell into two 
categories: those who were convinced that the Austrian navy could not catch up with 
the naval development programme of Italy and thus saw the main task of the fleet in 
defending the Austrian ports; and those delegates, who believed that Austria had to 
control the Adriatic in order to protect her military and trade interests in the area.350 
After bitter debates the Reichsrat increased the naval budget, which ensured that Austria 
would have an ironclad core for her fleet, but the smaller appropriation for 1863 made 
Maximilian aware of the limits of his power and forced him to scale down his plans for 
the future. 
More importantly, the heated debates about the naval budget had put Maximilian into 
the centre point of parliamentary critique. An anonymous report accused Maximilian of 
not being able to ‘manage his own fortune with the necessary economy [and that] the 
same mistake was visible in the administration of the naval budget and that 
consequently, the large sum that the navy was forced to claim in the last years, was 
mainly due to mismanagement’.351 However, as an archduke and a member of the ruling 
dynasty Maximilian was not bound by any parliamentary accountability and he could 
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not be subject of any parliamentary debates.352 Maximilian was very much aware of this 
fact when he complained in a letter to Franz Joseph that the opposition towards 
additional funds for the navy ‘in parliamentary circles (…) the agitation, which is so 
harmful to the public interest is escalating at an alarming rate’.353 This negative 
comment about the Reichsrat, which had only exercised its constitutional right to debate 
and approve budgets, is a rather telling example for Maximilian’s ideas of government: 
in his opinion the monarch could grant a parliament if he wished but this parliament 
should have very limited powers and should under no circumstances interfere with the 
political decisions of the monarch and the ruling dynasty. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2. MAXIMILIAN’S PROSPECTS IN THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 
OF THE HABSBURG EMPIRE 
 
 
The introduction of parliamentary institutions had not only made Maximilian’s work as 
the commander of the navy more difficult, but it had also left Franz Joseph with far 
fewer options for the employment of the archdukes, including his brother, as many high 
ranking representative positions became obsolete. In the early 1860s a number of 
imperial relatives had to be removed from positions of responsibility, among them the 
emperor’s cousins Albrecht, who was demoted from military governor of Hungary to a                                                         
352 Schmidt-Brentano, A., Österreichs Weg zur Seemacht, 1997, p.143 
353 HHSTA, Archiv K. Maximilian von Mexiko, cart. 114 
118 
 
corps commander, and William, who was reduced from the rank of Armee-Ober-
Kommandant to the post of general inspector of artillery.354 As for Maximilian, he 
himself noted that since the navy had to have its funding approved by parliament, it 
would be impossible for him to stay on indefinitely as Marine-Ober-Kommandant, 
mainly due to the fact that his expensive ironclad program had made him the central 
figure in one of the first great domestic controversies debated by the new parliament. 
This underscored the fact that his assignment to the naval command no longer served its 
primary purpose: to remove him from Vienna so that he could not get involved in the 
internal politics of the empire and threaten the position of the emperor. In the view of 
the political realities and his past relationship with Franz Joseph, it was unlikely for 
Maximilian to receive a position of importance elsewhere within the Habsburg Empire.  
This lack of prospects in combination with Maximilian’s overconfidence in his own 
abilities and the encouragement he received from his advisors, above all from 
Scherzenlechner, and from his wife Charlotte, who had no doubt that the time would 
come ‘when the Archduke will again play a leading role in the affairs of the world’,355 
convinced the archduke that his only alternative lay abroad. Thus he tried to find for 
himself a role and scope of activity, in which he could prove that he was a Habsburg 
prince destined to rule. Maximilian’s search seemed finally have come to an end when 
in October 1861, the Austrian foreign minister, Count Rechberg, came to Miramar and 
asked Maximilian whether he would like to become emperor of Mexico.356 
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3.2. THE IDEA OF CREATING A MEXICAN EMPIRE 
 
 
 
The idea of certain circles of conservative Mexican immigrants, living in exile in Paris, 
to create a monarchy in Mexico was not new: shortly after the end of the wars of 
independence (1810-1821) conservative Mexican politicians had been looking for a 
prince of a European dynasty to put on the throne of a to-be established Mexican 
empire. The reasons as to why the Mexican conservatives were looking for a European 
prince to become emperor were mainly to give the new Mexican monarchy a certain 
level of standing and legitimacy amongst its republican neighbours; they also hoped that 
a European prince would guarantee military support in the case of an armed conflict 
between Mexico and its neighbours such as the United States.357 Thus a Mexican 
delegation of leading conservatives had travelled to Vienna in order to offer the 
Archduke Karl, brother of the Emperor Francis I (II), the crown of Mexico. But 
Metternich, the Austrian chancellor, was a realist in politics; he had long since realized 
that although he could suppress revolutions in Italy, Germany and Poland he could not 
prevent revolution further afield. Thus he knew that it was quite impractical to intervene 
in Mexico, especially as the United States of America would strongly resent the creation 
of a monarchy on its doorstep; thus it would not be in Austria’s interest to become 
involved in a conflict with the United States on the American continent. Consequently, 
Archduke Karl declined the offer.358 The conservatives then decided that their leader 
General Augustín de Iturbide himself should become Emperor Augustín I of Mexico. 
The First Mexican Empire lasted eleven months, from May 1822 until March 1823; the  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liberals led by General Antonio López de Santa Anna, who later declared himself 
dictator, overthrew the emperor and forced Iturbide to go into exile to England. When 
Iturbide returned to Mexico the next year and tried to start a revolution, he was defeated 
and captured by the liberals.359 This time though, in what was rapidly becoming a 
tradition, they had him shot. However, this brutal end to the First Mexican Empire did 
not discourage Mexican émigrés now living in exile in Europe; they continued to 
believe that it was possible to establish a monarchy in Mexico with the financial and 
military help of a European power.360  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1. THE MEXICAN ÉMIGRÉS 
 
 
After the end of the First Mexican Empire many conservatives and supporters of 
Iturbide had left Mexico. Most of them had congregated in Paris and other European 
capitals, where they had conducted endless discussions on the subject of the restoration 
of the monarchy. Most prominent amongst Mexican émigrés was José María de Estrada, 
who had dedicated his whole life to the cause of monarchist restoration in his native 
land. As a young man he had been a member of the delegation that had offered the  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Mexican throne to Archduke Karl in 1821, and later had served as Mexican minister in 
Vienna. There he married the daughter of the Marquise de Laurant, who as Countess 
Lützow subsequently became mistress of the household of Maximilian’s court in 
Milan.361 Gutierrez de Estrada was a verbose conservative reactionary and clericalist but 
he was also a man of considerable financial means, which he devoted to the political 
cause of establishing a monarchy in Mexico. Time and time again, he petitioned the 
foreign ministers of Spain, France and Austria with his ideas but until 1861 all his 
efforts had been in vain. 
Gutierrez de Estrada had two energetic supporters of his plans in the persons of Juan 
Almonte and José Hidalgo. The former was allegedly the son of José María Morelos, a 
Roman Catholic priest, who led the insurgents in the Mexican War of Independence 
from 1811 to 1815.362 When the Mexican-American War broke out Almonte served 
under Santa Anna as minister of War; he later became senator of Oaxaca for four years, 
and then served as Mexico's representative to the U.S. under President Santa Anna. In 
1856 he was appointed minister to England, France and Spain; once overseas, Almonte 
became involved in the promotion of foreign intervention and monarchical schemes for 
Mexico.363 
Hidalgo, on the other hand, was a young Spaniard, whose father had served under 
Iturbide when the latter had been fighting on the Spanish side. Throughout the turbulent 
years after Mexico’s independence, Hidalgo had filled diplomatic posts in the Mexican 
legations in London, Madrid and Paris, where his endearing manners made him 
particularly popular with ladies of rank and substance.364 Among those whom he thus 
courted was Eugenie de Montijo, who later married the French Emperor Napoleon III. 
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Although Hidalgo and Eugenie had not been in contact for many years, they met by 
accident in September 1861 in Biarritz; this encounter happened at the same time as the 
Juárez government suspended all payments to foreign creditors.365 Thus Hidalgo could 
use his direct access to Eugenie to lobby the French Emperor for his support in the 
restoration of the Mexican monarchy. 
Examining the three leading figures of the Mexican émigrés it becomes apparent that 
they were not representative of the Mexican population as a whole. Almonte, Hidalgo 
and Gutierrez de Estrada all came from privileged backgrounds and had had an 
education; they held conservative-monarchical views; and they had lived in Europe for 
some time. The fact that they had been in exile for several years is crucial as it raises the 
question of how they would have known what kind of government they Mexican people 
desired if they had not been in Mexico for several years. It is therefore, possible to 
conclude that Hidalgo, Almonte and Gutierrez de Estrada only represented a minority of 
Mexicans, namely the privileged upper class; but their influence at the various courts in 
Europe and their monopoly as sources of information on Mexican affairs made it 
possible for them to argue that the bulk of the Mexican people desired the restoration of 
the monarchy. 
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3.2.2. NAPOLEON’S MOTIVES FOR PUTTING MAXIMILIAN FORWARD AS A 
CANDIDATE 
 
 
Although Mexican conservatives had offered the Mexican throne to Archduke Karl in 
1821 it is, nevertheless, astonishing that Napoleon favoured a Habsburg candidate for 
the position of emperor of Mexico. France and Austria had been at war only two years 
previously and Napoleon’s personal relationship with Franz Joseph, who under 
Habsburg family law had to give his permission to his brother’s candidature for the 
Mexican throne, had always been rather strained. However, Napoleon hoped to improve 
France’s relations with Austria, which had been tense since Austria’s defeat in the 
Italian war in 1859, by ‘putting forward as a possible candidate of a dynasty with which 
I have been recently at war’.366 It is also likely that Napoleon hoped that by supporting 
Maximilian’s candidature he would gain the Habsburg Empire as an ally against the 
rising ambitions of Prussia under the leadership of Bismarck. Austria and Prussia had 
been struggling for dominance over the German Confederation ever since its creation in 
1815. By the early 1860s it seemed possible that this struggle would end in favour of 
Prussia; thus Napoleon feared the creation of large and powerful German state led by 
Prussia on France’s eastern borders.367 
In addition to these considerations Maximilian also had excellent connections, through 
his father-in-law, to Britain; a fact that made it more likely in Napoleon’s eyes that 
Britain would support a military intervention in Mexico.368 Moreover, Maximilian 
fulfilled the prerequisites that Napoleon considered essential for the future emperor of  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Mexico: he was not a Spanish prince for the Spanish were hated in Mexico and the 
Mexicans would regard it as a step to make Mexico a Spanish colony once again; nor 
was he a member of the Bonaparte family, for the Great Powers would not agree to see 
Mexico incorporated into the French Empire. Most importantly, though, Maximilian 
was a devout Catholic, which would not only guarantee the support of the Pope as well 
as the Catholic Church and the conservative party in Mexico but would also to rally 
Catholic opinion in France.369 
In addition to the question as to why Napoleon put Maximilian forward as a candidate it 
is also intriguing to inquire why Napoleon III took such an interest in Mexico. This 
question has produced many different answers by historians: Haslip has stated that it 
was Eugenie’s interest in the Mexican affairs and her influence over the French emperor 
that led to France’s intervention in Mexico;370 yet Baker has demonstrated not only that 
Eugenie knew very little about Mexico and just assumed that the Mexicans were like 
the Spanish but also that her influence on Napoleon was rather limited;371 Lecaillon has 
pointed to the fact that by establishing a monarchy in Mexico Napoleon intended to 
create a buffer zone against the expansionist attempts of the United States, which would 
have made it more difficult for France to realise her economic interests in the region. 372 
Cunningham has also stressed the fact that Napoleon had primarily economic reasons 
such as the import of cotton, gold and other precious metals.373 Cunningham’s theory is 
also supported by the fact that during his exile in Ham Napoleon III had envisioned a 
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channel through Mexico in order to further commerce between the American continent 
and Europe.374 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.3. THE AUSTRIAN REACTION 
 
 
Bearing all the political and strategic considerations mentioned above in mind, 
Napoleon had approached Franz Joseph with the offer of the Mexican throne for 
Maximilian. Thus, when Count Rechberg told Maximilian about the French suggestion 
of making him a candidate for the Mexican throne, he did not only act with the 
permission of but also in the name of Franz Joseph; in theory the emperor had no 
objections to Maximilian accepting the crown offered to him. In fact, the French 
proposal would have taken a big worry off Franz Joseph’s mind: the new constitutional 
structure of the Habsburg monarchy left the emperor with fewer employment 
possibilities for the archdukes. Franz Joseph knew that although Maximilian liked his 
post with the navy, he was nevertheless aiming for a more prestigious position 
comparable to the one he had held as governor of Lombardy-Venetia, but under the 
current political realities no such position was available.375 Therefore, Maximilian’s 
acceptance of the crown of Mexico would remove a possible disruptive factor from the 
political stage of the Habsburg Empire.  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However, no matter how much Franz Joseph wanted to get rid of his brother, he still 
distrusted Napoleon. In order not to get involved too closely in the plans and schemes of 
the French emperor Franz Joseph insisted that if Maximilian accepted the throne it was 
his own, private affair and that the Austrian government would not get involved in any 
way. It is possible that Franz Joseph feared that Napoleon would demand Venice as 
compensation for installing Maximilian on the throne of Mexico, a worry that was later 
echoed by many observers. In addition to these considerations Franz Joseph was also 
worried that Napoleon could retreat from his promises and withdraw his support once 
Maximilian was made emperor. Therefore, he advised his brother not to accept 
Napoleon’s offer unless two conditions were fulfilled: first, that both Britain and France 
would support him in Mexico – and this meant not merely assurances of sympathy but 
definite treaty commitments to practical assistance; and second, that he would be 
accepted and welcomed as emperor by the majority of the Mexican people.376  
When Count Rechberg told Maximilian in Miramar in October 1861 that Franz Joseph, 
as the head of the House of Habsburg, would not refuse his permission, Maximilian 
showed himself eager to accept the throne of Mexico on the conditions that Franz 
Joseph had laid down. Although Maximilian demonstrated an extraordinary level of 
indecision about the Mexican adventure during the next thirty months, as he fluctuated 
between delight and despair, his first reaction was joy. The prospect of becoming 
emperor of Mexico offered him an escape from his current situation in Austria, where 
the strained relationship with his brother had closed the door for any further promotion. 
Moreover, the Mexican offer also appealed to the more adventurous side of his 
character, his Habsburg pride as well as to his belief of being called upon to rule a 
people: Mexico was in America, that unexplored and undeveloped continent of the 
future; the letters by Mexican émigrés such as Gutierrez de Estrade spoke of  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Maximilian’s obligation to ‘save a dying country through the high-born prince’;377 and 
what could be more fitting than that Mexico should be ruled by a well-meaning 
Habsburg prince, a descendent of the first Christian emperor of Mexico, Charles V? 
From Maximilian’s point of view the Mexican offer definitely contained a certain 
amount of dynastic pride and consideration. On his travels through Brazil he had 
commented that ‘it seems to me like a fairytale that I am the first scion of Ferdinand and 
Isabella the object of whose life had been from childhood upwards to set foot upon a 
continent which has acquired such gigantic significance in the history of mankind’.378 
Therefore, by establishing a Habsburg monarchy at the heart of the New World, 
Maximilian thought he could further the prestige, influence and ‘lustre of my house (…) 
our family has recently lost two sovereignties (…) so I cannot fail to see what an 
impression would be made upon the world (…) if the proposition [of the Mexican 
crown] (…) were carried out’.379 
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3.3. MEXICO IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTUTRY 
 
 
 
As the section above has demonstrated, neither of the protagonists had an objective idea 
about the political, social and economic situation of Mexico. The Mexican émigrés at 
the court in Paris were all supporters of the conservative party but they had lived in 
exile in Europe for many years; thus these émigrés were not representative of the social 
and political ideas and trends that were prevalent in Mexican society. Nevertheless, the 
reports and assurances of these émigrés, however inaccurate, were highly influential at 
the courts in Vienna and Paris and both Napoleon and Maximilian put a lot of trust in 
them, at least at the beginning of the Mexican adventure, as few other sources of 
information about Mexico were open to them. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the 
political, economic and social situation of Mexico at the middle of the nineteenth 
century. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.1. MEXICAN SOCIETY IN FLUX 
 
 
Throughout the colonial period society in Mexico had been strictly hierarchical; it was a 
society of orders and estates, in which the privileges, functions and comparative esteem 
of the various estates determined stratification and status. The central criteria for status 
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had been the five ethnic categories of Spaniards, mestizos, mulattoes, Indians and 
blacks.380 Although a fairly rigid class system was defined in the sixteenth century, by 
the end of the eighteenth century society was quite different in several respects. The 
most notable change was the greatly increased number of those with mixed blood, 
which made it possible that the five ethic categories gradually came to be regarded more 
as cultural than racial categories. As a consequence, movement within and amongst the 
estates was possible within certain constraints of hierarchy and patriarchy.381 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the top of the colonial social structure had been 
cut off. The Spaniards had been expelled from the country, leaving high offices to those 
white born in the new world, the creoles, who represented less than one-quarter of the 
population. Once Mexico had become an independent state, the creoles took over the 
position of the expelled Spaniards; they took over the highest levels of government; 
they became the highest clerics; and they solidified their position as rich businessmen, 
professionals, leading merchants, industrialists and mine owners. In effect, they 
attempted to maintain colonial structures by monopolizing resources and by limited 
access to power and prestige.382 However, the creoles did not manage to uphold this 
quasi-colonial structure indefinitely and by the mid-1850s their power was threatened 
by a different group: the mestizos. 
By the end of the colonial period the mestizos, who ethnically speaking were the 
progeny of the Spanish conquerors and the native Indian population, had accounted for 
approximately thirty percent of the population, by 1855 they made up almost fifty 
percent and were thus the largest single ethnic group in Mexican society. The vast 
majority of this group occupied the intermediate positions in society; they were small  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farmers and shopkeepers, lower clergy, domestic servants, notaries, scribes and 
secretaries and had only limited possibilities for social mobility.383 However, a small 
percentage of this group had received a good education and could be found in lower-
level bureaucratic posts, working as lawyers, merchants or journalists. As a 
consequence, this group was socially ambitious and participated in the fluid political life 
of post-colonial Mexico.384 It was precisely from this group that the leadership of the 
reform movement in the mid-1850s would eventually coalesce. 
The third group in the social order were the Indians, who accounted for about one third 
of the population.385 The Indians lived for the most part in thousands of small villages, 
which had communal property and traditional values and which were socially and 
economically isolated from the remainder of the country. Only the larger Indian towns 
had churches; practically none had schools, which meant that only a few Indians spoke 
Spanish and that in consequence they could not participate in civil society. Although the 
post-independence governments abolished most of the colonial legislation that 
discriminated against the Indians, legal equality brought few actual benefits to the 
Indians of Mexico. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, Indians were 
forced to join the army, were commandeered into work gangs, and were thrown off their 
lands.386 
The lowest group in the social hierarchy of Mexico was the black population. 
Throughout the colonial period slaves had been brought to Mexico to work on the 
cotton plantations; by 1800 this group accounted for seven per cent of the Mexican 
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population.387 Historians such as Joachim Meißner, Klaus Weber and Ulrich Mücke 
have pointed out that during Mexico’s war of independence Hidalgo and the Mexican 
liberals used the idea of abolishing slavery to fashion support amongst the freed black 
population for their fight against the colonial power; consequently, a high number of 
blacks fought in the Mexican army.388 Once Mexico gained her independence in 1810 
slavery was officially abolished; however, it was not until the 50s and 60s of the 
nineteenth century that slavery was finally abolished in all the regions of Mexico. 
Moreover, the material that deals with the fate of the mulattes, the people of mixed 
white and black parentage, is very sparse but it could be possible that in a Mexican 
context this group were absorbed in the mestizos. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2. A LAND OF INCREDIBLE RICHES? 
 
 
After Mexico had gained independence the principal economic activity in the country 
was agriculture, mainly maize but also cotton, sugar and tobacco, which could be used 
for export. However, Mexico had not always had an economy dominated by agriculture. 
During the three hundred years of Spanish colonial rule, the principal economic force 
had been the mining of precious metals.389 The Spaniards had created a economic                                                         387 Meißner, J., Mücke, U., Weber, K., Schwarzes Amerika – Eine Geschichte der Sklaverei, 
Beck, Munich, 2008, p. 205 388 Ibid, p. 207 389 Meyer, C.M; Sherman, W.L.; Deeds, S.M, Mexican History, 1999, p. 173 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system by which the precious metals mined in Mexico were transported to Europe and 
Asia and in exchange luxury goods and capital were brought to the new world. The 
mines around San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas and Durango had seemed to be inexhaustible 
and they had been the reason why most Europeans regarded Mexico as a land of 
incredible riches.  Nevertheless, independence destroyed the mercantile system, not 
only because Spanish dominance was removed, but also because much of the fighting 
occurred in precisely those areas that had been tied to the economy.390 After 
independence, revitalization of the mines proved to be impossible due to the lack of 
capital in Mexico and due to the fact that foreign investors were unwilling to the 
enormous risk of investing in such a politically unstable country as Mexico. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.3 THE POLITICAL FACTIONS 
 
 
The divisions in Mexican society did not only run along the lines of the different ethnic 
categories and castes or along the gap of rich and poor but also along competing 
ideological ideas. By the early 1850s, the political fractions and parties were clearly 
formed: the liberals on the one side and the conservatives on the other. In general the 
liberals were civilians and military men under forty, from a mestizo background and 
mostly from the centre and north of the country.391 Borrowing freely from liberal                                                         390 Sinkin, R., Mexican Reform, 1979, p. 14 391 Krauze, E., Mexico - Biography of Power, 1997, p. 156 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European thinkers, Mexican liberals opposed any institution that interfered with the free 
development of individual interests. Thus the liberal programme that was developed 
from the 1830s onwards sought to remove all vestiges of colonial forms. In the liberal 
view this included the rejection of a monarchy, the form of government favoured by the 
conservatives, as they regarded it as an anachronism of the dark ages, as well as attacks 
on the most powerful institution in Mexico: the Catholic Church. Sympathizers for the 
liberals came from the middle class and were found, in increasing numbers, among 
landowners and entrepreneurs, who saw economic opportunities in the proposed 
privatization of Church property.392 
While the liberals were hostile towards the concepts of monarchy and the institution of 
the Catholic Church, the conservatives regarded them as the two bastions of stability. 
Thus they glorified the “golden age” of the colonial past and attempted to restore the old 
order. As the conservatives feared what the conservative propaganda called the chaos of 
republican Mexico, their supporters mainly came from those groups in society that 
stood to loose the most from political changes. As a consequence, on the conservative 
side were politicians, clergy, and military men some ten years older than their liberal 
rivals. Therefore, the conservatives were mainly urban, rich and from a creole 
background and were above all supported by the onerous bureaucracy of the capital city 
and the clergy.393 It is rather remarkable that the supporters of both the liberal and the 
conservative were usually well-situated citizens and not labourers or peasants. Thus it 
can be argued that politics in Mexico were mainly a matter for the elites of the country. 
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3.4. LIBERALS VERSUS CONSERVATIVES 
 
 
 
The different ideological views of the two political factions led to the fact that Mexico 
suffered from the struggles between the conservatives and the liberals, between the 
centralists and the federalists, between one region and another and that relations 
between the Catholic Church and the state were often strained. The fights amongst the 
different political factions produced a centralised state that was soon replaced by a 
federation and vice versa. Between 1824 and 1863 all in all fifty conservative and 
liberal governments succeeded each other, taking the forms of juntas, republics and 
dictatorships. Shifts in allegiance of the military from a certain faction to the other, so-
called pronunciamentos, were seen as part of everyday politics and often caused the 
overthrow of one government or another.394 Fanny Calderón de la Barca, the Scottish 
wife of Spain’s first ambassador to the newly independent Mexico, commented on the 
political situation: ‘One government is abandoned and there is none to take its place, 
one revolution follows another, yet the remedy is not found’.395 
Moreover, the inner political and social turmoil was also reflected in Mexico’s foreign 
policy: she failed to defend herself against the expansionist policies of the United States 
of America. The annexation of Tejas by the US in June 1845 led to Mexico breaking off 
relations with her northern neighbour. Hostilities between the two countries began a 
year later.396 The war quickly assumed catastrophic proportions for Mexico, with US 
troops even occupying the capital Mexico City. The Mexican government was therefore 
forced to sign the Treaty of Guadalupe in 1848 ceding Utah, New Mexico, California,                                                         394 Krauze, E., Mexico - Biography of Power, 1997, p. 162 395 Calderón de la Barca, F., Life in Mexico, Chapman and Hall, New York, 1866, p. 433 396 Simpson, L.B., Many Mexicos, Macmillian, London, 1966, p. 258 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Nevada, Wyoming, Colorado and parts of Arizona to the United States. In total Mexico 
lost nearly half the land she had claimed when she had become independent from Spain 
thirty-two years earlier.397 However, the struggle and fight against a common enemy 
failed to unite the Mexicans as a nation and the liberals and conservatives continued to 
fight each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.1. THE REFORM LAWS 
 
 
In the 1840s, during one of the brief spells of liberal government, the liberals had made 
some attempts to introduce enlightened reforms, but the real attack on the established 
order came in 1855. At this point the liberals had gained the upper hand in the political 
struggles again and a liberal government under the leadership of Ignacio Comonfort, 
and with Benito Juárez as chief justice, had been formed. Already the first major reform 
decree of the Comonfort government, the Ley Juárez, opened wide the latent divisions 
in the country; the Juárez Law challenged the Catholic Church authorities by 
introducing civil marriage, by allowing divorce for insanity and cruelty and by ruling 
that no boy could marry until he was eighteen and no girl until she was fifteen. More                                                         397 Simpson, L.B., Many Mexicos, 1966, p. 258 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importantly, the Juárez Law (Ley Juárez) of November 1855 sought to subordinate 
ecclesiastical privileges to civil law, which in effect abolished many powers of the 
ecclesiastical courts as well as the legal privileges of the clergy.398 Although the 
Catholic Church denounced the law as anti-religious and heretical, it nevertheless failed 
to turn Mexico into a secular society. The Juárez Law only prohibited the ecclesiastical 
courts from hearing civil cases, and therefore the Catholic Church still retained the right 
to hear criminal cases. Thus it did not only fail to draw a clear line between the role of 
the Catholic Church and the role of the state but it also did not establish the secular state 
as the main dispenser of power in the nation.399  
If the conservatives and the clergy had considered the Ley Juárez as a radical piece of 
legislation, than the Ley Lerdo, which was introduced in June 1856, was seen as even 
more controversial. The Lerdo Law decreed the sale or disamortization of all corporate 
property except when it was directly used by the corporation. This meant that the 
Catholic Church was prohibited from holding any real estate, that the clergy could no 
longer receive any gifts and donations in the form of real estate and that the Church 
would lose its income from rented property.400 The purpose of this law had been 
threefold: to destroy the economic power of the clergy by forcing them to sell Church 
lands; to finance the government with the proceeds from the heavy tax on the sales of 
Church lands; and to encourage development by creating a new class of small 
proprietors.401 
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3.4.2. THE CONSTITUTION OF 1857 AND THE WAROF THE REFORM  
 
 
Both the Ley Juárez and the Ley Lerdo, along with several other pieces of liberal 
legislation and Mexico’s first genuine bill of inalienable rights, were included in the 
new constitution of 1857. In addition, the first thirty-four articles of the documents 
spelled out in detail the liberal principles of equality before the law and of freedom of 
speech, of the press, of petition, of assembly and of education. It further abolished 
slavery and all titles of nobility.402 However, the articles that prompted the most 
controversy were those that in some way touched upon the religious issue. While the 
constitution contained no article specifying freedom of religion, it did not recognise 
Catholicism as the religion of the state. Opposition of the church, already incensed by 
the laws of Juárez and Lerdo, was immediate. The bishops, led by Archbishop Pelagio 
Labastida and Bishop Clemente de Jesús Munguía of Michoacán denounced the 
constitution as an assault on Catholicism and as an attempt to replace Catholic society 
in Mexico with a secularised model based on foreign examples. The church authorities 
defended what they perceived as the Catholic identity of Mexico, while arguing against 
the liberal doctrine of sovereignty of the people and in favour of the Church’s right to 
possess property and to exercise control over education and private morality.403 
In view of the Ley Juárez, the Ley Lerdo and the constitution of 1857, Archbishop 
Labastida and his colleagues decided that it was not enough to order the clergy to refuse 
absolution to anyone who swore allegiance to the new constitution. The conservative 
thus considered it necessary to overthrow the liberal Comonfort government; 
Comonafort had been acting president since December 1855 and in November 1857 the                                                         402 Meyer, C.M; Sherman, W.L.; Deeds, S.M, Mexican History, 1999, p. 365 403 Simpson, L.B., Many Mexicos, 1966, p. 276 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Mexican Congress appointed him president, while Juárez was elected president of the 
Supreme Court. The conservatives carried out the coup d’état on 16th December 1857, 
despite the fact that Comonfort had closed Congress in December 1857 in order to curb 
the influence of the radical liberals. Nevertheless, in January 1858 General Zuloaga 
forced Comonfort to resign; he went into exile in New York and General Zuloaga 
established a conservative government in Mexico.404 However, the fact that Comonfort 
had resigned left enough scope for Juárez to argue that the conservatives had seized 
power illegally; the argument went that under the provisions of the 1857 constitution, 
presidential powers had passed to Juárez as chief justice and that by making himself 
president, Comonfort had seized power illegally. Juárez then established his liberal 
government in Veracruz, whereas the conservative government remained in Mexico 
City. The two rival governments settled down to a three-year civil war, which became 
known as the War of the Reform. During this war the hatreds, the fears and the 
frustration of the contending parties were expressed in wanton destruction. The liberals 
shot priests and lay brothers, gutted churches and burned sacred images; the 
conservatives executed prisoners, confiscated liberal wealth and destroyed properties 
owned by liberals.405 
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3.5. THE JUÁREZ’ GOVERNMENT 
 
 
 
After much violence Juárez emerged victorious out of the War of the Reform and in 
March 1861 Juárez, who had already been in office for three years as the de facto 
president in the regions controlled by the liberals, was elected President of the Republic 
with a convincing majority. The election as president had definitely been the high point 
of Juárez’s career so far; born on 21st March 1806 in the mountain village of San Pablo 
Guelatao as a Zapotec Indian, it looked unlikely that Benito Juárez would ever become 
president of Mexico. However, when he was twelve he began to attend school in 
Oaxaca and in 1831 he was awarded a lawyer’s certificate, which in effect was his 
passport into politics. From 1847 to 1852 Juárez was governor of the state of Oaxaca; in 
1853, he went into exile because of his objections to the corrupt military dictatorship of 
Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna; he returned to Mexico in 1855 and became chief justice 
under the Comonfort government; and as already mentioned Juárez led the liberal side 
during the War of the Reform (1858-1861) from which he emerged victorious and was 
elected President of the Mexican Republic.406 
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3.5.1. THE FINANCIAL SITUATION 
 
 
However, the election of Juárez as president of the republic did not end all hostilities, 
for the conservatives still held some areas of the country and their General Mejía was 
still operating from his personal stronghold in Sierra Gorda. More important though 
than the threat that the conservatives posed were the huge foreign debts that the new 
liberal government was facing. The total debt, which had reached 90 million pesos in 
1851, stood at 82 million pesos in 1861.407 Those debts were a direct result of the civil 
war; the conservative government had been in considerable financial trouble and could 
barely raise enough money to pay its troops. A Swiss banker called Jecker offered to 
lend the Mexican government money on very advantageous terms for himself: for one 
million in cash fifteen million had to be repaid, which meant that Mexican government 
bonds bore a twenty per cent interest rate per annum.408  
In the face of this enormous financial burden, the Juárez administration attempted to 
reassert federal government control over all the revenues appropriated by state 
governors, including the revenues of the river ports as well as those of the Gulf and the 
Pacific coasts. The government’s evident aim was to strengthen its fiscal position but 
this decree involved a two-year moratorium, suspending all payments of foreign debts. 
The envoys of Mexico’s main creditors, Britain and France, reacted violently to what 
Sir Charles Wyke, the British minister in Mexico, called ‘barefaced robbery’.409 
Presenting a united front, the envoys of both countries broke off relations with Mexico 
and threatened armed intervention, making no allowances for the immense difficulties 
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the newly elected Mexican government had to contend with in a country where guerrilla 
forces were still fighting in the mountains. Spain, Mexico’s third major creditor, also 
threatened the landing of troops already fully mobilised in Cuba.410 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.6. THE EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 
 
 
 
Apart from their common belief that a government was responsible for the debts and 
acts of earlier governments, the three European powers had very different motives for 
threatening armed intervention in Mexico. Spain’s relations with Mexico had been 
strained ever since the latter had gained independence in 1821. Relations between the 
two countries reached a low point when Juárez expelled the Spanish ambassador from 
Mexico and in 1858 Spain actually threatened to go to war with Mexico on several 
occasions.411 Spain’s goal was thus to reassert her influence in Mexico preferably by 
creating a monarchy and installing a Spanish prince; whether or not Spain, which was 
herself suffering from inner political turmoil, would have achieved this ultimate goal is 
questionable, but a joint intervention by France and Britain against Mexico definitely 
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improved Spain’s international standing and prestige and gave the Spanish government 
a chance to deflect from its own troubles. 
Britain’s interest in Mexico was primarily commercial. Ever since Napoleon 
Bonaparte’s continental system had excluded her from European markets Britain had 
had a strong commercial interest in Latin America. However, Juárez’s refusal to repay 
Mexico’s debts was not only damaging British commerce in the region but the British 
government also feared a trade treaty between Juárez and the US government, which 
would have excluded them from access to the Latin American markets.412 Therefore, 
Britain’s motive was to limit the influence of the United States of America in Latin 
America and to stabilize the political situation in the area in order to be able to establish 
flourishing commerce and trade links. 
France’s motives and intensions were a combination of those of her two allies: 
commercial interests and inner political considerations. Firstly, France had certain 
commercial interests in Mexico, as the country was regarded by Napoleon as a market 
for French goods as well as a supplier of raw cotton for the French textile industry. 
Since the beginning of the American Civil War, the Northern states prevented most 
shipments of cotton from the south to Europe, which had caused an economic slump in 
France, and Napoleon hoped that Mexico could replace the missing cotton shipments 
from the confederate states.413 Moreover, even in his earliest writings Napoleon had 
envisaged the construction of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama, which would have 
greatly enhanced trade and communication between the American continent and 
Europe. Michele Cunningham has argued that Napoleon saw the intervention in Mexico 
as an ideal opportunity to further develop his relations with Britain, with whom he had 
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only recently signed a commercial treaty, and to pursue his goal of a united Europe.414 
Secondly, Napoleon also thought that an intervention in Mexico would deflect from the 
political problems at home; the clergy and the conservatives in France would be 
reconciled since Napoleon was supporting the conservative-Catholic party in Mexico, 
whereas Napoleon’s apparent insistence on liberating the Mexican people would flatter 
republican opinion in France.415   
Despite their different motives for an intervention in Mexico, France, Spain and Britain 
signed a convention in London on 31st October 1861. In the treaty the three allies agreed 
that the Mexican government should be forced to honour its debt to foreign creditors, 
which amounted to 80 million Mexican piastres, and therefore, the European powers 
decided to send their naval forces and 10,000 troops to Mexico.416 As the Mexican 
decision to cancel all payments of debts to foreign creditors had been the reason for a 
joint European in the first place, the allied forces were to occupy the port of Vera Cruz 
and the customs houses there in order to take the revenues as a repayment of Mexican 
debts. Owing to the fact that Spanish troops were stationed in Cuba, which was then a 
colony of Spain, this power succeeded in establishing a foothold ahead of her two allies; 
on 8th December 1861 7,000 Spanish troops under the command of General Prim 
arrived. On the 6th of January 1862 the French force of 2.500 soldiers under Vice 
General Jurien de la Gravière appeared; and two days later 700 British marines under 
Commodore Dunlop arrived.417 
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3.6.2. WARNINGS AND ENCOURAGEMENTS 
 
 
While the three Allies were occupying the port and the customs houses of Vera Cruz in 
order to force Mexico to repay its debts, Maximilian received both encouragements and 
warnings about the political situation in Mexico and his possible involvement in the 
Mexican adventure. As already mentioned, Maximilian did not have on first hand 
account of the current situation and he had to rely on reports of Mexican émigrés and 
foreign diplomats. Nevertheless, from the very beginning of Maximilian’s candidature 
for the Mexican throne there were many voices that warned him against the adventure. 
Prominent amongst them were the warnings of two conservative émigrés: the former 
Mexican Archbishop Labastida declared that a reorganisation of the political situation in 
Mexico would be difficult if not impossible. Miguel Miramón, the ex-president of 
Mexico now living in exile in Paris, stated that ‘a monarchist party does not exist in 
Mexico’.418 And Richard Metternich, the Austrian ambassador in Paris, was worried 
that the Archduke did not have any idea as to what he was letting himself in for. In a 
letter to Count Rechberg he asked gloomily: ‘how many cannon shots will be needed to 
put him on the throne, and how many more to keep him there’.419 These warnings by 
Mexican émigrés and Austrian diplomats should have made Maximilian begin to 
question the feasibility of establishing a monarchy in Mexico, but he appeared to have 
been oblivious to the dangers that the Mexican throne held, or maybe he was just so 
excited at the prospect of becoming emperor of Mexico that he chose to ignore the more 
unpleasant facts. However, bearing in mind Maximilian’s past experiences in 
Lombardy-Venetia and his belief in his mission as a Habsburg prince to rule a people as  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well as the fact that the political situation in the Habsburg Empire made it unlikely for 
him to occupy an important political position again, it is quite likely that he considered 
all these negative reports about Mexico but dismissed them on the grounds that once he 
was made emperor he could change and influence the administration as well as the 
political situation in Mexico. Moreover, since his easy manners as well as his character 
and his modern ideas had always guaranteed Maximilian to be liked everywhere, he 
probably thought that he could win the Mexican people over.  
Apart from the warning, Maximilian also received encouragement for his candidature 
for the Mexican throne, mainly from Mexican émigrés, Catholic conservatives but also 
from within his own family. As some of the voices cautioning him had come from the 
side of the Mexican émigrés, which suggested a split amongst the Mexicans in Europe, 
Maximilian sent his private secretary, Scherzenlechner, to Paris in order to gain some 
insight into the political ambitions and the credibility of those Mexicans living in exile 
in Europe. After meeting with Gutierrez de Estrada, Hidalgo and other immigrants, 
Scherzenlechner gave a mainly positive report about the Mexican circles at the French 
court and concluded that ‘the Mexicans in Paris are joyous about the nomination of 
Your Imperial Highness’420 However, most of the émigrés in Europe had always been in 
favour of establishing a monarchy in Mexico; it was thus unlikely that they would have 
discouraged Maximilian from getting involved in the Mexican project. Maximilian also 
received encouragement to pursue the Mexican affair by Pope Pius IX, whom he had 
asked for his advice and blessing.421 Pope Pius IX, who had once been held some liberal 
ideas but had been driven by his fear of revolution to support conservative regimes all 
over the world, was naturally in favour of a establishment of a monarchy in Mexico. 
The liberal party had stripped the Catholic Church of most of her privileges and wealth  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under the provisions of the constitution of 1857 and the pope, therefore, hoped that a 
Catholic emperor would restore the old privileges of the Church.422 
In addition, Maximilian received further encouragement to accept the offer of the 
Mexican throne from within his own family. His father-in-law, King Leopold of 
Belgium, had the reputation of being a hard-headed man, famous for his astuteness and 
political judgement and consequently, Maximilian wanted to ask his advice before he 
made any decision concerning the Mexican crown.423 As a young widower living in 
England, he had been offered the Mexican throne and turned it down, but now he 
believed that Maximilian should accept the Mexican crown on the conditions that Franz 
Joseph had laid down; that Britain and France gave their firm guarantee to support 
Maximilian in Mexico; and that the Mexicans would ‘choose the principle [of 
government] themselves’.424  
Although Franz Joseph insisted on these conditions and although he still refused to give 
Maximilian any guarantees in political and military terms, he nevertheless encouraged 
Maximilian by agreeing to the floating of a loan of twenty-five million Mexican dollars 
to be effected through the banking house of Rothschild. Moreover, he also offered to 
advance his brother two hundred thousand Austrian gulden out of the family funds to 
meet the preliminary expenses, which proves that the Mexican project was not just a 
state affair but also a dynastic matter. Once the Mexican crown was accepted, the 
Archduke’s annual apanage of one hundred thousand gulden was to be used in repaying 
the same sum, and in settling the still outstanding debts on the building of Miramar. 
Maximilian was to be granted leave of absence on a permanent basis from the command 
of the Austrian navy and provided with a battleship to take him to Mexico. The biggest 
concession made by Franz Joseph was the permission to start recruitment for a  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volunteer corps serving directly under Maximilian, independently of the French 
army.425 This part of the agreement was crucial for both Maximilian and Franz Joseph: 
an Austrian Volunteer Corps would give Maximilian a powerbase to act independently 
from the French military as well as provide him with the core of a future Mexican 
imperial army after the bulk of the French troops had left Mexico, whereas it did not put 
any obligations on Franz Joseph to provide any more troops or money as the Austrian 
Volunteer Corps would not be part of the Austrian army and had to be paid by 
Maximilian. Nevertheless, what is rather astonishing is the fact that neither of the two 
brothers appeared to have had any doubts of the success of creating an empire in 
Mexico and that Franz Joseph, who usually had his feet firmly on the ground, treated 
the concept of a Mexican monarchy as an accomplished fact rather than a chimerical 
idea, although the project of a Mexican Empire was still in its first nebulous phase when 
Maximilian and Franz Joseph met in Venice on New Year’s Eve of 1861.   
 
 
 
 
 
3.6.2. THE REACTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE JUÁREZ 
GOVERNMENT 
 
 
While Maximilian and Franz Joseph were already making arrangements and plans for a 
future Mexican empire, its creation still depended largely on the political and military 
reactions of both the Juárez government and that of the United States. The European  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intervention in Mexico was in direct violation to the Monroe Doctrine, which had been 
proclaimed by the United States in 1823 as a reaction to the expansion of the British 
Empire and British influence and trade links in the New World.426 The doctrine stated  
 
That with existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we [the United 
States] have not interfered and shall not; but with the governments who have declared 
their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we [the United States] 
have, on great consideration and just principle acknowledged, we could not view any 
interposition for the purpose of exposing them or controlling in any other manner their 
destiny by any European power, in any other light than as a manifestation of an 
unfriendly disposition towards the government and the people of the United States.427 
 
This meant that efforts by European countries to colonize land or to interfere with the 
politics of any state in the Americas would be viewed by the United States of America 
as acts of aggression requiring US intervention.428 Clearly the joint European 
intervention in Mexico represented a case of interference of European powers in the 
affairs of a state of the Americas, but the United States were prevented from helping the 
Juárez government fight foreign intervention by the outbreak of the American Civil War 
in 1861.429 As the USA was engulfed by her own troubles, Washington could only 
protest against the intervention of France, Spain and Britain in Mexico. The fact that the 
United States could not enforce the Monroe Doctrine was one of the key factors for the 
joint European intervention as well as for the subsequent French occupation of Mexico. 
In contrast to the north, the Confederate States were not opposed to the establishment of  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a monarchy in Mexico, but in return the Confederacy expected France to recognise 
them as an independent state. However, Napoleon III was prudent enough not to 
recognise the Confederate States as long as the American Civil War was still 
undecided.430 
As it was obvious that the US could not stand by the Mexican liberals, the three 
European powers decided that this was the best opportunity to achieve their respective 
motives and, consequently, they went ahead with the intervention in Mexico. The three 
allies had expected a joyful welcome when they landed in Veracruz, as the Mexican 
émigrés in Paris had led them to expect. Instead the allied forces were met with hostility 
and fear, for Juárez had issued a decree that made any form of assistance offered to the 
allies punishable by death. The Law of 25th January 1862 was the most far-reaching 
measure against those who co-operated with the intervention; it stated that any foreigner 
who made an armed invasion of Mexico without the declaration of war, any Mexican 
who voluntarily served in the forces of such an invader, and any Mexican or foreigner 
living in Mexico who invited foreigners to invade or to alter the form of government of 
the republic would be guilty of a crime against the security and independence of Mexico 
and on conviction by court-martial would suffer the death penalty.431 The Belgian 
ambassador to Mexico, T’Kint de Roodenbeke, sent copies of this law to Maximilian 
and to Brussels pointing out the danger it posed to any future emperor.432 However, 
Juárez and the liberals knew that at the moment it was impossible for the liberals and 
the rest of their army to defy the combined might of the three naval powers. He was 
thus prepared to negotiate with the allies and maybe he hoped to profit from the 
differences that were already threatening to break up the alliance. 
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3.6.3. FRENCH DEMANDS 
 
 
The original plan under the Convention of London had been for the allied forces to 
force the Mexican government to repay its debts; the British claim amounted to 69 
million Mexican piastres, the Spanish one to about 9 million and the French were owed 
2.8 million.433 The British government realized that the Mexican government could not 
afford to repay its debts in full. If the allies seized the customs house in Veracruz, 
Mexico’s main source of revenue, it would render the Mexican government unable to 
operate: the claims of the three powers would absorb seventy-nine per cent of the 
customs dues. Charles Wyke, the British representative, thus proposed that the allies 
open negotiations with the Juárez, giving him with a detailed list of their respective 
claims and discussing how much the Mexican government was prepared to pay. The 
Spanish representative, General Prim, agreed, but Saligny presented the draft of an 
ultimatum that he proposed to be sent to Juárez. Without giving any particulars of the 
debts due to the French creditors, he demanded that the Mexican government pay 
twelve million US dollars to cover all the damages to the property of French nationals 
up to 31st of July 1861, with France reserving the right to claim a further sum as 
compensation for injuries suffered since then. Added to this sum he also demanded that 
the Juárez government recognize its liability to satisfy in full the claims of the Jecker 
bonds for an additional fifteen million dollars. 
Both Wyke and Prim thought that the sum was excessive and ‘utterly unreasonable and 
unjustified’.434 The French demands would take up another fifteen percent of the 
customs revenues of Veracruz, leaving only six per cent for the Mexican government.   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They also asked why the French government was making such demands on behalf of a 
Swiss banker? The official French explanation was that, as Switzerland had no 
diplomatic representative in Mexico, France was acting on behalf of Swiss citizens 
there. But the Swiss government had asked the United States, not France, to represent 
its interests in Mexico. What in 1862 no one except Jecker and his closest intimates 
knew was the fact that Napoleon III’s illegitimate half-brother and influential minister, 
the Duke of Morny, held thirty percent of the Jecker bonds. Many historians have 
argued that the French demands on behalf of Jecker had been intended to make 
impossible for the Juárez to accept the ultimatum but no evidence of these intentions 
can be found in the archives.435 Nevertheless, the theory that Napoleon had wanted the 
negotiations with the Juárez government to fail would tie in perfectly with the 
arguments of some historians, like Ridley, that Napoleon had had a carefully 
constructed plan to occupy Mexico preferably in accordance with the Spanish and 
British governments.436 If Napoleon’s intentions had been from the outset to create a 
monarchy in Mexico then he did not voice them during the diplomatic negotiations 
between France, Britain and Spain. Napoleon must have feared possible complications 
with his allies: Britain would probably have withdrawn from the proposed convention, 
for she did not wish to get involved in the internal affairs of Mexico, and Spain would 
have put forward a Bourbon prince as a possible candidate for the Mexican throne. It is 
thus likely that both Spain and Britain were quite unaware of Napoleon’s intentions to 
put Maximilian on the Mexican throne when the three powers finally signed the 
Convention of London on 31st October 1861. However, the fact remains that 
Maximilian had been approached by the Austrian foreign minister concerning his                                                         435 See: 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possible candidature for the Mexican throne on 10th October 1861, almost three weeks 
before the three powers signed the Convention of London.437 Therefore, Napoleon must 
have had the intention of establishing a monarchy in Mexico, with or without the 
assistance of Britain and Spain, even before the three powers had agreed on a concerted 
action by signing the Convention of London.  
Since both Britain and Spain were unaware of any such intentions the three allies met 
with representatives of the Mexican government in La Soledad, a small village a short 
distance from Veracruz, despite the British and Spanish protest concerning the 
unreasonable demands of the French government. The convention of La Soledad laid 
down the preliminaries for negotiations to take place two months later in Orizaba, 
thereby giving the commissioners time to consult their respective governments.438 The 
convention was later ratified by both Spanish and British governments but publicly 
disavowed by the French. Although Saligny rejected the Convention of La Soledad, the 
French troops were happy to take advantage of the provisions, which allowed them to 
leave Veracruz for the Orizaba district. The French, as well as the other European 
powers troops had suffered greatly from the fever-ridden coastal climate in Veracruz. 
During their seven weeks stay there, twenty-nine French soldiers had died of diseases 
and one hundred and fifty-nine were in hospital.439  The climate of the highland plateau 
in the Orizaba district was thus much healthier for the European soldiers. While the 
troops were on the march, General Count Charles Ferdinand de Lorencez arrived on 6th 
of March 1862 in Veracruz, with 4474 men and 616 horses as reinforcement for the 
French troops. They soon moved on to Tehuacan, where they joined the rest of the 
French army.440   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3.6.4. THE END OF THE JOINT EUROPEAN INTERVENTION 
 
 
The arrival of the French reinforcements had convinced the Spanish and the British 
commissioners that the French government’s intentions were to nullify the election of 
Juárez in the previous year and to super-impose a system in Mexico acceptable to the 
French government. In such a way, Mexico would fall into the French imperial orbit, 
though more indirectly than Indo-China or Algeria. As a consequence, the British and 
Spanish delegates openly ‘accused [the French government] of having broken the 
Convention [of London]’441 at the conference in Orizaba on 9th April 1862. The British 
government had no desire to advance further into the Mexican heartland, fearing that 
after the end of the American Civil War the United States would dispense troops to aid 
the Mexican liberals; and the commander of the Spanish troops, General Prim, had 
come to the conclusion during his stay in Veracruz that Spain had little hope of 
recovering her former colony, where she was still as bitterly hated as in the days of the 
Inquisition. The conference thus spelled the end of the joint intervention, leaving 
France, as Admiral Jurien de la Gravière put it free to act ‘completely independent, 
completely alone’.442 The British, who had already embarked their Marines, set sail 
from Veracruz the following evening. Their commissioner Charles Wyke stayed behind 
as a private citizen, waiting for the resumption of diplomatic relations. By mid-April, 
the six thousand soldiers sent by Spain to reclaim a former colony had returned to 
Havana and a letter from General Prim, written before leaving the country, warned 
Napoleon III of the dangers of armed intervention; he pointed out that the end of 
colonialism had destroyed the old structures and that therefore, there was no deep- 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rooted aristocracy that could be relied upon to support a monarchy, and that Mexico’s 
neighbour, the United States, held strong republican ideas and fiercely opposed the idea 
of a monarchy: 
 
Far be it from me, Sire, even to imagine that Your Imperial Majesty’s power is 
insufficient to erect in Mexico a throne for the House of Austria (…) It will be easy for 
Your Majesty to lead Prince Maximilian to the capital and to crown him King; but this 
King will find no support in the country, except from the conservative leaders, who 
did not think of establishing the monarchy when they were in power and only think of 
it now that they are dispersed, defeated, and in exile. Some rich men too will accept a 
foreign monarch, who will have arrived supported by Your Majesty’s soldiers, but this 
monarch will have nothing to sustain him on the day that this support is withdrawn, 
and he will fall from the throne erected by Your Majesty as other earthly powers will 
fall on the day when Your Majesty’s imperial cloak will cease to cover and defend 
them.443 
 
Prim’s reference to the “other earthly powers” was to the Pope, whose temporal power 
was protected by Napoleon III’s troops; Prim’s forecast was as accurate about Rome as 
it was about Mexico. 
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3.7. THE REACTION OF THE PRESS AND BOURDILLON’S REPORT  
 
 
 
The news of the breaking-off of the negotiations at Orizaba and the evacuation of the 
British and Spanish troops coincided with a visit of Maximilian and Charlotte to 
Brussels. King Leopold was by then an old, sick man, who before he died would have 
liked to have established another Coburg throne; he had hoped that his excellent 
connections to the British government, since Queen Victoria was his niece, would help 
to enlist British support for a guarantee, but it had been to no avail. Queen Victoria as 
well as public opinion in Britain, viewed the Mexican project rather sceptically and 
Lord Russell told Count Apponyi that he was ‘amazed an Austrian Archduke should be 
attracted by an undertaking so bristling with difficulties’.444 The British government 
saw the main difficulty in the reaction of the United States to the creation of a monarchy 
at her doorstep. Although the US was currently enwrapped in a civil war, this war 
would not last forever and recent victories of the Union forces made it looked more and 
more likely that the north would emerge victorious. President Lincoln had already 
warned the European powers that the United States would not stand for any 
infringement of the Monroe Doctrine and that any European power, which intervened in 
Mexican affairs, would sooner or later encounter the hostility of the United States.445 
Britain did not want to damage her trade links in the area by provoking a war with the 
U.S. and thus the subtle threats of President Lincoln were sufficient to make British 
ministers even more prudent. Therefore, even King Leopold had to acknowledge that 
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apart from moral support ‘the British government would in all likelihood not offer any 
guarantee.446  
Nevertheless, the matter of Maximilian’s candidature was now public knowledge and 
unpleasant articles had been appearing in the Vienna press on an Austrian Archduke’s 
willingness to become a vassal of France:  
 
We believe ourselves to be the organ of public opinion in Austria when we declare 
that not a person in Austria believes that the acceptance of this crown by Archduke 
Maximilian is fortunate (…). A crown delivered through the hands of a Napoleon. 
(…). Austria [and Maximilian] would become (…) a vassal of France.447 
 
In general, the reaction of the Austrian press to the possible candidature of Archduke 
Maximilian to the Mexican throne was largely negative. Die Presse asked how the 
Emperor of the French could offer a throne to the Archduke that did not yet exist448 and 
pointed out the fact that ‘this venture [the joint intervention of the allied powers] would 
have never taken place, if the United States would not be disunited and her immense 
powers would not be paralysed by the civil war’.449 Mainly, though, the Austrian 
newspapers were worried about Napoleon’s intentions; they feared that Napoleon would 
demand the handover of Venetia in exchange for making Maximilian emperor of 
Mexico450. Apparently Maximilian was also beginning to doubt the intentions of the                                                         
446 HHSTA, Archiv K. Maximilian von Mexiko, cart. 4  
447 ANNO, Die Presse, 11th August 1863, retrieved 15th January 2010,  
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French Emperor for in a letter to the foreign minister, Count Rechberg, Maximilian 
came very close to the bitter truth: 
 
From the very beginning of our negotiations the thought has continually recurred to 
me that there was a danger of an unlimited extension of French power (…) In my 
opinion, the Emperor Napoleon wishes to dominate Mexico without appearing to do 
so in the eyes of Europe. [Napoleon’s actions were proof] of the desire of the Emperor 
of the French so to manage the affair that the future sovereign of Mexico will be quite 
unable to free himself from his tutelage’.451 
 
Maximilian’s analysis of Napoleon’s intentions in Mexico refutes the popular claim by 
the Austrian press after the death of the Archduke that he had been deceived by 
Napoleon and had thus accepted the Mexican crown without prior knowledge of French 
intentions and of the political situation in Mexico.452 Maximilian clearly understood that 
by accepting the French crown he would be dependent on the French Emperor and that 
he would be a pawn in Napoleon’s grande pensée.  
In the light of this realisation Maximilian decided to send Bourdillon, a former 
correspondent of the London Times, on a fact-finding mission to Mexico. Maximilian 
and Charlotte hoped to get from him ‘an impartial account of the state of affairs in 
Mexico’453 for so far the two had not heard a single account that had not passed through 
the hands of the Mexican émigrés in Paris. The report that Bourdillon produced painted 
anything but a positive picture of the Mexican people. He described them as ‘rotten to 
                                                        
451 Quoted in: Cone Corti, E.C., Maximilian and Charlotte, 1929, Vol I, p152 
452 ANNO, Neue Freie Presse, 2nd July 1867, retrieved 14th March 2010, 
<http://anno.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/anno?apm=0&aid=nfp&datum=18670702&zoom=2> 
453 Quoted in: Haslip, J., Imperial Adventurer, 1971, p 187 
158 
 
the core and good for nothing but thieving’.454 In his opinion most Mexicans could be 
bribed, mainly because the majority of the population was so poor but also because of 
the greed of the different political leaders. Bourdillon suggested in his report that the 
Archduke should not only bring with himself the French army to pacify the country but 
also some Europeans of talent and probity to properly colonize the country. If this was 
the case though, he thought that Mexico, due to its natural resources of gold and silver, 
could once again become one of the richest areas in the world.455  
Bourdillon’s report, as well as the one he received form Kint d’Roddenbeeck, definitely 
had a great impact on Maximilian’s decision to accept the Mexican throne; both stressed 
the immense natural resources of Mexico, which could be exploited by a government 
that established order. The reports also emphasised the backwards nature and character 
of the majority of the population, above all of the Indians who lived in extreme poverty 
and often could neither read nor write. To an extent this turned the whole project of a 
Mexican empire almost into a colonial mission to civilize a backward country and 
people by installing a monarchy according to European-Habsburg principles. It is quite 
likely that Maximilian came to this conclusion because of his past experiences as 
governor of Lombardy-Venetia: both he and Franz Joseph had seen a necessity ‘to 
civilize the Italians’456 by creating court that would bind the different factions of society 
to the ruling dynasty. In the case of Mexico, the establishment of a monarchy would be 
a factor of order, which would end the fighting between the conservatives and the 
liberals; the empire would also ensure that Mexico was lifted out of its backward state 
and would be transformed into one of the richest countries on earth. This belief of 
having a colonial mission in Mexico led Maximilian to ignore his own realisation as 
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well as the many warnings and negative reports that he had received; the Mexican 
throne seemed to offer greater allure and glory for Maximilian than his current life in 
Austria.  On 3rd June 1862 Maximilian confirmed his interest in the Mexican affair in a 
letter to Napoleon, stating that the Mexican Empire could only be established if certain 
conditions were fulfilled: the guarantee of his rule by the two naval powers and the 
guarantee of the military and financial support of France.457 Maximilian’s letter 
coincided with a letter by Napoleon in which the French Emperor stressed the point that 
the intervention would only support the creation of monarchy in Mexico if that was the 
wish of the Mexican people. In general though, Napoleon told Maximilian that the news 
from Mexico was very good, for ‘General Lorencez wrote to me that he reckoned on 
being in Mexico-City by 25th May at the latest’.458 The news of the Fifth of May, the 
defeat of the French army at the hand of the much smaller republican forces, only 
reached Europe a few days later. 
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3.8. THE FRENCH OCCUPATION OF MEXICO 
 
 
 
Following the evacuation of the British and Spanish troops from Veracruz, the French 
army had begun to occupy the country. Apart from some smaller fights and guerrilla 
style attacks the French met little resistance from the republican forces and thus General 
Lorencez wrote encouraging reports to Paris.459 What he forgot to mention was the long 
forced marches through the hot plains, the difficulties of supplies and the effects of the 
yellow fever, which had decimated the French troops. Out of the seven thousand men 
that had landed in Veracruz less than six thousand were fit enough to take part in the 
march on Puebla.460 The town had had a reputation of being stoutly conservative and 
thus the French had been expecting a friendly welcome, but the republican forces had 
occupied the city first and had turned it into a fortress. On 5thMay the French 
encountered the Mexican force on Guadalupe Hill a few miles outside Puebla; three 
times the French troops tried to storm the hill, and three times they were repulsed. As 
they were regrouping for the fourth assault, the Mexican cavalry charged down the hill 
and routed them. The French lost five hundred killed and wounded, and the army had to 
retreat towards Oaxaca; Juárez, making the most of the victory, decreed that the Fifth of 
May should be made a national holiday.461  
The defeat of the French troops at Puebla at the hands of the much smaller Mexican 
troops shattered Napoleon’s optimism of an easy victory over the republican forces and 
of quickly creating a monarchy in Mexico. More importantly though, French honour 
had been insulted and Napoleon found a scapegoat in General Lorencez and accused  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him of having mismanaged the attack on Puebla. The need to avenge the defeat, to show 
the Mexicans and the world that France was one of the greatest military power on earth, 
which could conquer a backward nation if she really put her mind to it, had swung over 
French public opinion and ended the apathy and opposition in France to the Mexican 
expedition. In the Corps Législatif the Prime Minister, Billaut, explained that French 
honour must be avenged, and the deputies enthusiastically voted the funds he demanded 
for the new expedition to Mexico. In September General Forey sailed for Mexico and 
took over command from Lorencez, and more soldiers were dispatched to Veracruz; by 
the end of 1862 the French expeditionary forces consisted of twenty-eight thousand 
men. The new commander of the French forces had the strict instructions of Napoleon 
to occupy Mexico-City and to pacify the rest of the country. The Emperor’s instructions 
on policy were even more specific: Forey was to empower Almonte, one of the émigrés 
who had petitioned Napoleon III to establish a monarchy in Mexico, to summon an 
assembly of notables presenting all shades of political opinion, but choosing only those 
who had given their adherence to the French. Should the assembly vote for a monarchy, 
and Napoleon made it clear that this was his wish, then it was ‘in the interest of France 
to support them in their wishes and in that case the General should indicate the 
Archduke Maximilian as the candidate of France’.462 However, Napoleon’s motives 
were not quite so altruistic as they appeared to be; at this point Napoleon had invested a 
considerable amount of money and men in the Mexican project; costs which would have 
to be repaid by the future imperial government of Mexico in the form of money 
transfers but also through shipments of raw cotton and precious metals to France.  Apart 
from the financial consideration there was also a political side to why Mexico was so 
important to Napoleon. The Mexican campaign with its heavy costs of men power and 
money had diminished Napoleon’s political standing and prestige in France. The  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opposition and the Corps Législatif had asked why French troops were fighting so far 
from home and on behalf of a Habsburg prince. Therefore, it was essential for Napoleon 
that the Mexican assembly chose a monarchy as the form of government. The creation 
of monarchy would, on the other hand, reduce the political pressure that the opposition 
put on him and, on the other hand, it would guarantee that the costs of the occupation 
would be repaid to France as the future emperor would ‘always be forced to act in the 
interests of France, not only from gratitude but even more because his country’s 
interests will be in accordance with ours, and he will not be able to maintain himself 
without our influence’.463 
 
 
 
 
 
3.8.1. ALTERNATIVES TO THE MEXICAN THRONE 
 
 
Apparently, it was not only Napoleon who came to the conclusion that the future 
emperor of Mexico would always be dependent on the good will of France but also 
several other European governments, for when the Greek throne became vacant it was 
offered to Maximilian as a substitute for the Mexican crown.464 It was above all the 
British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston and the British government who were in favour 
of Maximilian’s candidature to the Greek throne but what they had not reckoned with 
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was Maximilian’s Habsburg pride and his sense of chivalry. Both he and Franz Joseph 
considered it ‘the height of bad taste’465 on the part of the British government to offer 
him the throne of a country from which their cousin Otto had had to flee on board a 
British battleship, but to which he had never renounced his natural rights. But what 
outraged Maximilian most of all about the British proposal was the fact that the throne 
of Greece had already been offered to and declined by half a dozen princes. With biting 
sarcasm Maximilian complained in a letter to Count Rechberg about the lack of tact by 
the British government: 
 
Even if it had been lawfully vacated by my cousin King Otto, I should be the last to 
feel inclined to accept a throne, which had been hawked around unsuccessfully by half 
a dozen princes. I am too well acquainted with modern Hellas and its present corrupt 
condition not to be convinced that it would be impossible to build a firm foundation of 
an independent state with a people as crafty and as morally degenerated as the modern 
Greek.466 
 
The Greek crown was not the only one Maximilian was offered; in the spring of 1863 
Poland was on the brink of revolution and a considerable body of European statesmen 
was in favour of restoring it as an independent monarchy.467 Several names were 
mentioned as possible Kings of Poland, including that of the Archduke Maximilian. The 
major obstacle to the independence of Poland and the creation of a Polish kingdom was 
the fact that Prussia regarded it as her sphere of influence. Thus Bismarck asked the 
Austrian ambassador in Berlin, Count Károlyi, whether the liberalism of several 
members of the cabinet in Vienna led to the idea of establishing a united, independent  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Poland, above all in connection with the candidature of Archduke Maximilian.468 In the 
end nothing came of the idea and the rebellion of 1863/64, put down by Russia with a 
sanguinary ferocity, ended all Poland’s hopes of independence. However, the offer of 
two crowns within a year boosted Maximilian’s morale and appealed to his pride. He 
commented in his diary: ‘They won’t let me be (….) Figaro qua, Figaro la, every day a 
different crown’.469 
The question as to why the European powers offered these alternatives to the Mexican 
throne to Maximilian is an intriguing one: Were they just worried that Maximilian was 
accepting a dangerous crown, or did the European powers want to curb Napoleon’s 
influence in the Americas by removing his possible candidate? Although no documents 
exist to support either of these theories, it is likely that the European governments were 
worried about the influence and power Napoleon would exercise in the Americas 
through the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico. Moreover, a quasi-colony in 
Mexico would give France an economic advantage as it would open up new markets for 
French merchants as well as simplify the import of precious metals and cotton to 
France. Thus it is possible to argue that by offering respectively the Greek and the 
Polish crown to Maximilian, the European powers were less concerned with 
Maximilian’s well being but with limiting French economic, political and military 
influence in the Americas. 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
468 Wiedenhofer, J., Öffentliche Meinung in Österreich, 1978, p. 28 
469 Ibid, p.28 
165 
 
3.8.2. THE FALL OF PUEBLA AND THE OCCUPATION OF MEXICO-CITY 
 
 
The offers of the crown of Greece and of Poland had come at a time when news from 
Mexico was scarce and that which reached Europe was discouraging enough; the 
advance of the French army was stalled by heavy resistance of the Mexican republican 
troops. The months that had followed the French defeat at Puebla had been months of 
nervous uncertainty for Maximilian and Charlotte. Both were following the articles in 
the newspapers about the events in Mexico and were also receiving reports from 
Gutierrez de Estrada, Almonte and other Mexican émigrés. The French defeat at Puebla 
also made Count Rechberg, as well as Richard Metternich doubt the possible success of 
the French campaign, which both communicated to the Archduke. Apparently 
Maximilian also began to fear that his chance at ruling a people himself was quickly 
disappearing if the French could not defeat the republican forces, a fear that was 
heightened by the fact that Maximilian’s brothers, and above all Ludwig Victor, had 
started to refer to Maximilian as the ‘new Montezuma’.470 
However, in May 1863 the reinforcement of the French troops finally began to pay off: 
after a siege of sixty-two days the republican troops surrendered Puebla to the French. 
Napoleon was happy when he heard the news of the capture of Puebla; his only regret 
was that it had not arrived before the election day in France, as it would have silenced 
any further criticism of the opposition concerning the campaign in Mexico. Despite the 
unfortunate timing Napoleon still had won the election with a comfortable majority in 
the Corps Législatif and the military victory had made the French people less worried 
about Mexico. After the fall of Puebla the prospects of Juárez and the republicans were 
bleak indeed: they could not raise an army big enough to defend Mexico-City. Juárez  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announced that it would be necessary for the government to leave Mexico-City and 
temporarily establish the capital of the republic in San Luis Potosi, some two hundred 
miles to the north. The morning after the republican forces had evacuated Mexico-City 
General Bazaine and his advance guard entered the city without a single shot being 
fired. Two days later Forey himself made his ceremonial entry, riding at the head of the 
army with Almonte on his right and Saligny on his left. They were welcomed by the 
clergy at the cathedral as the deliverers who had saved them from the godless liberals. 
The church authorities and the clergy interpreted the fact that Forey allowed the 
traditional religious procession of Corpus Christi day through the streets three weeks 
later as a sign that their old privileges would be restored under the future monarchy. The 
same was true for the Mexican conservatives, who had cheered the entry of the French 
and their Mexican supporters in the capital, when Forey restored the old Spanish titles 
of the nobility that had been abolished by the republic after Mexico became 
independent. 
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3.9. THE PROCLAMATION OF THE SECOND MEXICAN EMPIRE 
 
 
 
In accordance with Napoleon’s orders that ’you must be master in Mexico-City without 
appearing to be’,471 Forey lost no time in setting up a provisional government. He 
nominated thirty-five prominent Mexicans to become members of a junta that would 
establish the future government of the country. Nearly all the members of the junta were 
conservatives, and ten of them had already held office in a previous conservative 
government under Miramón. The junta nominated three regents to rule the country for 
the time being: Almonte, General Salas and Bishop Labastida; Bishop Ormeachea of 
Tulanciago was appointed as a deputy to the Regency Council till Labastida, who by 
this time had been appointed archbishop of Mexico by the Pope, returned to Mexico. 
The junta also elected two hundred and thirty-one eminent persons, nearly all of them 
conservative supporters, to form the Assembly of Notables. The assembly met in the 
National Palace on 10th July 1863 and passed four resolutions almost completely 
unanimously and without debate: the first, declared that ‘the nation adopts as its form of 
government a limited hereditary monarchy under a Catholic prince’;472 the second, that 
the monarch should bear the title of emperor of Mexico; the third offered the crown to 
Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria; and the fourth declared that if the 
Archduke refused the accept the throne, it should be offered to another Catholic prince 
selected by Napoleon III. The Juárez government at San Luis Potosi protested against 
the proclamation of the Mexican Empire; however, with the American Civil War still 
raging the republicans could not hope for any support by the United States. Therefore,  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Juárez and his supporters could not stop the Assembly of Notables from sending a 
deputation to Miramar to inform Maximilian that the Mexican people had invited him to 
be their emperor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.9.1. REACTIONS TO THE PROCLAMATION OF THE SECOND MEXICAN 
EMPIRE  
 
 
The news that the Assembly of Notables had offered him the crown of Mexico reached 
Maximilian first through a telegram by Napoleon on 8th August 1863. Maximilian was 
delighted and the news produced another change in Maximilian’s attitude: all the doubts 
he had felt since the French defeat at Puebla now disappeared and his original 
enthusiasm revived. He thus wrote to Napoleon assuring him of his eagerness ‘to lend a 
hand in the regeneration of Mexico’.473 However, Maximilian’s delight was tempered 
by the continued scepticism expressed by Franz Joseph, Count Rechberg as well as his 
own secretary, Baron du Pont. Rechberg had pointed out to Maximilian the threat that 
the continued victories of the Union forces in America threatened the future of the 
Mexican Empire, since once the American Civil War was over there would be a hostile 
and unemployed army waiting across the thousand-mile long border between the United  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States and Mexico. The American Consul in Trieste, Richard Holdreth, confirmed the 
hostile attitude of the U.S. government by adding that anyone aspiring to the throne of 
Mexico would be extraordinarily lucky if he escaped with his life.474 Consequently, 
Maximilian’s letters to Napoleon became more demanding for he had realised that the 
questions of long-term guarantees was more vital than ever. Franz Joseph too kept 
insisting on the guarantees of the two naval powers, mainly because he thought it a folly 
to go to Mexico without the guarantees of two naval powers and thus for Maximilian to 
place himself at the mercy of France. With the Mexican deputation on its way to 
Miramar, Franz Joseph also declared again that he and the Austrian government would 
not become involved in the matter by stressing that Maximilian could only receive the 
delegates privately with no Austrian minister or Archduke present; Franz Joseph’s 
explanation was that the delegation was coming from an assembly that had not yet been 
recognized by the Imperial government. Franz Joseph also made Maximilian, who had 
submitted a draft of his speech to both Franz Joseph and Napoleon, delete his opening 
sentence: ‘The Emperor, as the august head of our House, and I are deeply moved’475 by 
the Mexican offer. Franz Joseph was anything but moved, and he ordered Maximilian to 
remove all references to himself and his government. The whole Mexican project was 
Maximilian’s personal affair, in which neither the Austrian emperor nor the government 
was in any way involved.  
It was exactly the insistence of Franz Joseph that the Mexican affair was a private 
matter of Maximilian that the public and the press refused to accept and which was 
consequently discussed in the press: ‘Maximilian is the brother of our Emperor and if 
things in Mexico would go badly (…) we would not be able to forget that the Emperor 
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of Mexico was an Austrian Archduke’.476 Therefore, there were many in the Habsburg 
Empire who wondered aloud how long it would be until Napoleon would ask the 
Austrian government for compensation for his support of the Mexican Empire; most 
commentators thought that Napoleon would demand the Austria hand over Venice in 
return for his assistance in Mexico. In short, the response to the proclamation of the 
Mexican Empire and the offer of the throne to Maximilian was consistently negative, 
for the public as well as the press could not believe that an Austrian Archduke would 
want to become ‘a crowned slave of Napoleon’.477 Maximilian was well aware of the 
negative reports in the Austrian press and he urged Count Rechberg in a letter ‘to take 
care that, at least during the time the Mexican deputation stays on Austrian territory, no 
direct insults against the respective delegates can be made [by the press]’.478 It is likely 
that Maximilian, who at this point seemed already resolved on accepting the Mexican 
throne with or without the condition that Franz Joseph had laid down a year earlier, was 
not only afraid that negative comments in the press would displease the Mexican 
delegates but he was also worried that the negative reports would hinder any future 
recruitment for an Austrian volunteer corps.  
As already mentioned, Maximilian fully understood that the Mexican affair was his 
private matter; that Austria would not give any guarantees, that neither France nor 
Britain had given any definite guarantees and that the majority of the Austrian public 
was opposed to the Mexican project. However, the Mexican crown still had enough 
appeal for Maximilian to ignore warnings about the true state of Mexican affairs and to 
be willing to compromise on such important matters as the guarantees of the two naval 
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powers. For him the Mexican throne offered the possibility of what he believed to be his 
destiny: to rule a people. 
 
Out of the blue the Mexican crown was offered to me and with it the opportunity to 
end in a honourable and lawful manner my unemployed existence forever. Who in my 
place (…) would not have snatched at the offer?479 
 
The comment definitely shows how frustrated Maximilian was with his current position 
in the Habsburg Empire; although Maximilian was anything but unemployed as he was 
still commander of the navy, he nevertheless felt that this task was not challenging 
enough for him and he knew that the new constitutional structure as well as his 
unfriendly relationship with his brother had closed the door to any further promotion in 
Austria. Bearing all these considerations in mind, it becomes understandable why the 
Mexican throne had such an appeal to Maximilian. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.9.2. CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE AND THE REFERENDUM 
 
 
Maximilian thus received the Mexican deputation in Miramar on 3rd October 1863; the 
party consisted of four Mexicans resident in Europe, amongst them Hidalgo and 
Gutierrez de Estrada, and five, who had come over from Mexico, including a priest  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named Miranda.480 In a rather long winded speech Gutierrez de Estrada offered 
Maximilian the crown saying that ‘as soon as the Mexican nation had been given back 
its freedom by the powerful hand of a magnanimous monarch it had looked to 
Maximilian as a Catholic prince ‘to restore the splendid heritage which we [the Mexican 
nation] were unable to preserve under a democratic republic’.481 In his acceptance 
speech, which Maximilian delivered in Spanish, the Archduke stated that he was willing 
to accept the throne of Mexico and that he intended to reign as a constitutional monarch 
but he also stressed the point that guarantees were necessary and that he must be sure 
that the offer was supported by the majority of the Mexican people, which he demanded 
to be done via a referendum. 
Franz Joseph was not pleased when he read the report of Maximilian’s speech; the 
archduke’s prevarication on the subject of the guarantees of both France and Britain 
provoked a sharp rebuke from his brother in Vienna:  
 
I see that you do not explicitly adhere to the guarantee of the three powers, particularly 
England. I must remind you in the most decided manner of this condition as originally 
stipulated between us. You cannot place yourself in a state of dependence upon France 
alone.482 
 
In contrast to the Austrian Emperor, Napoleon approved of most of the speech, but he 
warned Maximilian that ‘it is not parliamentary liberty that a country in the grip of 
anarchy can be regenerated. What is needed in Mexico is a liberal dictatorship, that is to  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say, a strong power that shall proclaim the great principles of modern civilization, such 
as equality before the law, civil and religious liberty, an upright administration, an 
equitable judicial procedure’.483 In many ways, Napoleon demanded of Maximilian 
exactly what he had done in France in 1851/52: to seize power, to establish a 
dictatorship and to only to make concessions to the liberals once his power was firmly 
established.  
While Maximilian had conditionally accepted the Mexican throne at Miramar, the 
French forces, now under the command of General Achilles Bazaine, were making 
progress in their campaign against the republican forces; the republican forces used 
guerrilla warfare tactics to avoid any major battles that they stood no chance of winning. 
As a result the French troops occupied many towns but they could never stamp out the 
resistance of the republicans completely. However, in the towns occupied by French 
forces a referendum was organised in order to decide whether the people of Mexico 
wished to have Maximilian as their emperor. Juárez called upon the Mexican people to 
boycott the referendum and announced that anyone who voted would be deemed to have 
collaborated with the invaders and would be guilty under his decree of 25th January 
1861. The majority of the inhabitants in the towns held by the French went to the polls 
and voted for Maximilian but the official results were certainly suspect. The republican 
propaganda claimed that the people were voting under the glitter of French bayonets 
and there was certainly a degree of force involved in the election. Nevertheless, the 
regency announced that of the 8,620,892 population of Mexico, 6,445,564 had voted for 
Maximilian.484 The election was certainly a fraud; no elections could have been held 
north of Zacatecas or south of Tehuacan, where the French had no control. And even in 
the central areas voting only took place in the few towns controlled by the French.  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Charles Wyke commented that the referendum was held in such unimportant towns that 
they were ‘only inhabited by two Indians and a monkey’485. However, the official 
figures impressed Maximilian; they confirmed his belief that he was destined to rule a 
people and that he would be welcomed enthusiastically by the Mexican people; it also 
gave Maximilian and Napoleon the legitimacy they needed for the occupation and the 
creation of a monarchy in Mexico. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.10. THE ACT OF RENUNCIATION 
 
 
 
By the end of 1863 it seemed as it would only be a matter of months before Maximilian 
was crowned Emperor of Mexico, although Franz Joseph kept pointing out the fact that 
his initial guarantees had not yet been fulfilled and although Count Rechberg kept 
warning Maximilian about the dangers that were involved in the Mexican adventure. 
But Maximilian appeared to be resolved on accepting the Mexican offer and thus Count 
Rechberg mentioned in the course of a conversation with Maximilian, who was on a 
visit to Vienna, that before accepting the throne of Mexico Maximilian would have to 
officially resign for himself and his heirs all rights of succession to the Austrian throne 
and his financial rights as an Austrian archduke. Maximilian told Rechberg that he  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would not sign away his rights in Austria.† The matter of Maximilian resigning his 
rights to the Habsburg throne should have been the topic of the meeting Maximilian had 
with Franz Joseph on 12th February 1864 but Maximilian stated that he was yet unsure 
whether or not to accept the Mexican offer. Why Franz Joseph did not raise the subject 
is a more complex question: firstly, he definitely wished to put off having an unpleasant 
family quarrel with his brother; secondly, he wanted to ensure that Maximilian 
completely committed himself to the Mexican adventure so that he could get rid of him 
as a disruptive factor in the political arena; and thirdly if Maximilian would have known 
about the Act of Renunciation it would have given him time to appeal to the Reichsrat. 
The Reichsrat would probably have sided with the Emperor, in which case the 
Hungarian diet could have evoked its right to discuss the problem. The result of the 
discussion of the Hungarian diet would in all likelihood have been contrary to that of 
the Austrian diet and may have caused discord between the two parts of the empire.486 
At the beginning of March 1864 Maximilian went to Paris to discuss the matter of a 
loan for Mexico and the duration of the stay of the French troops in Mexico with 
Napoleon. He told Franz Joseph that his acceptance of the Mexican throne would 
depend on the answers he got from Napoleon but in reality he had already made up his 
mind to go to Mexico. However, on the eve of Maximilian’s departure for Paris Count 
Rechberg handed him a document, compiled by the court historian Ritter von Arneth 
and autographed by the Emperor. Drawing on historical analogies and parallels, the 
memorandum set out in lengthy detail the reasons for the Act of Renunciation. The case 
of Leopold of Tuscany was dismissed as Tuscany had always been part of the Imperial 
inheritance, whereas Mexico’s geographical position precluded such a possibility. 
Leopold, the third son of Maria Theresa, had been reigning over the Habsburg’s  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possessions in Tuscany from 1765 until 1790, but when his older brother Joseph II died, 
Leopold became emperor of Austria and the Holy Roman Empire in 1790. However, 
Tuscany had not only been part of the Habsburg inheritance but was also only some 
hundreds miles away from Vienna, whereas Mexico was not even located on the same 
continent. What would happen in the event of Franz Joseph dying while the crown 
prince Rudolph was still a child? Would the Emperor of Mexico be able to perform the 
duties of a regent when he was ruling over a country at the other side of the world? 
Maximilian dismissed the memorandum and continued his journey via Brussels, where 
he received ‘valuable advice from cher papa’,487 to Paris.  
 
 
 
 
 
3.10.1. NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS 
 
 
Maximilian and Charlotte were welcomed by Napoleon with Imperial honours; there 
were balls and banquets in their honour and a reception that was attended by all the 
diplomatic representatives, with the exception of the United States minister, William 
Dayton. He had declined the invitation, for Washington wanted to make it quite clear 
that they still recognized Juárez as the lawful president of Mexico and would not accept 
a foreign emperor. Despite this subtle warning from the United States, Napoleon and 
Maximilian began to discuss the unresolved questions of the duration of the stay of the 
French troops and of a Mexican loan in private conversations. In the end Napoleon  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acceded to Maximilian’s request that France keep twenty-five thousand troops in 
Mexico for the next three years and that eight thousand men of the French Foreign 
Legion remain there for eight years. Maximilian in return promised to pay the entire 
cost of intervention, the costs of French supporting troops, and all prior debts due 
England, France, and Spain, including the exorbitant Jecker loan. This amounted to the 
astonishing sum of two hundred and sixty million francs for France alone; it included 
the expenses of the French army only up to 1st July 1864, after which date the Mexican 
government was to pay one thousand francs a year for every French soldier in the 
country, but it excluded the repayment of the Jecker bonds and the claims of the French 
nationals for damages suffered during the war. The Austrian ambassador in Paris, 
Richard Metternich, regarded the terms of the loan as highly unfavourable: ‘the burdens 
involved are enormous and the finances will have to be very well regulated to survive 
such monstrous demands’.488 And indeed, this financial clause of what was later known 
as the Treaty of Miramar almost tripled Mexico’s already huge external debts and thus 
condemned the new Mexican Empire to bankruptcy from the very beginning. For the 
time being though, Maximilian congratulated himself of having secured the support of 
the French troops and on the friendly relationship he had established with Napoleon. 
From Paris Maximilian and Charlotte went to London in the hope of getting guarantees. 
However, the British government and Queen Victoria refused to give anything but their 
best wishes for the success of the Mexican adventure. Even Maximilian had to 
acknowledge the fact that ‘it is impossible to insist on the guarantees, which had been 
demanded at the beginning, namely the one from Britain. (…) I cannot with honour put 
forward conditions which I now know to be unattainable’.489 This was the decisive point 
in Maximilian’s candidature for the Mexican throne: after two more than two years of  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negotiations he was willing to compromise on the main condition he had once seen as 
indispensible: the guarantee of another naval power besides France. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.10.2. THE FAMILY PACT 
 
 
In the meantime the Mexican representatives were crossing the Atlantic, on their way to 
Miramar to proclaim Maximilian Emperor of Mexico. On their way back to Miramar 
from London, Maximilian and Charlotte stopped in Vienna, where Maximilian was 
handed a document from Franz Joseph. The emperor demanded that Maximilian sign 
the family pact renouncing all his rights to the Austrian throne as well as the financial 
benefits he had hitherto enjoyed; otherwise Franz Joseph, as the head of the House of 
Habsburg, would not consent to Maximilian becoming emperor of Mexico.490 
Maximilian was indignant for he fully realized for the first time the consequences of his 
actions: the signing of the family pact practically meant a withdrawal from the House of 
Habsburg and as such closed the door to an honourable return to Austria if the Second 
Mexican Empire proved to be less stable than expected. The following day, Franz 
Joseph addressed a letter to his brother, which read:  
 
I can give my consent to your accepting the crown of Mexico only on condition that 
you solemnly confirm the deed, of which I enclose a copy, renouncing for you and                                                         490 HHSTA, Archiv, K. Max von Mexiko, cart. 12 
179 
 
your heirs the rights of succession and inheritance in Austria. If you are unable to 
consent to consent to this and prefer to refuse the crown of Mexico, I will take it upon 
myself to notify the foreign countries of your refusal, and in particular the Imperial 
crown of France.491 
 
Franz Joseph left Maximilian only two choices: either sign the family pact and become 
emperor of Mexico or keep his rights to the Austrian throne but remain an unemployed 
archduke in Miramar. Maximilian still refused to sign. 
Maximilian’s stubborn refusal to sign the Act of Renunciation raises of course the 
question whether Maximilian actually believed that the Mexican Empire would be 
stable enough to resist the challenges posed by the republicans and the United States. 
Why else would he insist on his rights as an Austrian Archduke? An explanation for 
Maximilian’s behaviour might be found in the fact that he was immensely proud of his 
Habsburg heritage.492 As already mentioned, there were certain dynastic aspects to 
Maximilian’s candidature for the Mexican throne. But by signing the Act of 
Renunciation he would cease to be a member of the House of Habsburg and thus, his 
achievements would not further the prestige and standing of the Habsburg family. 
Moreover, Maximilian’s insistence on his birthright also makes it appear likely that 
Maximilian would have abandoned the Mexican crown as soon as the Habsburg throne 
would become vacant.493 
On 27th March 1864, two days before the ceremony proclaiming Maximilian Emperor 
of Mexico was to take place in Miramar, Maximilian decided to refuse the Mexican 
throne. Maximilian’s plan was to leave for Rome the next day in order to explain to the 
Pope the reasons for his refusal of the Mexican crown and then to retire to the island of                                                         
491 HHSTA, Archiv, K. Max von Mexiko, cart. 12 
492 Anders, F. & Eggert, K., Maximilian von Mexiko, 1982, p.53 
493 Lughofer, J.G., Der Fall Maximilian von Mexico, Ueberreuter, Vienna, 2002, p.95 
180 
 
Lacroma.494 However, Maximilian told Hidalgo, who had already arrived in Miramar 
for the ceremony, of his decision and Hidalgo telegraphed the news to Napoleon. 
Maximilian and Charlotte were already drafting their letters of refusal to Napoleon and 
Eugenie, when a letter from the French Emperor arrived appealing to Maximilian’s 
honour: ‘Your Imperial Highness is bound in honour to me, to Mexico, and to the 
subscribers of the loan. Family quarrels cannot prevent Your Imperial Highness from 
fulfilling more exalted tasks elsewhere. Only think of your own reputation. A refusal 
now seems to me impossible’.495 On the same day Napoleon wrote a follow up letter in 
which he wrote the much quoted sentence: ‘What would you really think of me if, after 
Your Imperial highness had already reached Mexico, I were suddenly to say that I can 
no longer fulfil the conditions to which I have set my signature?’.496 
This touched a nerve with Maximilian for Napoleon had written to him that ‘the honour 
of the House of Habsburg is in question’.497 He postponed the acceptance ceremony that 
was to have taken place the next day and he offered Franz Joseph a compromise: he 
would sign the family pact if a secret clause was added by which Franz Joseph promised 
to restore him to his rights in Austria if he were driven out of Mexico.498 Franz Joseph 
would not agree to the secret clause, but he promised that if Maximilian was forced to 
abdicate as emperor of Mexico he would ‘take all measures to safeguard your position 
in my empire that I shall find compatible with its interests’.499 He also agreed to pay 
Maximilian an annuity of one hundred thousand gulden every year and to release him 
from the debt of fifty thousand gulden he had incurred in building Miramar. He also 
granted ‘the recruitment of approximately six thousand men and three hundred sailors in 
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the monarchy for military services in Mexico’;500 these forces were to form part of the 
Austrian- Belgian volunteer corps. 
However, this was not good enough for Maximilian; he insisted on the secret clause. 
Charlotte even went to Vienna to emphasize their position but Franz Joseph would not 
make any further concessions. On the 9th April 1864 Franz Joseph came himself to 
Miramar to have a final talk with his brother about the subject. The two brothers spent 
several hours in the library and when they emerged they both were in an agitated state. 
In the end, Maximilian finally signed the family pact though with great resentment; in 
fact, on the sea voyage from Miramar to Mexico, Maximilian drafted a protestation in 
which he declared that he did not recognise the legal validity of the family pact because 
he had been forced to sign by unfair pressure from eminent persons in several 
countries.501 Maximilian accompanied the emperor to his special train but just as Franz 
Joseph was about to board the train he turned around and the two brothers said goodbye 
with tears in their eyes. They were never to meet again. 
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3.11. THE EMPEROR MAXIMILIAN I OF MEXICO 
 
 
 
On the following day the Mexican delegation, which had come to make Maximilian the 
formal offer of the crown, arrived from Trieste and were received by Maximilian and 
Charlotte in the presence of a large gathering, including members of their future 
imperial household as well as the principal notables of Trieste and Napoleon’s 
representative, General Frossard. In the bedchamber at the castle of Miramar Gutierrez 
de Estrada proclaimed Maximilian emperor of Mexico suggesting that in this role he 
represented the united people of Mexico. After the proclamation Maximilian signed the 
Treaty of Miramar, which guaranteed French military and financial support for the 
newly found monarchy but which also made the Mexican Empire liable for the debts 
incurred by previous governments. It was certainly the strain of the quarrel of the last 
three weeks and his mortification at having been forced to sign the Act of Renunciation 
that caused him to collapse at his desk in the library a few hours after the ceremony, 
thus postponing his departure to Rome and thence Mexico. 
Three days later Maximilian was fit enough to travel, but he found it incredibly hard to 
say goodbye to his dream castle, his household and to the people of Trieste, of whom 
hundreds had gathered to see him leave the country. Thus he wept as he boarded the 
Austrian warship, the Novara, at Miramar.  
The first stop for the newly crowned Imperial couple was Rome to get the Pope’s 
blessing. Charlotte and Maximilian were given a splendid reception but neither 
Maximilian nor Pius IX gave any attention to the outstanding differences, the matter of 
the church properties, the necessity for a concordat and the appointment of a nuncio, 
which should have been settled before the Imperial couple departed for Mexico. 
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Maximilian, who seemed to have fully recovered, was as gratified as Charlotte by the 
splendour of the reception and thus evaded these unpleasant issues. Other commentators 
were not blinded by the splendour of the reception and one cynic commented that it was 
‘no wonder they guard Maximilian so well. They would have difficulty in finding 
anyone else to take his place’.502 The same view was reflected in the little songs, which 
were so popular with the lower classes: 
 
 Massimiliano, non ti fidare. 
 Torno al Castello di Miramare. 
 Quel trono facile di Montezuma. 
 E un nappo gallico colmo di spuma. 
 Del timeo Danaos, del ti ricorda. 
 Sotto il porpora trova la corda. 
 
 [Maximilian, do not be misled. 
Go back to the Castle of Miramar. 
That beguiling throne of Montezuma. 
Is nothing but a cup of Gallic froth. 
Remember Danaos and his dangerous gifts 
Under the purple you may find the hangman’s rope]503 
 
Maximilian and Charlotte were probably the only ones in Rome who did not hear the 
rhyme and the two continued their thirty-seven day voyage across the Atlantic, from 
Civita Vecchia to Veracruz.  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              CHAPTER FOUR 
The Second Mexican Empire 
— 
‘The country is being pacified and the robbers are being pushed back; but now is not the 
time for Napoleon to withdraw his troops.’ 
Emperor Maximilian, in a letter to his father-in-law Leopold I, King of the Belgians, 9th February 1865 
 
 
 
 
 
After a sea voyage of thirty-seven days the Novara reached Vera Cruz on 27th May 
1864; Maximilian had at last arrived in his new empire. The imperial couple went 
ashore the next morning and although the French and Mexican officials in Vera Cruz 
had organised an impressive reception, there was hardly any response at all from the 
people. The streets were empty, and the few individuals they encountered were too 
indifferent to cheer; arguably for the inhabitants of Vera Cruz the arrival of their new 
sovereigns was nothing more than yet another pronunciamiento. Galderan, the former 
vice consul of the United States in Vera Cruz, described the entry of Maximilian and 
Charlotte into the city in a letter to the U.S. foreign secretary William H. Seward: 
 
He [Maximilian] landed the following morning about six o’clock and met with a grand 
reception from the French and Mexican authorities; on the part of the people no 
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popular demonstration was made in the least in fact they remained impassive 
spectators of the scene drawn thither by curiosity alone.504 
 
In the face of this chilly reception Maximilian maintained what Countess Kollonitz 
called ‘a sarcastic tranquillity’,505 but the Mexican representative pointed out that Vera 
Cruz was a liberal stronghold and that the reception would be much warmer further 
inland. This was certainly true: in Orizaba and in Puebla the imperial couple met with 
quite an ovation, which had been carefully staged by the French military authorities, and 
this was repeated at Guadalupe on the outskirts of the capital, where Maximilian and 
Charlotte paid a visit to the famous shrine of the virgin Mary. It was definitely these 
staged shows of support for the empire that Maximilian remembered and which he 
described in his letters to Europe as ‘a mass of people that came from the surrounding 
mountains and villages to see us’.506 On 12th June 1864, the anniversary of the French 
occupation of the capital, Maximilian and Charlotte made their state entry into Mexico-
City, where they were cheered by a crowd of one hundred thousand people.507 On this 
day, it actually appeared possible that Maximilian could found a dynasty on the throne 
of Montezuma. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
504 National Archives, Washington D.C. (NA), Dispatches from the US consuls in Veracruz, 
M183 – roll 9 
505 Kollonitz, P., Eine Reise nach Mexiko im Jahre 1864, Carl Gerold’s Sohn, Vienna, 1867,  
p. 59 
506 HHSTA, Archiv K. Maximilian von Mexiko, cart. 44 
507 AN, Archive Napoléon, 400 AP 61/2 
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4.1. ESTABLISHING AN EMPIRE – POLITICAL LEGITIMISATION 
 
 
 
In order to establish a functioning state Maximilian and the imperial government needed 
the power to impose their will on the Mexican people; this could not be achieved by 
coercion alone, but the empire had to justify its demands and existence before the 
people. Seymour Lipset states that ‘legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to 
engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most 
appropriate ones for the society’.508 In the case of the Second Mexican Empire it was 
pivotal that the people should regard the monarchy as the legitimate form of 
government: firstly, the liberals stated that Maximilian had usurped power illegally as 
he had come into power with the support of French arms; and secondly, Juárez and the 
liberals never relinquished their claim to be the legitimate government of Mexico and 
thus provided a republican alternative to the monarchical form of government of the 
Second Mexican Empire. Therefore, for the empire to achieve legitimacy and to create a 
sense of loyalty amongst the Mexican people, it was first of all necessary for 
Maximilian to establish political institutions through which he could impose his will 
and which the Mexican people could regard as the legitimate government. 
 
 
 
                                                         
508 Lipset, S. “Social Conflict; Legitimacy, and Democracy”, in Legitimacy and the State, ed. 
W. Connolly, Blackwell, Oxford, 1984, p. 88 
187 
 
 
4.1.1. THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 
 
 
When Maximilian was proclaimed emperor of Mexico on 10th April 1864, he had stated 
in his acceptance speech his intentions ‘to place the monarchy under the authority of 
constitutional laws, so soon as the pacification of the country shall be accomplished’509. 
However, once Maximilian had arrived in Mexico he had to acknowledge that the 
political and military situation was not stable enough to introduce a constitution: 
 
(…) constitutional attempts cannot even be considered at the moment, complete 
authority has to remain in the hands of the government at least until the country is 
completely pacified.510 
 
Maximilian was probably correct in assuming that it would have been difficult to 
implement a constitution; a constitutional monarchy would have required the 
establishment of a parliament, which in return would have required elections to be held 
throughout the country. However, the fact that the French forces still had not managed 
to pacify the whole of Mexico and that there was still fighting going on between the 
French army and the republicans made it impossible for any elections to be conducted 
in Mexico. Moreover, Maximilian had been brought up to regard the establishment of a 
parliament and the creation of a constitution as dangerous ideas, which limited the                                                         
509 New York Times, 28th April 1864, retrieved 18th February 2010, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/1864/04/28/news/spirit-press-approaching-campaign-advice-jeff-
davis-growls-people-arresthttp://www.nytimes.com/1864/04/28/news/spirit-press-approaching-
campaign-advice-jeff-davis-growls-people-arrest-
alleged.html?scp=6&sq=New+York+Times%2C+28th+April+1864&st=palleged.html?scp=6&
sq=New+York+Times%2C+28th+April+1864&st=p> 
510 HHSTA, Archiv K. Maximilian von Mexiko, cart. 44 
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monarch’s god-given rights to rule his people. Thus it was not only the advice of 
Napoleon III but also his own inclination due to his Habsburg heritage that led 
Maximilian to postpone the implementation of a constitution in Mexico. 
As it proved impossible to implement a constitution while the country was not yet 
pacified, Maximilian issued the Estatuto Provisional del Imperio Mexicano on 10th 
April 1865; the statute formed the basis of the state and provided a body of rules for all 
branches of public administration. In order to establish the empire as the legitimate form 
of government in the eyes of the Mexicans, the statute replaced former republican 
institutions with nine ministries.511 Moreover, it allotted the emperor a position that was 
anything but a ceremonial one; Maximilian could exercise real political power. A 
council of state, whose members were appointed by Maximilian himself, made, 
reformed, declared and abrogated all imperial laws and government regulations. The 
emperor would offer proposals for consideration and after debate in the council the 
approved resolution would circulate as law.512 However, for this government to work 
Maximilian not only needed the support of conservatives but also of the liberals in 
Mexico. 
 Maximilian had come to Mexico in the hope of winning over Juárez and of establishing 
a government based on the support of moderate liberals. He had little success with the 
former. While sailing to Mexico on board of the Novara, Maximilian had written to 
Juárez, inviting him to come to Mexico-City and join the imperial government.513 
Juárez had flatly refused the offer but Maximilian, nevertheless, attempted to integrate 
moderate liberals into his government. Thus, Maximilian appointed two well-known 
Mexican liberals to the state council: Jose Fernando Ramirez, who had hitherto opposed                                                         
511 Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Gobernación, Segundo Imperio, cart. 12/18 
512  Ibid 
513 Most historians have regarded this letter by Maximilian as a historical truth but Ridley has 
argued that the letter was a forgery by Juárez. 
Ridley, J., Maximilian and Juárez, 1992, p.179 
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the intervention, became foreign minister and Martin Castillo was appointed as finance 
minister. At the same time, Maximilian failed to appoint any prominent conservative to 
the state council: Almonte, who had headed the regency before Maximilian’s arrival, 
was given a high-sounding court appointment to keep him out of politics, while the two 
other leading conservatives, Marquez and Miramón, were sent abroad. Marquez was 
sent on a mission to Jerusalem and Constantinople, and Miramón to Berlin to study the 
latest Prussian military tactics. He thus alienated the very party that had called him to 
the country and that was his power base and yet failed to gain the support of the 
moderate liberals.  
Nevertheless, instituting the state on paper, however, was only the first step; the 
administration also needed to be functional. Maximilian hoped that the establishment of 
an effective Mexican bureaucracy, modelled on the lines of bureaucracies in Austria, 
would gather support for his regime after years of almost total state collapse. In 
principle Maximilian’s ideas were correct, but unfortunately his reforms never touched 
the core problems of the Mexican administration, such as the corruption of the civil 
servants, who ‘all do not know their duties and they only live for the money’.514 
Maximilian’s reforms thus only scratched at the surface; they never questioned the 
social or economical problems that lay behind the difficulties his administration was 
facing, and in the end they were nothing else but a make over of the existing system. 
For instance, an inspection of the Foreign Ministry found no discernible filing system or 
registry of incoming and outgoing correspondence; important letters lay scattered on the 
floor or were missing altogether. Moreover, employees maintained no fixed working 
hours, coming and going as they pleased and an inspection at the Ministry of the 
Interior produced similar results. Although Maximilian claimed proudly that after 
                                                        
514 Praschl-Bichler, G., Corvetten-Capitän, 2006, p.215 
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enacting ‘radical changes’ the civil servants now worked ‘actively and regularly’,515 it 
remained doubtful if this was actually the case. However, these examples showed that 
apart from selective and paternalistic actions, Maximilian’s reforms were in essence 
conservative, aiming at the uphold existing structures in Mexican society. 
However, Maximilian’s comments about being ‘bound to recognize that capable men 
are almost impossible to find amongst the Mexicans’516 prove that he appeared to have 
believed, at least to a certain extent, in the negative stereotypes attributed to the 
Mexican nation and in the resulting inferiority of the Mexican culture in comparison to 
their own. Charlotte described ‘the people [as] apathetic, partly by nature, partly as a 
result of their misfortunes’517 and Maximilian complained that ‘capable men are almost 
impossible to find amongst the Mexicans’518 for ‘they all do not know their duties and 
they only live for the money’.519 It is possible to argue that Maximilian saw it as his 
moral obligation to bring order to a country ‘that was currently devastated by chaos but 
that was largely untouched by civilisation’.520 Since Maximilian perceived Mexican 
society as inferior or less civilized than the European ones he had ‘to look to the French 
element in particular for intelligent and practical schemes’521. As a consequence of 
Mexican inferiority it was his paternal mission to civilise the country, to educate the 
Mexicans in the fields of economy, administration, culture and morals, in short ‘to 
educate the people in every detail’.522 The fact that Maximilian referred to his subjects 
in terms of children who had to be civilised has been an idea that historians have 
                                                        
515 Duncan, P.H. Political Legitimation and Maximilian’s Second Empire in Mexico, 1864-
1867. In Estudios Mexicanos, 1996, Vol. 12/1, p.35 
516 AN, Archives Napoléon 400 AP 46/1 
517 AN, Archives Napoléon 400 AP 50/1 
518 AN, Archives Napoléon 400 AP 46/1 
519 Praschl-Bichler, G., Corvetten-Capitän, 2006, p. 213 
520 Anders, F. & Eggert, K., Maximilian von Mexico, 1982, p. 88 
521 AN, Archives Napoléon 400 AP 46/1 
522 AN, Archives Napoléon 400 AP 50/1 
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identified as typical for Habsburg neo-absolutism: the sovereign expected loyalty from 
his subjects, just like a parent expected loyalty from a child.523  
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2. EXTERNAL RECOGNITION 
 
 
Ever since the Assembly of Notables had offered the Mexican throne to Maximilian, the 
liberals in Mexico and the United States had argued that Maximilian and his 
government were not the legitimate rulers of the country, since the support for the 
emperor did not go ‘beyond the populations controlled by the French and a few 
impotent and pursued bands, and as all that is very far from forming a majority of the 
country’.524 Although Maximilian certainly believed that the plebiscite, which had been 
conducted in 1864, was the expressed will of the Mexican people and consequently 
provided the legitimate basis for his rule, he nevertheless attached great importance to 
winning diplomatic recognition from foreign governments just as Napoleon III had done 
a decade earlier. The reasoning behind this insistence on diplomatic acceptance was that 
if foreign powers recognised the empire, then the increased prestige abroad would aid in 
strengthening the state’s image at home. International acknowledgement could also                                                         
523 See: Gottsmann, A., Venetien 1859-1866. Österreichische Vewaltung und nationale 
Opposition. In: Arnold Suppan / Grete Klingenstein (Eds), Zentraleuropa-Studien, Vol. 8., 
Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna,  2005, p. 502.  
Hobsbawn, E.J Nationen und Nationalismus. Mythos und Realität seit 1780, Campus-Verlag, 
Frankfurt, 1992, p. 100. 
524 NA, Notes from the Mexican Legation in U.S. to Department of State 1821-1906, M54 –  
roll 8 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serve as a weapon to discredit and delegitimize the rival claims of Juárez’s republican 
regime. Of course, his empire was immediately recognized by France, Austria and 
Belgium and soon other countries were sending diplomatic representatives to Mexico; 
the King of Prussia reopened his legation in Mexico-City and even King Victor 
Emmanuel of Italy, who wished to stay on good terms with Napoleon III, sent a 
minister. Portugal, Spain, Russia, Holland and Switzerland recognized Maximilian’s 
empire but did not send ministers. Although Britain hesitated initially, Queen Victoria, 
who was Charlotte’s cousin, eventually named Peter Scarlett as minister to the Mexican 
court.525  
While Maximilian gathered European support, his empire had little backing among its 
new world neighbours. The Central American republics of Honduras, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica all resisted the idea of an “American” monarchy, fearing 
possible annexation by Mexico. Chile, along with Venezuela, Argentina and Peru 
refused to receive Mexican ministers. The concerns of the other southern American 
countries were not completely unfounded; while the whole Mexican project had still 
looked uncertain, Maximilian had already dreamed of a Habsburg Empire in America. 
In his imagination this empire would have comprised most of the central and southern 
American states, with Mexico and Brazil, where Maximilian’s cousin already ruled as 
Pedro II, as the two nucleus states. 526 As a consequence, Brazil and Guatemala were the 
only two countries that were amenable to the neighbouring empire. 
It was exactly the fear of an expansion of the Mexican monarchy to the south that made 
diplomatic attempts no more successful in the United States, where acceptance was 
critical. As Mexico’s neighbour and military power to the north, the United States was a 
vital potential ally for Maximilian. If the Washington administration made peace with                                                         
525 AGN, Gobernación, Segundo Imperio, cart 10/4 
526 Haslip, J., Imperial Adventurer, 1978, p. 176 
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the empire, then the military and financial support of the Juárez government would 
disappear, along with the threat of U.S. intervention. However, as early as 1861 the 
United States had stated that she was firmly opposed to the French invasion of Mexico 
and the resulting establishment of the empire. Many in the political arena of 
Washington called for action to defend the Monroe Doctrine; amongst those were 
members of the Congress as well as Romero, Juárez’s delegate in Washington, who 
argued that the US had to do more to help the Mexican liberals. The reports in of the 
American press largely reflected this attitude, but the New York Times argued that the 
US government should inform France that ‘the attempt to control Mexico is an offence 
to us’ and then ‘determine on some course of policy which will comport with our 
principles and our dignity’.527 Despite these appeals to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, the 
United States maintained neutrality toward the conflict, since a conflict with France 
over Mexico would have jeopardized the war effort against the Confederacy. The 
southern states, on the other hand, would have recognised the Second Mexican Empire 
on the condition that France would recognise them as an independent country in return; 
the diplomatic recognition of France would have given the confederate states a certain 
level of diplomatic standing when dealing with other countries as well as with its 
northern neighbour. Until mid-1865, the American Civil War complicated Maximilian’s 
diplomatic efforts; although the southern states offered diplomatic recognition, it was 
contingent upon Mexico obtaining French support for the Confederacy in return. 
Southern endorsement, moreover, carried the danger of creating an obstacle in dealing 
with the government in Washington. Despite great efforts by the empire, the United 
States refused to establish diplomatic relations with Maximilian and continued its 
support of the Juárez regime.                                                         
527 New York Times, 17th July 1865, retrieved 18th February 2010, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/1865/07/17/news/austria.html?scp=5&sq=17th+july+1865&st=p> 
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4.2. ESTABLISHING AN EMPIRE – POPULAR ACCEPTANCE 
 
 
 
Maximilian did not only have to fashion public support for an entirely new theory of 
state but he also had to generate acceptance and authority for himself. Bearing in mind 
that there had not been an emperor in Mexico since the fall of Iturbide and the First 
Mexican Empire some forty years earlier, Maximilian recognised the fact that in order 
to build an image of monarchical power in Mexico, it was necessary to convince the 
polity of its legitimacy. The referendum, which had been held in 1864 under the glitter 
of French bayonets, certainly gave the monarchical system in Mexico legitimacy, at 
least on paper, but Maximilian knew that for it to survive and to prove stable it had to 
appeal to the masses and create a sense of dynastic loyalty amongst the higher circles of 
Mexican society. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.1. TRYING TO WIN OVER THE CREOLES AND THE MESTIZOS 
 
 
As already mentioned Mexico did not have a landed aristocracy on which the newly 
created monarchy could rely; this was due to the fact that after Mexico had gained 
independence from Spain the top of the colonial social structure had been cut off. The 
Spaniards had traditionally occupied the highest offices in the state but once Mexico 
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gained independence the Spaniards had been expelled from the country. Thus the 
creoles took over the positions of the expelled Spaniards; they took over the highest 
levels of government; they became the highest clerics; and they solidified their position 
as rich businessmen, professionals, leading merchants, industrialists and mine owners. 
In order to fashion support for the empire and to guarantee its stability it was, therefore, 
crucial for Maximilian to bind this highly influential social group to the ruling dynasty. 
The best way to achieve this goal was to create an imperial court in Mexico-City; it 
would not only give dignity and grandeur to the newly created throne but the creation of 
court offices as well as the dispensing of awards and favours would also bind the 
Mexican upper class to the court.528 
Maximilian was well aware that the establishment of a court would strengthen the ties 
between the creoles and the empire; therefore he had focused his attention on drafting 
the rules and regulations of his court during his crossing of the Atlantic. When it was 
finally printed in 1865, these guidelines on etiquette and court ceremonies, the 
Reglamento para el servicio y ceremonial de la corte, filled almost four hundred pages. 
The manual detailed a wide range of job descriptions from the grand marshal of the 
court, aides-de-camp, chamberlains and court doctors to stable hands, cloakroom 
attendants, and maids. It also contained over one hundred categories of precedence, 
including every detail of the procedures to be observed at levees and receptions; the 
precise moment during the Maundy Thursday ceremonies at which the emperor should 
hand his hat to his aide and the empress give her shawl and fan to her lady-in-waiting; 
and who should hold the basin when they washed their hands.529 In a letter to Karl 
Ludwig, Maximilian noted that ‘our Court Ceremonial, a thick printed book, a gigantic 
                                                        
528 Pani, E.P., ‘El Proyecto de Estado de Maximiliano a Través de la Vida Cortesana y del 
Ceremonial Público’. In: Historia Mexicana, 1995, Vol 155/2, p. 447 
529 AGN, Gobernación, Segundo Imperio, cart7/31 
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piece of work, is at last complete. I may flatter myself that in this sphere I have 
achieved the most finished piece of work that has ever been done’.530   
The regulations were closely modelled on the strict Spanish etiquette that was in use the 
Hofburg in Vienna and to which both Maximilian and Charlotte were accustomed. The 
implementation of the regulations, however, proved to be rather difficult; while court 
etiquette was an age-old custom in Austria, this was not the case in Mexico. Sara Yorke 
Stevenson, a young resident of Mexico-City, observed that 
 
It was at first difficult to establish among republican Mexicans the rigid etiquette of 
the Austrian court, and some unsuccessful attempts to do so were fruitful of heartache 
on both sides.531 
 
As a consequence, most of the Mexican aristocracy had to learn the rudiments of the 
etiquette first and it was not until the following year that large and formal receptions 
were held at the palace. The strict Spanish etiquette that laid so much emphasis on 
formality also conflicted strongly with Mexican customs and clearly revealed the 
cultural gap that existed between the sovereigns and their subject. When the wife of 
General Salas was first introduced to Charlotte: 
  
The poor old lady amiably advanced, prepared to give her the national abrazo - a 
graceful greeting which closely simulates an embrace (…). Much to her consternation, 
the tall Empress stepped back and drew herself up to her full height at what she 
regarded an undue liberty, while tears of indignation came into her eyes. Whereupon 
the poor señora was dissolved in tears, and the incident came near to disturbing the                                                         
530 Conte Corti, E.C., Maximilian and Charlotte, 1929, p. 465 
531 Yorke Stevenson, S., Maximilian in Mexico: A Woman’s Reminiscences of the French 
Intervention 1862-1867, Century, New York, 1899, p. 131 
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good feeling that every one hoped might at once be established between the sovereigns 
and their Mexican court.532 
 
Some historians, like Antonia García Cubas have faulted Maximilian for importing the 
‘exaggerated ceremonial of Vienna’,533 which he argued was alien to Mexican culture. 
Joan Haslip, on the other hand, has claimed that Maximilian wasted many hours on the 
writing of the court ceremonial only because he was obsessed with the mystique of 
royalty.534 However, it can be argued that his attention to detail did not came from an 
obsession with the mystique of royalty but from the realisation that a functioning court, 
which was closely modelled on the Habsburg court in Vienna and which gave him the 
possibility to dispense offices and favours that would guarantee support for the throne 
from the most influential parts of society.  
Maximilian clearly realized that it was crucial to bind the influential social group of the 
creoles to the court but he also saw the necessity of gathering support for the empire 
amongst the upper middle class, which consisted mainly of mestizos. Many in this 
group held liberal ideas; thus by granting them access to court Maximilian hoped to 
bind those to the empire that still had to be won over to the idea of a constitutional 
monarchy. As a consequence, access to state balls was not only given to the Mexican 
upper class but also to social and economic elites, which consisted of wealthy 
landowners and notable persons in commerce, science, industry and fine arts. It was a 
tactic that Maximilian had already employed during his time as governor in Lombardy-
Venetia and just like in Italy it failed again. Although there was great competition for 
tickets of admission as many in society wanted to attend the balls, Maximilian                                                         
532 Yorke Stevenson, S., Maximilian in Mexico, 1899, p. 131 
533 García Cubas, A., El libro de mis recuerdos, narraciones históricas; anecdóticas y de 
costumbres mexicanas anteriores al actual orden social, Imprenta de Arturo García Cubas 
Sucesores Hermanos, Mexico-City, 1905, p. 502 
534 Haslip, J., Imperial Adventurer, 1976, p. 267 
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nevertheless, could not bind the liberal Mexican to the court and thus they remained in 
opposition to the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2. MAXIMILIAN’S POLICY TOWARDS THE INDIAN POPULATION 
 
 
Throughout the three-hundred-year Spanish domination of Mexico, the Indians had 
been treated as a conquered people. They were forced to pay tribute to the Spanish 
crown; by law they were considered wards of the king; and they were forced to work for 
the state or the church with little or no compensation. In addition, the Indians were 
subject to restrictions on the types of clothes they could wear, jobs they could hold, 
money they could borrow, and even meat they could buy.535 Although both conservative 
and liberal governments abolished most of the colonial legislation that discriminated 
against the Indians and other ethnic groups after Mexico gained its independence, legal 
equality brought few actual benefits to the Indians. Throughout the first half of the 
nineteenth century, Indians were forced to join the army, were commandeered into work 
gangs, and were thrown off their lands.536 Many were also to work on the estates of the 
big landowners, the haciendas, with no compensation and were subjected to a system of  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536 Pani, E. P., “Verdaderas Figuras de Cooper” o “Pobres Inditos Infelices”? La Politica 
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slavery. It was amongst this poorest class of people that the idea of an empire had the 
biggest appeal; most hoped that they could benefit from the empire both materially and 
financially and that the empire would abolish the system of slavery that still existed in 
many places.537 
Even before Maximilian became emperor of Mexico, he had encountered slavery 
several times during his travels. In Smyrna in 1859 he had insisted on a visit to the slave 
market and was appalled by ‘the picture of misery and sorrow’538 that he saw there; in 
his travels to Brazil in 1860 Maximilian had shown himself shocked by the jesting 
manner in which the Brazilian landowner referred to the chicote, the double-pronged 
oxhide whip with which slaves were flogged. Maximilian’s religious beliefs and his 
humanitarian ideas revolted against the system of slavery and he condemned the 
government and the clergy who tolerated this practice. He asked himself: ‘is religion not 
a mockery when a white man arrogates the right to treat men who, like himself, are born 
in the image of the creator, as if they were beasts of burden, or bales of goods?’.539  
Maximilian had already put a lot of thought into improving the plight of the Indians; he 
even drew up a referendum about the Indian question.540 Although the referendum was 
rather far stretched and its policies almost impossible to implement, it nevertheless 
provided the principles on which Maximilian based his attitude and policy towards the 
indigenous population. Arguably Maximilian regarded the Indians as noble savages and 
saw himself as a kind of father figure but he, nevertheless, attempted to promote their 
well-being and to protect them from exploitation.541 Consequently, Maximilian set up a 
commission that was supposed to end the system of slavery that was still in operation on 
many haciendas; the idea was that the Indians should be elevated from their state of                                                         
537 Ridley, J., Maximilian and Juárez, 1992, p. 187 
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extreme poverty and slavery by giving them fertile land, which could provide them with 
food and a basic income.542 Although Maximilian definitely had the best interests of the 
Indians at heart, it nevertheless proved to be impossible to lessen the plight of the 
indigenous population of Mexico due to the resistance of the wealthy and influential 
landowners. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3. THE SEARCH FOR AN HEIR 
 
 
Maximilian had seen his ascension to the Mexican throne only as the beginning for the 
foundation of a vast Habsburg empire in Latin America stretching from the Rio Grande 
to the River Plate. In his imagination Mexico and Brazil, where his cousin Pedro 
already ruled as Pedro II, would be the two nucleus states; the republican states adjacent 
and lying between Mexico and Brazil would be gradually absorbed by the empire. 
However, in order to achieve this goal and to guarantee the stability of the monarchy in 
Mexico Maximilian needed an heir. After ten years of marriage to Charlotte the couple 
was still childless. There had already been a lot of rumours, most of a slanderous nature, 
in Europe as to why Maximilian and Charlotte rarely shared a bed after the first years of 
marriage. The most popular version circulated by Maximilian’s enemies was that the 
estrangement between Charlotte and Maximilian was due to the fact that the Archduke                                                         
542 Oprießnig, C. Kickapoo-Indianer am Hofe Kaiser Maximilians von Mexiko. Eine Fallstudie 
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had caught syphilis from a prostitute in Vienna and had infected his wife; in another 
version of the same story Maximilian had caught syphilis from a prostitute in Brazil. 
Just how little credibility can be laid on this story, is proved by the fact that the exact 
same tale was told about Franz Joseph and Elizabeth after the Empress left Vienna and 
went on her travels around Europe. As it seemed unlikely that he and Charlotte would 
have any progeny, Maximilian looked towards his own family in the search for an heir. 
He suggested to his youngest brother, Ludwig Viktor, to marry one of Pedro’s daughters 
and thus to become his successor to this Habsburg empire, consisting of Mexico and 
Brazil, in the new world. Ludwig Viktor, however, had little inclination to marry, as he 
was probably homosexual, nor to leave Vienna. Consequently he declined both the 
marriage plan and the offer of becoming Maximilian’s heir.543 
With Ludwig Victor refusing to take part in the Mexican adventure, Maximilian turned 
towards the descendents of Mexico’s ill-fated first emperor Iturbide, who fortunately 
had two surviving grand children: Augustín and Salvador. Of the two, Augustín seemed 
the best candidate as he was the younger one and Salvador was already attending 
college in Paris. Accordingly an offer was tendered to the family; though the family 
rejected it a secret agreement was soon reached between the two parties. Maximilian 
would provide for the education and maintenance of the children, with their aunt Josefa 
remaining as co-tutor, and both Augustin and Salvador would receive lifetime titles. 
The rest of the family pledged to leave the country and not return without authorisation; 
Augustín, on the other hand, stayed with Maximilian and Charlotte in the National 
Palace in Mexico-City.544 The adoption of Augustín de Iturbide gave the Mexican 
monarchy the appearance of continuity by providing a symbolical link of the Second 
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Mexican Empire to the first; thus it gave the empire the opportunity to widen its 
legitimacy and offered a future Mexican heir to the throne 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.4. SYMBOLS AND RITUALS 
 
 
The main problem of the Second Mexican Empire was that it was perceived by many as 
having seized power illegally with the support of French arms and that it did not possess 
any historic roots in Mexico. Thus it was necessary for Maximilian to recast Mexico’s 
past in such a way that the empire appeared to be in line with Mexico’s history and 
tradition. Maximilian understood that the best way to achieve this was to use symbols 
and rituals with which the majority of the population were familiar and which could 
create support for the empire from all the different classes and groups in Mexican 
society. The best example for Maximilian’s attempts to use national rituals as a tool to 
create public support for the empire was the speech delivered on Mexico’s 
independence day in 1864. In the speech Maximilian praised the heroes of the war of 
independence, distanced the Second Mexican Empire from the ‘slavery and 
despotism’545 of the Spanish colonial period and managed to gain a lot of support by his 
patriotic exclamation of ‘long live independence and the memory of its heroes’.546 
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In addition to these rituals there were also several symbols that Maximilian utilized in 
order to link the Second Empire to Mexico’s past; for example, the palace of Chalputec, 
which in 1864 was some four or five miles beyond the western limits of Mexico-City, 
provided an opportunity to identify the empire with Mexico’s Aztec past. The palace 
stood on a hill surrounded by a large park, where it had been built by the Spanish 
viceroy in 1785 on the ruins of the palace of the sixteenth-century Aztec emperor, 
Montezuma. W.H. Bullock commented in his travel journals on the great importance the 
palace of Chalputec held in the minds of the Indian population: 
He [Maximilian] could hardly have made a more successful bid for the sympathies of 
the Indians; for to no other spot would the monarchical leaning of the mass of the 
population so naturally attach, as to the rock and grove of Chapultepec.547 
 
However, in order to fashion support for the empire from all sides of society, 
Maximilian had to prove to the liberals and the world that the Mexican monarchy was 
both modern and progressive. Ignacio Trigueros, the Major of Mexico-City commented 
that the city needed ‘essential improvements to place it at the level enjoyed by the 
leading cities of Europe and most of the United States’.548 Therefore, Maximilian and 
the representatives of the municipal government began with the urban development of 
Mexico-City; one priority was to expand gas street lighting, not only for convenience 
and safety but also to enable the city to meet international standards, which in turn 
would ideally promote foreign trade, economic development and international respect 
for the empire. The idea that a modern capital would reflect the power and glory of the 
ruling dynasty led to the fact that the redevelopment program included the 
                                                        
547 Bullock, W.H., Across Mexico in 1864/65, Kessinger Publishing, Whitefish, 2007, p. 145f. 
548 Trigueros, I. Memoria de los Ramos Municipales correspondiente al semestre de julio a 
diciembre de 1866 presentada a S.M. Emperador por el alcalde municipal de la ciudad de 
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improvements of public drives, such the Alameda, where the upper class of Mexico-
City would promenade on evenings and Sundays; Charlotte herself planned the 
reconstruction of the Alameda and used her own funds to finance the project. The most 
ambitious of all projects was a planned paseo, called the “Calzada de la Emperatriz”. 
The planned boulevard was to be finer and wider than the Champs-Elysées and was 
supposed to lead from the Chalputec castle directly into the city, precisely to the statue 
of Carlos IV near the Alameda.549  
 
 
 
 
 
4.3. THE PUPPET OF NAPOLEON? 
 
 
 
The Second Mexican Empire had been established with the support of French arms and 
money and throughout its existence the empire depended heavily on the supply of 
French money and troops. Arguably Maximilian’s fear that ‘the future sovereign of 
Mexico will be quite unable to free himself from his tutelage’550 had come true for 
although Maximilian now was the crowned emperor of Mexico, he was, nevertheless, 
not the absolute ruler of the country. Thus it is worth exploring the extent to which 
Maximilian depended on the support and goodwill of Napoleon III and whether he 
                                                        
549 Duncan, P.H., Political Legitimation, 1996, p.50 
550 Cone Corti, E.C., Maximilian and Charlotte, 1929, Vol I, p152 
205 
 
could have foreseen this situation by looking at his experiences as governor of 
Lombardy-Venetia. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.1. FINANCIAL DEPENDENCE 
 
 
The pretext of the joint intervention of France, Spain and Britain in 1861 had been the 
fact that the liberal government in Mexico could no longer pay the debts due to foreign 
debtors; but under Maximilian Mexico’s debts more than doubled, rising from $81, 
632,760 in 1861 to $201, 573,640 in 1866.551 This enormous rise in Mexico’s debts was 
mainly a cause of the Treaty of Miramar in which Maximilian had promised to pay the 
entire cost of intervention, the costs of French supporting troops, and all prior debts due 
Britain, France, and Spain, including the exorbitant Jecker loan. This amounted to the 
astonishing sum of two hundred and sixty million francs for France alone; it included 
the expenses of the French army only up to 1st July 1864, after which date the Mexican 
government was to pay one thousand francs a year for every French soldier in the 
country but it excluded the repayment of the Jecker bonds and the claims of the French 
nationals for damages suffered during the war.  
In addition, the creation and maintenance of a functioning court also added to Mexico’s 
mounting debts; as did Maximilian’s attempts to win over those Mexicans, who were 
opposed to the empire. Thus, household expenses, costs for the state balls, and outfitting  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the royal residences became serious financial undertakings. Between April and August 
of 1864, the bill for purchases of silverware totalled $47,113; chinaware amounted to 
$11,375; crystal was bough for $ 3,512 and wines for $21,487.552 Upon his arrival in 
Mexico Maximilian had granted himself an annual allowance of $1.5 million; thus 
Maximilian’s personal salary could cover all these expenses. The allowance was the 
same amount that Emperor Iturbide had received several decades earlier, but it was also 
extraordinary compared to the salary of the presidents of the Republic of Mexico. 
Mexico’s first republican president, Guadalupe Victoria, received $36,000 per year, 
from which came the salaries for his private staff and administrative expenses. The 
budget of 1869 that had allotted $30,000 to Juárez was exactly fifty times less the 
amount that Maximilian received.553 
Maximilian’s allowance and the demands of the French and other debtors were financed 
through the circulation of Mexican bonds, the so-called petits bleus, in Paris and 
London in 1864 and 1865; these were the first large Mexican bonds ever issued on the 
Paris stock market and the first substantial Mexican loan in Europe since 1825. Despite 
Mexico's apparently disastrous straits, decades of civil war, and unenviable record of 
failure in servicing its foreign debt, thousands of French investors of modest means 
enthusiastically subscribed at a sixty-three per cent discount rate.554 Nevertheless, the 
terms of the Treaty of Miramar made sure that virtually all of the proceeds of the petits 
bleus went to finance the French troops garrisoned in Mexico, to guarantee the loans, to 
cover the cost of floating the bonds, and to pay off past loans. Of the five hundred and 
thirty-four million francs nominally issued, only thirty four million, about six percent of 
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the total, were actually paid to Maximilian’s government.555 Arguably the Treaty of 
Miramar had condemned the new Mexican Empire to bankruptcy from the very 
beginning. The financial situation was further aggravated by the fact that the imperial 
government did not have any access to the silver mines in the north of the country. 
Therefore, it was hardly surprising that Maximilian could not fulfil these obligations; a 
fact that he acknowledged in a letter to Napoleon in May 1866.556 As a consequence, 
Napoleon found it impossible ‘to demand new subsidies of the Corps Législatif for the 
army to remain in Mexico’.557 The Austrian ambassador to Mexico also reported that 
the French finance minister would ‘stop advance payments unless revenues of the 
country were handed over to his agents’;558 and indeed the French forces did take 
control over the revenue of Mexico, which was mainly created by customs raised at the 
large ports such as Vera Cruz. However, with the loss of control over the revenues of 
Mexico Maximilian lost a part of his sovereignty and thus he made himself and the 
Second Mexican Empire even more dependent on France. 
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4.3.2. MILITARY DEPENDENCY 
 
 
In the Treaty of Miramar Napoleon had guaranteed that twenty-five thousand French 
troops would be stationed in Mexico for the next three years and that eight thousand 
men of the French Foreign Legion would remain there for eight years. The stability of 
the Second Mexican Empire depended largely on these troops; at the beginning of 1865 
the French forces had occupied almost all of Mexico and Maximilian’s government had 
established its authority over all except four of Mexico’s provinces. Only Guerrero, 
Chihuahua, Sonora and Baja California, which together had only seven per cent of the 
country’s eight million inhabitants, had not been occupied. With the country finally 
more or less pacified, a fact that delighted both Maximilian and Napoleon, the French 
emperor began to urge Maximilian in his letters ‘to organise the national troops’559 as 
soon as possible, as he felt that he could recall some of his troops now. Maximilian had 
of course been aware that the French forces would not stay indefinitely but the creation 
of a regular army proved to be rather difficult: what remained of the Mexican forces 
lacked order and discipline; units had been broken up and generals had been deprived of 
their commands.560 More worryingly though, and was the desertion rate; many Mexican 
officers and soldiers deserted and joined the liberal forces, taking with them arms, 
ammunition and equipment.561 As a consequence, the liberal troops increased in number 
and were now able to halt or stall the campaigns of the French army. This was the case 
in the capture of Oaxaca; the French forces had to lay siege to the city for more than six 
months before they could defeat the liberal troops and occupy Oaxaca.562  
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As Maximilian had been aware that the French troops would not stay in Mexico 
indefinitely and that the Mexican troops were neither numerous nor disciplined, he had 
obtained the guarantees of Franz Joseph and King Leopold to recruit volunteers for an 
Austrian-Belgian corps even before his departure from Europe. In theory these 
volunteers should have provided Maximilian with the core for his own imperial army 
and should have given him a power base independent from the French forces and 
Napoleon III. Franz Joseph had granted ‘the recruitment of approximately 6,000 men 
and 300 sailors in the monarchy for military services in Mexico’563 and together with 
the soldiers from Belgium the volunteer corps consisted of nine thousand men: all of 
them had finished the military service in their respective home countries; they had to 
serve in Mexican forces for six years; and they were guaranteed to be able to return to 
their old commands in Belgium or Austria after they had served their time in Mexico.564 
Moreover, the Austrian volunteers were not a homogenous group but in fact the soldiers 
came from all parts of the Austrian Empire; thus it consisted of Italians, Hungarians, 
Czechs, Croats, Austrians and a large group of Poles, who had been fleeing from 
Russian reprisals after the Polish uprising in 1861. The volunteers should have formed 
the basis of the imperial Mexican army but the financial difficulties of the empire made 
it impossible for Maximilian to pay them. In the end, it was the French army that paid 
the volunteers and thus the Austrian-Belgian corps was put under the control of the 
French military high command and it was integrated into the French troops in 
Mexico.565 Maximilian had thus failed to establish an important power base and the 
survival of the empire still depended on French arms. 
Nevertheless, although the military might of France was essential to the stability of the 
Second Mexican Empire, Maximilian had astonishingly little influence on the French  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army and the French military campaigns in the country. Just how little influence 
Maximilian had can be deducted from his strained relationship with the commander of 
the French forces in Mexico, Marshal Bazaine. Before the landing of the emperor, 
Bazaine had been in the eyes of conservatives and liberals alike ‘the master of 
Mexico’566. Being used to giving orders to everybody in Mexico, including the regents 
and the archbishop, it was not easy for him to submit to Maximilian. Maximilian, on the 
other hand, found it hard to work with a man, who in many ways undermined his 
authority in his own country. Although Bazaine’s behaviour to Maximilian in public 
was impeccably correct, and although Maximilian on his side gave many public 
demonstrations of respect for Bazaine, there nevertheless existed a friction between 
them that began a few weeks after Maximilian’s arrival in Mexico. In Bazaine’s opinion 
Maximilian was tackling none of ‘the grave questions by which the country is 
disturbed’567, while Maximilian accused the Marshal of ‘laziness and lack of organizing 
power coupled with jealousy and discontent with others’.568 Although Maximilian and 
Charlotte constantly complained in their letters to, respectively, Napoleon and Eugenie 
of the dilatoriness and expense of the campaign and accused Bazaine of incompetence, 
the French emperor never showed any intention of releasing Bazaine of his command or 
to give Maximilian more power in military matters.569 The tension that existed in the 
relationship between Bazaine and Maximilian, however, was a result of the fact that the 
Marshal was not subordinated to the Maximilian’s authority; Bazaine only executed the 
orders he received from Napoleon. 
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4.3.3. REPETITION OF ITALY 
 
 
As Maximilian had been afraid that he would be ‘unable to free himself from his 
[Napoleon’s] tutelage’,570 it is worth asking the question whether he could have 
foreseen the difficulties he was facing now in Mexico by looking at his own past as 
governor of Lombardy-Venetia. Although at first glance the crown of Mexico offered 
much more power and scope for independent action than the position of governor of 
Lombardy-Venetia, these two posts that Maximilian once occupied are remarkably 
similar, as are Maximilian’s attempts to solve the political and social hurdles he 
encountered in both Mexico and Italy.  
In Lombardy-Venetia Maximilian’s purpose had been to represent and embody the 
Austrian emperor, Franz Joseph, in a dignified manner. Maximilian thus represented the 
glory and power of the House of Habsburg but had in effect hardly any real power as 
policies were drawn up in Vienna and the command of the army had not been entrusted 
to him but to Count Gyulai.571 In Mexico Maximilian’s position was anything but 
ceremonial; there he exercised executive power through his prerogative to introduce 
bills to state council for consideration.572 Although this gave Maximilian considerable 
more power than he had possessed in Italy, he nevertheless lacked one crucial element 
in Mexico as well: the command over the army. As demonstrated above, Maximilian 
had very little influence on the military campaigns in Mexico as he failed to organise an 
efficient fighting force. When Maximilian had arrived in Mexico in 1864, there already 
existed an imperial army of 19,437 men, built around the earlier conservative forces.573 
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Building on these existing forces Maximilian began to reorganize and increase his 
regular army in January 1865; thus in October 1865 the strength and structure of the 
forces was reported as7,658 regulars, 9,432 auxiliary troops, and 12,263 rural guards 
and gendarmerie, for a total of 29,353.574 As can be seen, one of the problems of 
Maximilian’s force was that only a quarter of it could be considered as a professional 
army, whereas nearly half of it was in fact of a police force. Moreover, there were 
deeper structural problems that plagued the imperial army: the Mexican leadership that 
was woefully incompetent. General officers had become more accustomed to political 
intrigue and to fighting small insurgencies than to leading their men in a serious, 
modern military conflict with a determined, well-equipped and well-trained 
opponent.575 Unit commanders and officers on all intermediate levels lacked the kind of 
hands-on military experience their French counterparts had gained in the Crimean War. 
As a consequence, the officers of the imperial army did not know how to develop 
independent action within the framework of a broader operation that may often make 
the difference between winning and losing a war.576 Thus Mexican officers tended to be 
passive, awaiting orders from their superiors but such orders were often too late and 
when they arrived, often contradictory and meaningless as well. Due to the inefficiency 
of the leadership and the structural deficits of Maximilian’s army military power 
remained with the commander of the French forces in Mexico, Marshal Bazaine. Of 
course, this was a challenge to Maximilian’s authority, which was constantly threatened 
by his dependency on France not only in military matters but also financially. French 
bonds represented the major part of Mexico’s revenue but when a second bond was 
undersubscribed and the Mexican government failed to generate income through 
taxation and other sources, Napoleon decreed that French forces should take control  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575 Depalo, W.A.Jr., The Mexican National Army, College Station, Texas, 1997, p. 194 576 Ibid 
213 
 
over the customs raised at the large ports such as Vera Cruz. With the loss of control 
over the revenues of Mexico Maximilian lost a part of his sovereignty; Maximilian was 
thus dependent on Napoleon’s support, decisions and goodwill in a very similar way as 
he had been dependent on Franz Joseph as governor of Lombardy-Venetia. 
The other similarity between Maximilian’s time of emperor of Mexico and governor of 
Lombardy-Venetia is the ways in which he attempted to overcome the hostility of a 
large part of society towards respectively his own and Habsburg rule. In both countries 
Maximilian began a ‘guerre de la coquetterie’577 against the nobility and the social 
elites; consequently, Maximilian attempted to establish a brilliant court that would 
create a sense of dynastic loyalty amongst the aristocracy and the local elites by giving 
him the opportunity to grant favours and access to court. In both Italy and Mexico 
Maximilian widened access to court in order to include ‘ not only the gentry but also the 
nobles in the fields of intellect, (…) of science and the arts, as well as the nobles of the 
civil life’.578 This revealed Maximilian’s elitist-conservative concept of society: for 
Maximilian the representatives of society were synonymous with those who possessed 
intellect and decency, which of course were synonymous with the members of the 
aristocracy and the social elites. Thus he considered a vast majority of the population in 
both Mexico and Lombardy-Venetia as unfit to attend court; this was based on 
Maximilian’s belief in certain stereotypes and national characteristics concerning the 
Italians and the Mexicans, which in return led to the fact that Maximilian perceived 
Italian and Mexican culture as inferior to his own. A consequence of this perceived 
superiority was that Maximilian saw it as his paternal mission ‘to educate the people in 
every detail’,579 a view he shared with his brother Franz Joseph, who argued that the 
Italians ‘had to be civilized (…) and had to be made accustomed to treat the court with  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due respect’.580 It is remarkable that Maximilian referred to his subjects in both Mexico 
and Lombardy-Venetia in terms of children; Weber and Gottsmann have identified this 
belief as typical for Hasburg neo-absolutism: the sovereign expected loyalty from his 
subjects, just like a parent expected loyalty from a child.581 Nevertheless, Maximilian’s 
attempts to civilize and to create a sense of dynastic loyalty amongst his subjects failed 
both in Lombardy-Venetia and Mexico.  
 
 
 
 
 
4.4. ALIENATING ALL SUPPORT 
 
 
 
It had been the members of conservative circles in Mexico, who in 1863 had proclaimed 
the Second Mexican Empire and who had offered the Mexican throne to Maximilian. 
As a consequence, they expected Maximilian not only to enforce and up-hold 
conservative principles and ideas, but also to restore the ancient privileges and rights to 
the conservative elites. However, Maximilian had a reputation of having some liberal 
beliefs and upon his arrival in Mexico he failed to fulfil the expectations and demands 
of the conservatives. While Maximilian’s refusal to restore the property and privileges 
to the Catholic Church alienated his natural powerbase, the clergy and the 
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conservatives, it nevertheless failed to fashion support for the empire from the liberal 
side. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.1. THE CHURCH AND THE CONSERVATIVES 
 
 
By the end of 1864 the Mexican conservatives were thoroughly disillusioned with 
Maximilian, above all his attitude towards the still unresolved issue of the Church and 
the former Church property caused a serious rupture between the Emperor and his main 
supporters. Over the last three hundred years since the conquest of Mexico by the 
Spanish, the Catholic Church had steadily increased its power, influence and wealth in 
the country.  By the nineteenth century the Catholic Church was the biggest land and 
property owner, enjoyed many legal privileges and had considerable influence over the 
population. During the republic the liberals challenged these established rights of the 
Church; the Ley Juárez abolished many powers of the ecclesiastical courts as well as the 
legal privileges of the clergy, the constitution of 1857 failed to recognise the 
Catholicism as the religion of the state and the Ley Lerdo nationalized the property of 
the Church. It was under this law that the liberal government had closed most of the 
monasteries and nunneries and had sold the Church land to private purchasers in an 
attempt to raise money to repay Mexico’s enormous debts. The clergy had assumed that 
Maximilian, as a devout Catholic and as a descendent of a conservative and strictly 
Catholic dynasty, would reinstate all their former privileges, their land and property. 
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The former U.S. legate to Mexico, Thomas Gorwin, rightly remarked that ‘the 
Archbishop [Labastida was] still insisting on the return to the Church of all the property 
formerly owned by it, and sold under a law of Congress’.582 Arguably the Mexican 
clergy had some reason for this assumption, as throughout his four-year candidature for 
the Mexican throne, Maximilian had never expressed his liberal sympathies in the 
question of religion and in his letter to Pope Pius IX in November 1861 he had even 
promised to reinstate the ‘Church in all the prerogatives that are due to her in a country 
so eminently Catholic’.583 
Thus the conservatives and the clergy had some reason to be disillusioned by 
Maximilian’s stance towards the Church when he did not place a cross in his imperial 
crown and did not call himself emperor “by the grace of God” in official documents. 
They were shocked to discover that Maximilian did not intend to reverse the anticlerical 
policies of the republic but instead insisted on religious toleration and confirmed the 
sales of the Church’s land by the Juárez government and the titles of the purchasers. 
Apart from Maximilian’s and Charlotte’s belief that it was impossible for a modern 
ruler to return to the days of Philip II of Spain and refuse toleration, there was also the 
fact that the heavily indebted Mexican state could simply not afford to buy the land 
from the purchasers and then return it to the Catholic Church. Moreover, many French 
nationals and other foreigners had bought land and property that had once belonged to 
the Catholic Church; thus a reversal of the policy of nationalisation and secularisation of 
church property would have caused serious problems with Napoleon III, on whose 
support the survival of the Second Mexican Empire still depended.584 Moreover, the 
majority of the Mexicans, who had bought former Church property, were liberals. It 
would have alienated the liberals even further from the Maximilian and the Mexican  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monarchy if the imperial government would have repossessed these lands and properties 
and handed them back to the Catholic Church. 
Therefore, it was in Maximilian’s best interest to hold on to the policy of nationalisation 
and not to return the properties and land to the Catholic Church. In Maximilian’s mind 
the only solution to his difficulties with the Church was to enter into negotiations with 
the nuncio Meglia, whom the Pope had sent to Mexico, and to reach a concordat that 
would settle the question ‘in an entirely Catholic but also perfectly liberal sense’.585 
Although the Vatican had reached agreements with other governments about the 
nationalisation of church property before, for example in France in 1801, the pope and 
the curia refused to come to an agreement with Maximilian on the question of Church 
property in Mexico; the Vatican would not renounce its claims to the nationalized 
property nor would it tolerate liberty of worship and as a consequence, the private talks 
between the nuncio and the Emperor did not produce any results. After a few weeks of 
fruitless discussion, Maximilian issued a decrees in which he declared that the Roman 
Catholic religion was to be the official religion of the Mexican Empire, but that all other 
sects would enjoy religious toleration, and that the confiscation and sale of Church 
lands by the Juárez government were recognised as valid.586 These decrees did not only 
provoke the wrath of the entire religious hierarchy in Mexico and of the most powerful 
sections of the conservative upper class but it also proved to be the final breaking point 
with Rome; recognising that he could not come to an agreement with Maximilian the 
papal nuncio issued a public protest against the decrees and left for Rome. With the 
conservatives and the clergy turning towards open opposition towards the empire, 
Maximilian was left isolated without any large group of supporters. In less than a year 
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after his arrival in Mexico, Maximilian had managed to alienate his own powerbase, the 
conservatives and the clergy, and had yet failed to win over the liberals.  
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.2 THE BLACK DECREE 
 
 
When Maximilian had arrived in Mexico he had hoped to form a government based not 
only on the support of the conservatives but also of the moderate liberals. Thus he had 
attempted to integrate moderate liberals into his government by appointing two well-
known Mexican liberals, Jose Fernando Ramirez and Martin Castillo, to the state 
council.587 However, this gesture had little success in fashioning support for the empire 
from the liberals, who remained more or less hostile towards the monarchy and 
Maximilian. Moreover, although French forces and the Austrian-Belgian volunteer 
corps were hunting Juárez and the liberal troops, whom the imperial government 
branded as bandits, they never managed to crush the guerrillas completely. On 3rd 
October 1865 Maximilian issued a decree, which was mainly directed against the 
guerrillas but which was also supposed to eradicate the threat that Juárez posed to the 
popular appeal and acceptance of the empire by the Mexican people.588 Maximilian 
believed that Juárez had left Mexican territory and had sought refuge in the United 
States; thus Maximilian thought that by leaving Mexican soil Juárez had automatically  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forfeited his claim that he and the liberals were the legitimate government of Mexico. 
And indeed there was some question as to the legitimacy of Juárez’s claim to the 
Mexican presidency: under the republican constitution Juárez’s term of office had ended 
but on 8th November 1865 Juárez had issued a decree prolonging his own term of office 
as president until such time as it would be possible to hold a presidential election 
throughout the republic.589 Consequently, the emperor thought that the republican 
opposition was left without any leadership and that the resistance was now maintained 
by a soldiery that was in no way patriotic but was the debris that always remained after 
a civil war: 
 
The time for indulgence has passed, for it would only help the despotism of the 
bandits who burn villages, rob and murder peaceful citizens, poor old men and 
defenceless women. The government, strong and powerful, will henceforth impose 
inflexible punishment.590 
 
This inflexible punishment was clarified in the decree, which stated that anyone found 
carrying arms or was convicted of being a member of an armed band, even if he claimed 
to have acted from patriotic or political motives, would be put to death within twenty-
four hours without being permitted to send a petition to the emperor or to any other 
authority.591 When prisoners were captured in a military action, the commander of the 
unit that captured them could execute them on his own authority without a court martial. 
The decree was to go into effect on 15th November 1865; anyone to whom it applied 
would be granted amnesty if he surrendered before that date. Mexican conservatives 
welcomed the decree, for in their opinion Maximilian was at last taking firm action  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against the guerrillas. The liberals, on the other hand, were as incensed by the 
provisions of the decree as by Maximilian’s claim that Juárez had left Mexico.  
Maximilian apologists have always felt that of his actions the decree of 3rd October 
1865 was hardest to justify. Contemporaries of Maximilian, like his private secretary 
Blasio, have argued that Maximilian only issued the decree because he thought that 
Juárez had left Mexican soil and because he had been pressured into doing so by 
Bazaine.592 Paul Gaulot, on the other hand, denied that Bazaine held any responsibility 
for the decree. In effect, it is impossible to exempt either Maximilian or Bazaine from 
responsibility for the decree; Bazaine had been complaining that the emperor pardoned 
too many captures bandits and had urged Maximilian to allow him to shoot guerrillas 
but the decree had been drafted by the war ministry and Maximilian had approved it.593 
The other excuse put forward by Maximilian’s supporters, that he believed that Juárez 
had left Mexico and that the resistance would consequently collapse, is equally 
specious. Even if Maximilian thought that Juárez had left the county, he still knew that 
guerrilla activity had never been greater than in the summer and spring of 1865; 
Maximilian had repeatedly written to Napoleon expressing his alarm at their increasing 
strength and his annoyance at Bazaine’s failure to destroy them.594 Thus Maximilian did 
not issue the decree because the guerrillas were nearly beaten but because he feared that 
they were getting stronger and hoped, by resorting to this drastic measure, to finally 
destroy them. 
Whether Maximilian or Bazaine were to be blamed for the decree, it was nevertheless 
executed with full force. On 13th October 1865 two republican generals, Ateaga and 
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Salazar, and thirty-five of their officers and men were taken prisoner by imperial forces 
under the command of General Mendez. Most of the men were pardoned and given the 
opportunity of joining the imperial army but Ateaga and Salazar and three officers were 
shot. The execution of the two generals further intensified the hatred of the liberals for 
the imperial government and provided fuel for their anti-imperialist propaganda in the 
United States. In a letter to the U.S. foreign minister William H. Seward, Romero, 
Juárez’s representative in Washington, condemned the decree and praised Ateaga and 
Salazar as martyrs: 
 
In the first, the ex-Archduke supposes, contrarily to the fact, that the President of the 
Mexican Republic has abandoned the national territory, and from this hypothesis, he 
concludes that the defenders of independence, whom he calls bandits, in obedience to 
orders received from the French, have no leader. (...) [The decree created] most 
informal military tribunals, extending their jurisdiction to every person in the country, 
found armed, without license from his so-called government, regardless of the party he 
belongs to. In this decree (...) he [Maximilian] condemns to death, every armed man 
who is not a French or rebel soldier, and even those temporarily called to defend their 
country; and sanctions severe penalties for the mere act of concealing a patriot or 
circulating alarming news.595 
 
The decree of 3rd October 1865 did not only damn Maximilian forever in the eyes of the 
liberals but it also failed to have the wished for effect of destroying the liberal 
resistance; in effect guerrilla activity remained stable and even increased in some parts 
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of the country.596 It was exactly this decree under which Maximilian was sentenced to 
death after the fall of the empire. In many respects, the decree of 3rd October 1865 was 
the Rubicon: until this point Maximilian had tried to find a way to win the liberals over 
and to integrate them in the Second Mexican Empire. Thus the decree was a complete 
reversal of this policy; from now onwards Maximilian was attempting to complete 
stemp out the opposition and threat posed by the liberals. It is worthy to note that as a 
young archduke he had criticized his brother, Franz Joseph, for employing the same 
measures, such as the military tribunals, against the revolutionaries in Hungary in 1849 
as he was now using against the liberals and their supporters.  
 
 
 
 
 
4.5. NAPOLEON CHANGES HIS MIND 
 
 
 
When Maximilian had considered refusing the offer of the Mexican throne in March 
1864 due to fact that he had not wanted to renounce his rights to the Austrian throne, 
Napoleon had appealed to Maximilian’s pride and honour by arguing that Maximilian 
could neither withdraw from the promises he had made nor from the agreements he had 
signed: ‘What would you really think of me if, after Your Imperial highness had already 
reached Mexico, I were suddenly to say that I can no longer fulfil the conditions to 
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which I have set my signature?’.597 Now Napoleon was doing exactly the same thing for 
what he had condemned Maximilian in 1864; he withdrew from all the promises, 
agreements and treaties he had signed. In the Treaty of Miramar Napoleon had 
guaranteed that twenty-five thousand French troops would be stationed in Mexico for 
the next three years and that eight thousand men of the French Foreign Legion would 
remain there for eight years; by the end of 1865 Napoleon had come to the conclusion 
that it was necessary ‘to set a definitive term to the French occupation’.598 On 15th 
January 1866 Napoleon informed Maximilian of his decision to withdraw his troops 
from Mexico,599 and on 22nd January he announced to the Corps Législatif in his speech 
from the throne that ‘all our overseas expeditions are reaching an end, (...) our army (...) 
in Mexico is already returning to France’.600 Napoleon’s plan was to withdraw the 
troops in three stages: nine thousand men would leave in October 1866, another nine 
thousand in March 1867, and the remaining 11,300 would be withdrawn in October 
1867. However, Napoleon later revised this policy for he feared that a withdrawal in 
stages would leave the remaining French forces too weak to defend themselves; in the 
end he set the date for the complete evacuation of the French troops from Mexican soil 
for March 1867. However, what were the reasons that led to Napoleon changing his 
mind? 
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4.5.1. THE PRESSURE ON NAPOLEON 
 
 
Throughout the French invasion in Mexico, the opposition in the Corps Législatif had 
questioned the benefits of the French occupation of Mexico.  In April 1865, at a time 
when French forces had occupied almost all of the country and Maximilian’s 
government had established its authority over all but four provinces, the opposition in 
the Corps Législatif raised the issue of Mexico again asking why the troops were not 
brought home now that victory had been achieved. It was a question that people were 
asking all over France; a fact that he knew from secret reports of the procureurs. 
Napoleon had to admit that the people in France ‘had never appreciated  (…) what 
interest we could have to create a great empire in Mexico’.601 As the public pressure to 
recall the troops from Mexico was mounting, so were the demands of the delegates in 
the Corps Législatif for the Mexican government to begin with the repayment of its 
debts. By the Treaty of Miramar Maximilian had agreed to pay all the costs of the 
French conquest of Mexico, amounting to two hundred and seventy million francs at 
three per cent interest per annum, plus one thousand francs a year for every French 
soldier, and four hundred thousand francs every time a French warship brought new 
troops to Mexico.602 However, as already demonstrated above, the Second Mexican 
Empire depended heavily on French financial support and could not create enough 
revenue, so it was impossible for Mexico to fulfil the demands of the Corps Législatif. 
Napoleon’s desire to bring back his troops to France also had external motives; in 
Europe the growing power of Prussia made it look possible that war would break out 
soon. The forty thousand troops in Mexico were not a large proportion of the total of                                                         
601 AN, Archives Napoléon 400 AP 46/1 
602 Ridley, J., Maximilian and Juárez, 1992, p. 213 
225 
 
four hundred thousand French troops, but if Prussian ambition brought about a war in 
Europe, these forty thousand men would be much better employed along the Rhine than 
in Mexico.603 The more worrying matter that Napoleon had to take into consideration 
was the fact that with the capitulation of Lee to Grant at Appomattox the American 
Civil War had ended. Throughout the last four years Napoleon had believed that the 
South would win the American Civil War and that Maximilian would have as his 
northern neighbour not a strong and powerful United States but a weakened 
Confederate States of America.604 He had also hoped that the Second Mexican Empire 
would have been firmly established before the end of the Civil War, and that once 
French troops had withdrawn from Mexico, the United States would accept and 
recognize Maximilian. As long as the United States had been caught up in her own 
troubles, her official policy had been one of neutrality, although she secretly provided 
Juárez and the liberals with weapons and ammunition.605 With the end of the Civil War, 
the assassination of Lincoln and mounting pressure on Seward from the American 
public and press as well as from military commanders such as Grant to enforce the 
Monroe Doctrine and thus to invade Mexico in order to restore the republican 
government, it was rather uncertain if the United States would remain neutral much 
longer.606 
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4.5.2. MAXIMILIAN’S REACTION 
 
 
Maximilian was furious when he was told about Napoleon’s decision; he wrote to the 
French emperor in protest accusing him of breaking ‘the treaties that [he] had signed 
with me only two years ago’ and demanding that Napoleon ‘returned his troops 
immediately to the American continent’.607 However, there could be no question of 
Napoleon changing his mind, he was determined to cut his losses in Mexico. Complying 
with Napoleon’s orders, Bazaine began to evacuate the French troops from the borders, 
withdrawing to convenient assembly points and not fighting unless they were attacked. 
As soon as the French soldiers started to withdraw from strategically important 
positions, the liberal army immediately occupied those and thus the liberals conquered 
more and more territory. It became increasingly obvious that after the evacuation of all 
the French troops from Mexico, the imperial army would not be able to halt the advance 
of liberal forces. Maximilian looked chiefly to Austria to provide the volunteers needed 
for his army and ultimately to replace the withdrawing French troops. A force of 6,800 
Austrian volunteers had already arrived in 1864/65 and now formed part of the 
Austrian-Belgian volunteer corps. 608 In March 1866 his agents recruited a second 
contingent consisting of four thousand volunteers in Austria; the first detachment was to 
sail from Trieste on 15th May.609 Seward instructed the U.S. consul in Vienna to make a 
strong protest to Count Rechberg, the Austrian foreign minister and to inform him that 
 
In the vent of hostilities being carried on hereafter in Mexico by Austrian subjects, 
under the command or with the sanction of the government in Vienna, the United  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States will feel themselves at liberty to regard those hostilities as constituting a state of 
war, waged at this time and under existing circumstance, the United States could not 
engage to remain as silent or neutral spectator.610 
 
With this statement Seward abruptly reversed Washington’s posture toward foreign 
intervention in Mexico; the United States’ neutrality toward the conflict between France 
and the Juárez government would apparently end if Austrian troops intervened in the 
conflict. Seward was sure that the Austrian government would not engage itself in a war 
overseas while Prussia was threatening its vital interests in Europe. And surely enough, 
the Austrian government forbade the volunteers to sail to Vera Cruz and banned any 
further recruitment in Austria of volunteers to serve in Mexico.611 
 
 
 
 
 
4.6. MAXIMILIAN CONSIDERS ABDICATION 
 
 
 
By the summer of 1866 Maximilian’s situation looked very serious; the liberals were 
winning everywhere and he had neither sufficient money nor sufficient troops to stop 
them. Napoleon believed that Maximilian’s best course was to abdicate and return to 
Europe and there were many amongst the French officers and the moderate liberals,                                                         
610 Valone. S.J., ‘Weakness offers temptation’, 1955, p.592  611 Ibid, p.594 
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who agreed that abdication was the only possible solution.612 Maximilian wavered, his 
common sense fought with his pride as he dreaded the ridicule of failure. It was at this 
point that Charlotte intervened; she decided to go to Europe in order to confront 
Napoleon with his broken promises; she would regain the support of the Pope and she 
would open the eyes of European statesmen to the growing danger of the United 
States.613 Before she set out for Europe, Charlotte gave Maximilian a memorandum in 
which she urged him not to abdicate: 
 
Abdication is only excusable in old men and idiots. It is not permissible in a young 
man of thirty-four, full of life and hope for the future, for sovereignty is the most 
precious of all possessions. From the moment one assumes responsibility for the 
destiny of a nation, one does so at one’s own risk and is not at liberty to abandon it. 
(…) Emperors do not give themselves up. So long as there is an emperor, there is still 
an empire, even if he has no more than six feet of earth belonging to him, for the 
empire is nothing without the emperor.614 
 
On 9th July 1866 Charlotte left Mexico-City; on the four-day long journey to Vera Cruz 
Charlotte began to behave a little strangely and the members of her court later, with 
hindsight, thought that she displayed the first symptoms of insanity.  
 
 
 
                                                         
612 AN, Archive Napoléon, 400 AP 61/1 613 Conte Corti, E.C., Maximilian von Mexiko. Tragödie eines Kaisers, Knaur, Vienna, 1978, 
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4.6.1.  CHARLOTTE’S VOYAGE TO EUROPE 
 
 
On 8th August 1866 Charlotte arrived at Saint-Nazaire and went from there by train to 
Paris. She had hoped to see Napoleon at once but the emperor was ill and could only 
receive her a few days later. Although Charlotte pleaded with Napoleon to reverse his 
decision with regard to the evacuation of the French troops, the emperor remained 
adamant; the French would withdraw from Mexican soil by March 1867.615 Following 
Charlotte’s departure from Paris, Napoleon wrote a letter to Maximilian in which he 
ultimately cut himself and France loose from any responsibility for the survival of the 
monarchy in Mexico: 
 
We had great pleasure in receiving the Empress Charlotte, yet it was very painful for 
me to be unable to accede to her requests. We are in fact at a decisive moment for 
Mexico, and it is necessary for Your Majesty to come to a heroic resolution: the time 
for half measures has gone by. I must begin by stating to Your Majesty that it is 
henceforth impossible for me to give Mexico another écu or soldier.616 
 
While Napoleon was cutting the remaining ties with Mexico and even urged 
Maximilian to abdicate, Charlotte was trying to gather support for the empire. From 
Paris she went to Miramar; she stayed there for three weeks living not in the castle, 
where construction work was being carried out, but in the little cottage in the garden. 
                                                        615 Conte Corti, E.C., Maximilian von Mexiko., 1978, p. 226f 
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She then went to Rome to see Pope Pius IX and there she showed the first 
unmistakeable symptoms of insanity.617 
On 30th September 1866 Charlotte had a private audience with the pope during which 
she asked Pius IX if she could stay the night in the Vatican instead of returning to her 
hotel. No woman in history had ever spent a night in the Vatican and, consequently, the 
pope at first declined her request.618 But Charlotte insisted that this was the only place 
where she would be safe from Napoleon’s agents, who were trying to poison her. There 
was no question she was suffering from paranoia and a severe persecution mania, and 
thus the pope allowed her to stay one night in the Vatican; the next morning he sent her 
back to her hotel under escort.619 In the hotel she refused to touch any food or drink that 
had been prepared by the staff of the hotel she was staying in, for she claimed that 
‘someone is intent on poisoning me’.620 She also drove with her lady-in-waiting to the 
Trevi Fountain and filled a crystal pitcher with water from the fountain and took it back 
to the hotel to drink.621 
Realizing Charlotte’s mental distress, her gentlemen had written to her brother King 
Leopold II of Belgium, who arranged for his sister to be taken to Miramar. There she 
was examined by Professor Riedel, the leading mental specialist in Vienna, who 
diagnosed ‘a severe congestion of the brain’.622 Leopold later decided that Charlotte’s 
medical condition and the isolation of Miramar were doing more harm than good, and 
he had her brought to Belgium, where she lived in the castle of Tervuren near Brussels. 
Her mental state did improve slightly; the persecution paranoia vanished and sometimes 
                                                        
617  Bestenreiner, E., Charlotte von Mexiko, Triumph und Tragödie einer Kaiserin, Piper, 
Munich, 2008, p. 238 618 Ibid, 241f 
619 NA, Notes from the Mexican Legation in U.S. to Department of State, 1821-1906, M54 – 
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620 Ibid 
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she even understood her condition, while on other occasions she asked why Maximilian 
was late for dinner.623  
On 18 October 1866 Maximilian received a telegram informing him that the empress 
was ill. The telegram did not specify the nature of her illness but mentioned that she was 
in the care of Professor Riedel. When his physician, Dr Basch, told Maximilian that 
Professor Riedel was the director of the lunatic asylum in Vienna, Maximilian did not 
only immediately understand what had happened to Charlotte but he also realized that 
her mission to gather support for the Mexican Empire in Europe had failed.624 Charlotte 
died on 19th January 1927 at the age eighty-six, having survived Maximilian by sixty 
years.625 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.6.2. MAXIMILIAN REACHES A ‘HEROIC DECISION’626 
 
 
While Charlotte travelled to Europe the liberals had overrun the empire: by the end of 
September they had captured Matamoros, Tampico, Tuxpan, Saltillo, Monterrey, 
Durango, Guaymas, Alvarado and Tlacotalpan; by the end of the year Oaxaca, 
Mazatlan, Jalapa, Guadalajata and San Luis Potosi had fallen to the liberals.                                                         623 Bestenreiner, E., Charlotte, ,2008, p. 259 
624 Basch, S., Recollections of Mexico. The last Ten Months of Maximilian’s Empire, Sr Brooks, 
Wilmington, 2001, p. 28 625 Bestenreiner, E., Charlotte, ,2008, p. 262 
626 AN, Archives Napoléon 400 AP 46/1 
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Maximilian’s empire had shrunken considerably, now comprising only the areas around 
Vera Cruz, Orizaba, Puebla, Mexico-City and Querétaro. Considering the desperate 
political and military situation the emperor was facing, it is hardly surprising that 
rumours that Maximilian was about to abdicate were circulating in Europe and the 
United States.627 Maximilian was indeed seriously considering abdication but he could 
not make up his mind. Before her departure to Europe Charlotte had called abdication 
an act of cowardice but now one of Maximilian’s closest advisor, Hertzfeld, urged him 
to abdicate and leave Mexico.628 A return to Europe would have meant humiliation and 
a future without any prospects; Franz Joseph might reinstate Maximilian in his rights as 
an Archduke but he would certainly not give him any kind of high-ranking position. 
However, remaining in Mexico without any outside support for the empire was 
definitely a dangerous idea. 
Without having reached any kind a resolution, Maximilian travelled to one of his 
residences in Orizaba in November 1866; the news spread immediately that he was on 
his way to Vera Cruz to embark for Europe and that he would abdicate before he sailed. 
Maximilian, though, was so unsure and indecisive about the best course of action that 
he summoned his cabinet ministers to Orizaba in order to get their advice on whether or 
not he should abdicate. Some of his moderate liberals in the cabinet though that he 
should go, but Maximilian’s conservative ministers appealed to Maximilian’s sense of 
honour and pride by calling a possible abdication and return to Europe a flight. 
However, the conservatives were less concerned about Maximilian’s safety if he stayed 
in Mexico than fear for their own; before the French occupation of Mexico Juárez had 
decreed that any Mexican, who supported or helped the invaders would be considered a 
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traitor and would be shot if he fell into the hands of the liberals.629 Thus, the 
conservative ministers did not only stand to lose their position and property in Mexico if 
Maximilian abdicated but quite possibly also their lives. 
When the question of abdication was put to a vote, it is not surprising that ten out of 
twelve ministers voted against abdication.630 When the ministers told Maximilian of 
their decision, he said that he would continue as emperor until he could convoke a 
special session of the Assembly of Notables, whose decision he would abide by. 
Maximilian had decided not to abdicate; he was now relying solemnly on the support of 
the conservatives, including Miramón and Marquez who had returned to Mexico, to 
fight the liberals. Upon Maximilian’s return to Mexico, the imperial government issued 
a proclamation stating that the emperor would not leave the country but would defend 
the empire against the liberals:  
 
One of the most grateful events for good Mexicans has just occured to the nation. 
H.M. the Emperor, who has made so many sacrifices for the welfare and happiness of 
our dear country has given the best proof of the interest he takes in it. When 
overwhelmed by the natural feelings which were still contending and which are still so 
in his mind, in consequence of the ill-health of his august and noble spouse our 
beloved sovereign, he thought for a moment that he ought temporarily to abandon the 
country to devote himself to fulfilling the sacred duty of offering to his worthy consort 
the cares she so much needs in the delicate condition in which she is. The Emperor 
sacrifices himself for us, postpones his duties as a man to those which his honour 
points out to him to be controlling, and in these critical moments that the country may 
pass safely through, he solemnly declares that he will continue at the helm and will  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contest without remission until the last drop of his blood be shed in defence of the 
nation.631 
 
Maximilian seemed indeed prepared to stay in Mexico;632 before the French army 
marched out of Mexico-City on 5th February 1867, three years and eight months after 
they had captured it, Bazaine had offered Maximilian a place on the last French ship 
leaving Vera Cruz for Europe. On the way to Vera Cruz, Bazaine stopped in Puebla 
from where he sent Maximilian a message that if he had changed his mind about leaving 
the country, he would wait for him at Puebla and escort him to Vera Cruz. Maximilian, 
however, had decided to remain in Mexico and to lead his army into battle against the 
liberals.633 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Tragedy 
                        — 
‘I am dying in the knowledge of having wanted to achieve the right thing’ 
Maximilian, in his farewell letter to his mother, Archduchess Sophie, 16th June 1867  
 
 
 
 
 
At the beginning of 1867 the situation for Maximilian and the survival of the Second 
Mexican Empire looked very bleak indeed: the liberals were winning everywhere. The 
liberal forces had recaptured most of Mexico and Maximilian’s empire, in effect, had 
shrunk so much that it now only comprised the cities of Vera Cruz, Puebla, Mexico-
City and Querétaro. The military success of the liberal troops was mainly due to the fact 
that France was withdrawing her forces from Mexico; in accordance with Napoleon’s 
orders the French army was assembling in Vera Cruz to be shipped back to Europe. 
Before evacuating a town, the French in most cases destroyed their armaments. Bazaine 
and the French officers were bitterly reproached for this, both at the time and 
afterwards, by Maximilian and his supporters. They raised the question as to why the 
French did not at least leave their cannons, their rifles and their ammunition behind for 
Maximilian’s army. Maximilian’s supporters attributed this solely to Bazaine’s malice 
and his hatred of Maximilian.634 Bazaine’s supporters, such as Paul Gaulot, refuted this 
accusation. They argued that the imperial army was so inefficient that they would not                                                         
634 Hellinghaus,O. (ed.) Maximilian von Mexiko. Das Ende einer Kaisers. Blätter aus dem 
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have been able to collect the munitions if the French had left them behind.635 It was true 
though, that when the French evacuated a town, the liberals occupied it almost 
immediately; and if the French had not destroyed their ammunition when they 
withdrew, it would in every case have fallen into the hands of the liberals. Thus the 
steady advance of the liberal troops under the command of General Escobedo and 
General Corona towards Mexico-City gave Juárez, who was moving a little behind his 
armies, the chance to move further south and to establish his government in Zacatecas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1. QUERÉTARO 
 
 
 
While the liberals were overrunning the empire, the Mexican conservatives had 
appealed to Maximilian’s honour as a Habsburg and had presented him with the 
necessity of putting himself at the head of his army and to assume command. From the 
safety of Paris Gutierrez de Estrada asked Maximilian in letter: 
 
Which general renounces his command over the army at the hour of battle? (…) The 
Empress has sacrificed her health, as she would have sacrificed her life, (…) the whole                                                         
635 Gaulot, P. L’Expedition du Mexique, Ollendorf, Paris, 1906, p. 496 
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world (…) would applaud your Majesty if you would show the same courage. Then a 
glorious victory will be possible (…). However, if everything fails, then you, sire, 
have the certainty to have done everything humanly possible and to have preserved 
your honour as well as that of your house.636 
 
Nevertheless, it had not only been the appeals of the conservatives and the knowledge 
that a return to Austria would give him few future prospects that convinced Maximilian 
not to abdicate, but he also hoped that a military victory against the liberals was still 
possible. The withdrawal of the French forces from Mexico had seriously weakened the 
military strength of the imperial army but Maximilian had attempted to see the French 
departure as a sort of liberation; his comment that ‘we are now finally free from exterior 
pressure’637 was clearly intended to appeal to the Mexicans’ sense of independence and 
thus to raise the morale amongst his supporters and troops. Maximilian’s hopes for a 
military success were raised by a victory of Miramón over the liberal forces. Miramón, 
who had known that Juárez was established in Zacatecas, had led a troop of cavalry, had 
raided Zacatecas and had almost captured Juárez. Unfortunately, the liberal leader had 
been warned and he and his ministers had left the city just in time. Maximilian had 
given Miramón the order that ‘in the event that you capture Juárez, Lerdo de Tejada 
(…) and others, they should be tried by court marshal in accordance with the law of 4th 
November of last year; the sentence though will not be carried out until we 
[Maximilian] have given our consent’.638 The question what Maximilian would have 
done with Juárez if Miramón had caught him is an intriguing one: would he have given 
the permission to shoot Juárez in accordance with the decree of 3rd October 1865? Or 
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would he have pardoned his enemy? However, the joy about Miramón’s victory was 
short-lived; his daring raid had caught the liberals off guard, but General Escobedo 
quickly assembled his forces and struck back at Miramón; a week later he defeated 
Miramón at San Jacinto, a little south of Zacatecas.639 The liberals captured more than 
one hundred prisoners in the battle, most of whom were shot, but Miramón managed to 
escape with the rest of his forces to Querétaro. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1.1. STRATEGIES, RIVALRIES AND SHORTAGES OF SUPPLIES 
 
 
On the 13th February 1867 Maximilian left Mexico-City, not for Vera Cruz and the 
safety of Europe, but for Querétaro in the north of the country. He was accompanied by 
General Marquez and a force of two thousand cavalry, while the Austrian and Belgian 
levies stayed behind in the capital. The Belgian and Austrian volunteer corps had been 
disbanded on 26th December 1866 party due to the fact that the imperial government 
could not longer pay the volunteers and partly due to the pressure that the United States 
put on Austria not to supply troops for the Mexican Empire.640 Most of the Belgian and 
Austrian soldiers had left Mexico together with the French army. However, one 
thousand and eleven Austrians and a couple of hundred Belgian volunteers had decided 
to stay in Mexico and had become part of the imperial army. As the Austrian and                                                         
639 Ridley, L., Maximilian and Juárez, 1992, p. 247 
640 Klinger, W., Für Kaiser Max nach Mexiko - Das Österreichische Freiwilligenkorps in 
Mexiko 1864/67, Grin Verlag, Vienna, 2008, p. 56 
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Belgian volunteers were regarded as more reliable and experienced than the Mexican 
soldiers they were kept in the capital to contribute to the security of the government and 
the ministers, who remained behind in Mexico-City.641 However, this arrangement 
deprived Maximilian of a valuable military support in the campaign against the liberals; 
without the support of the Austrian and Belgian volunteers the imperial army only 
comprised nine thousand men when Maximilian entered the city on 19th February 1867. 
From a military point of view the decision to face the liberal forces in Querétaro was 
not particularly wise: the city lay in the midst of a fertile valley and was entirely 
surrounded by hills. Arguably, Querétaro could only be effectually defended by an army 
numerous enough to occupy the surrounding hills in order to prevent the liberal forces 
from encircling the city, but Maximilian’s forces were in no position to do so. 
Therefore, the principal merit of choosing Querétaro as the headquarters of the 
campaign against the liberals in the eyes of Maximilian and his conservative supporters 
had been that the city was a conservative stronghold and consequently the conservatives 
could rely on the support of the inhabitants for the provision of food, money and other 
supplies. Maximilian had never managed to regulate and improve the financial situation 
of the empire, and consequently he did not have sufficient funds to maintain his army 
even at the beginning of the campaign. Maximilian’s surgeon, Dr. Basch, reported that 
the imperial government attempted to overcome the money shortage by deciding ‘to 
declare a forced loan. (…) The rich citizens of Querétaro had to pay and maintain the 
army whether they wanted to or not. But they accepted the inevitable good-naturedly. 
Querétaro was a city with pro-imperial sentiments and its residents voluntarily made the 
sacrifices that had been imposed on them’.642 Of course it is rather unlikely that the 
citizens of the town supported the imperial forces gladly; Basch’s comment can thus be                                                         
641 Hyde, H.M., Mexican Empire, 1946, p. 252 
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seen as a justification for Maximilian’s decision to stay in Mexico for it proved that 
there were still some ordinary Mexicans who were still loyal to the emperor. However, 
despite the enforced loan and other hardships that the inhabitants of Querétaro were 
suffering due to the imperial army’s need for provisions, Maximilian was nevertheless 
in a far weaker position than the liberals. Owing to his failure to organize an efficient 
army and financial administration Maximilian was short of men, short of munitions and 
short of money, whereas Juárez and the liberal forces now, after the end of the 
American Civil War, received supplies, ammunition and arms from the United States.643 
At the end of February 1867 there were two liberal armies advancing on Querétaro, one 
under the command of General Escobedo, who was coming from San Luis Potosi with 
seventeen thousand men, and the other under Corona, coming from Acambaro with 
eighteen thousand soldiers.644 When the two armies were still approximately one 
hundred and fifty miles apart, Miramón proposed to Maximilian the idea of attacking 
the two armies in turn before they could unite. He thought that if he could defeat 
Escobedo by a vigorous surprise attack, which would have a shattering effect on the 
morale of Corona’s forces, he could then march against Corona and defeat him.645 The 
proposal was discussed at a council of war; the council consisted of Maximilian, who 
presided over it, and the five conservative Generals Marquez, Miramón, Mejía, Mendez 
and Castillo. Although all five generals were fighting for the same cause, there was 
nevertheless a certain degree of discontent and rivalries amongst them. General 
Marquez, for instance, was against attacking the advancing armies of the enemy, mainly 
because Miramón had come up with the idea. Since Marquez had considerable influence 
over Maximilian, the latter rejected Miramón’s proposal.646  
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As a direct result of the decision ‘not to attack the enemy forces and to await them in a 
protected position’,647 the armies of Escobedo and Coroana joined together at Querétaro 
and began the siege on 6th March 1867 with thirty-five thousand soldiers and siege 
artillery that bombarded the city nearly every day. Maximilian’s nine thousand men 
resisted valiantly and often made successful sorties to obtain provisions and to inflict a 
blow at the liberals’ morale by defeating their troops in some local engagements. 
Maximilian had established his headquarters in the Convent of La Cruz on a hill inside 
the city. The convent came under fire but Maximilian behaved with great coolness, and 
alarmed his officers by insisting on strolling slowly across the courtyard, where there 
was no cover from liberal shells and bullets. He also walked in the streets of the city and 
stood together with his soldiers on the battlements of the city, ‘where the Emperor (…) 
is very much in danger. Toward noon, a grenade explodes six to eight paces from the 
Emperor. In a group around him stand General Marquez and Mendez as well as the 
officers of the General Staff. All duck, except the Emperor, who remains standing 
upright’.648 Although Maximilian proved his courage and bravery during battle, Prince 
Salm-Salm and other officers in the imperial army thought that Maximilian was not 
much of a military commander. On several occasions the imperial forces were able to 
win small engagements but instead of attacking the liberal army in these moments of 
weakness, Maximilian decided not to go over to the attack and pursue the enemy.649 
However, it s questionable whether a direct attack against the liberal forces, as Prince 
Salm-Salm argued for, would have produced a positive result; the liberal forces greatly 
outnumbered the imperial army and thus it is probable that the liberals would have 
eventually defeated the attacking imperial troops, which in return would have 
diminished the number of imperial soldiers defending Querétaro.                                                         
647 Basch, S., Recollections, 2001,p.133 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5.1.2. WILL MARQUEZ BRING REINFORCEMENTS? 
 
 
The longer the siege lasted, the more the defenders suffered from the shortage of food 
and ammunition. The supply of the latter had become so scarce that the conservatives 
ordered that the lead-covered roofs of the churches and theatres to be taken down and 
melted into bullets.650 Maximilian and his officers thus realized that they could not hold 
out indefinitely in Querétaro. Their only hope was that a relieving army would come to 
their aid and force Escobedo to abandon the siege. Therefore, the war council decided to 
send General Marquez to Mexico-City to raise a new army that would march to the 
relief of Querétaro. At dawn on 22nd March 1867 Miramón led a sortie and attacked the 
liberals as a diversion while Marquez with an escort of one thousand men cavalry 
slipped quietly out of the city.651 The manoeuvre was successful; Marquez reached 
Mexico-City, and by resorting to the leva, the system of forced recruiting that had 
employed by conservatives and liberals alike during the civil war, Marquez’s press 
gangs managed to forcibly enrol young men into the army.  
However, while Marquez was recruiting soldiers in order to relieve the imperial forces 
defending Querétaro, the liberal army under the command of General Diaz began 
capturing and occupying the few remaining cities and towns that were held by the 
conservatives and imperial troops. One of the cities that were still in the hands of the 
imperial army was Puebla. The liberal forces under the command of General Diaz 
besieged Puebla and on 2nd April 1867 captured it by assault. Although the commander 
of the imperial forces Noriega had surrendered unconditionally to Diaz, the latter 
nevertheless ordered that Noriega and all his seventy-four officers were to be shot as  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traitors under the decree of 25th January 1862. After capturing Puebla Diaz advanced on 
Mexico-City. Marquez was intending to lead the army he had raised to Querétaro to 
rescue Maximilian but he knew that if he left Mexico-City it would fall immediately to 
Diaz, which would be a terrible blow to the morale of Maximilian’s supporters. 
Therefore, he decided to disobey Maximilian’s orders and lead the army against Diaz to 
save Mexico-City by defeating him in battle. The troops of Marquez and Diaz clashed at 
San Lorenzo on 10th April 1867. Diaz routed Marquez’s men, who fled in all directions 
as they had not had any military training before the battle. Marquez was able to retire in 
good order to Mexico-City with four hundred Austrians, who had enlisted in 
Maximilian’s army when the Austrian and Belgian volunteer corps had left for Europe 
in January 1867.652 Marquez now had no army to lead to Querétaro, so he decided to put 
the capital into a state of defence and hold it at all costs against an attack by the liberals. 
Within a few days Diaz had laid siege to Mexico-City, establishing his headquarters in 
Maximilian’s former palace in Chapultepec. 
In the meantime the defenders of Querétaro were waiting impatiently for the arrival of 
Marquez’s relieving army and were wondering why he had not come. Maximilian sent 
out scouts who were to slip through the lines of the liberals and bring back news of 
Marquez from Mexico-City. Dr Basch described the eagerness with which any kind of 
news about Marquez and the relieving army were expected in the besieged city: 
‘Marquez has disappeared and remains so. We have no firm news about him. (…) More 
than three weeks have passed since Marquez’s departure. The day fixed for his return 
had long since passed. (…) We have sent out courier after courier but none has 
returned’.653 Most of the scouts Maximilian sent out had been captured by the liberals; 
along the road to Mexico-City their bodies could be found hanging from the trees,  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sometimes mutilated and with notes saying that this fate would befall all traitors who 
carried messages for Maximilian.654 Despite the fact that the liberals were executing any 
imperial soldier that fell into their hands, Maximilian refused to treat captured liberal 
soldiers in a similar way. The Mexican generals had proposed that liberal prisoners 
should be executed and their corpses displayed to their comrades in the besieging army 
as reprisal for hanging Maximilian’s messengers. However, the emperor forbade any 
reprisals and insisted that the liberal prisoners be kindly treated and that any who were 
wounded should receive medical attention in the hospitals as his own soldiers did.655   
 
 
 
 
 
5.1.3.  CAPITULATION OR BETRAYAL? 
 
 
By the middle of May the situation was becoming very serious for Maximilian. His 
supplies were getting low and although he still retained the loyalty and support of most 
of the inhabitants of Querétaro, some of his soldiers were deserting to the liberals. The 
departure of Marquez as well as losses and desertions had reduced Maximilian’s troops 
to less than seven thousand men, while the arrival of reinforcements had raised the 
liberal numbers to forty-one thousand.656 As the defenders were so greatly outnumbered 
and, as it looked likely that the liberals were going to win shortly, Maximilian and his 
                                                        
654 Murray, R.H., Maximilian Emperor of Mexico. Memoirs of his Private Secretary José Luis 
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generals decided that their only hope was to break through enemy lines with their 
cavalry and to ride across the country to Vera Cruz. The city was still in the hands of the 
conservatives, and Maximilian and his generals thought that it would be possible to find 
ships at Vera Cruz to take them to Europe and they thus agreed to attempt the breakout 
on the night of 14th May 1867.657 The plan had been that three thousand Indian 
inhabitants of the city, who were to be organized by General Mejía and armed for the 
purpose, would create a diversion.658 However, Mejía failed to collect sufficient arms 
and ammunition to create a diversion and thus Maximilian made the fatal decision to 
postpone the attempt for twenty-four hours. 
During the night of 14th May liberal forces entered Querétaro; and Maximilian was 
awakened at 4 a.m. on 15th May to be told that the enemy were in his headquarters at the 
Convent of La Cruz. When Maximilian, accompanied by Blasio and a few of his 
officers, stepped out into the courtyard it was full of liberal soldiers, but Maximilian and 
his companions were not arrested as the soldiers apparently did not recognise them. The 
question of how the liberal forces had managed to gain entry into the city has been a 
source of dispute amongst conservatives and liberals in Mexico. Maximilian’s 
supporters argued that they had been betrayed by Colonel Lopez, the commander of 
Maximilian’s household cavalry. According to this version of events Lopez, acting on 
his own accord and not on the order of the emperor, showed the liberal forces an 
unguarded entrance in Querétaro; the conservatives claimed that Lopez received a 
considerable amount of money as a bribe for this act of betrayal.659 Not surprisingly the 
liberals recounted a completely different version: one day before the fall of Querétaro 
Lopez, acting as an authorised agent of Maximilian, had met with the commander of the 
liberal forces, General Escobedo, to deliver Maximilian’s offer of handing over the city  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to the liberal forces if he and his supporters were allowed to leave Querétaro and board 
a ship to Europe. However, Escobedo had orders only to accept an unconditional 
surrender of the imperial forces; thus Escobedo declined Maximilian’s offer and in the 
early hours of 15th May 1867 liberal soldiers surprised the imperial guards and forced 
their way into Querétaro. While the liberal troops were occupying Querétaro, 
Maximilian and his companions rode to the hill of the Cerro de las Campanas. There 
Maximilian asked General Mejía ‘whether it might be possible to break through with a 
handful of determined people. Mejía was negative on such a possibility. The Emperor 
stayed calmly on the Cerro, hoping that one of the many shells that were bursting there 
would end his own life, too. (…) He [Maximilian] asked Mejía five more times whether 
a breakout might be possible. But the general’s reply remained a steadfast “no”. So he 
finally asked for the white flag to be raised on the Cerro’.660 After two months the siege 
of Querétaro was over, and Maximilian surrendered to the liberal forces under the 
command of Escobedo. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1.4. THE REVENGE OF THE LIBERALS AND THE REACTIONS OF THE 
PUBLIC IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
After Maximilian had surrendered to Escobedo several of his officers, amongst them 
General Mendez, had gone into hiding in Querétaro. On 16th May 1867 the Escobedo                                                         660 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issued an order that anyone who had served as an officer in the imperial army ‘would be 
shot when he was captured unless he surrendered to the liberal authorities within 
twenty-four hours’.661 Thereupon most of Maximilian’s officers surrendered and were 
imprisoned with the others. Mendez alone did not turn himself in, as he knew that he 
could not expect any kind of mercy from the liberals; a little more than a year ago he 
had shot the two liberal Generals Arteaga and Salazar in accordance with the decree of 
3rd October 1865.662 Three days later the liberals found him and he was executed 
without trial on 19th May 1867. However, Mendez was not the only supporter of the 
imperial cause who was executed; throughout their campaign against the Second 
Mexican Empire the liberals had shown no mercy to captured imperial soldiers, most of 
whom were shot under the provisions of the decree of 25th January 1862.663  
News of these executions had reached the United States, where the support of the 
American public began to turn against Juárez and the liberals. The New York Times 
summed up the prevailing feeling in the United States by stating that ‘the Juarists in 
Mexico have recently lost the sympathy of the American people because of (…) the 
massacres that they have committed against captured imperial [soldiers]. After each of 
their victories (…) they committed general slaughters (…) amongst the imperial 
officers’.664 It is this change of sympathies of the American public, which claimed that 
Juárez’s ‘policies finds the contempt of all mankind’,665 that provided the basis for the 
attempts of the US government to persuade the Mexican liberals to release Maximilian 
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and send him back to Europe.666 However, the diplomatic attempts of the USA proved 
to be in vain as Juárez did not change his mind. The liberal leader had two main reasons 
for not pardoning Maximilian: firstly, he feared that if Maximilian were allowed to 
return to Europe, the former emperor would become a rallying point for Mexican 
conservatives and he might even return to Mexico to proclaim another empire; 
secondly, Juárez had to take the feelings of his liberal followers into account, who 
would not have approved of a pardon for Maximilian.667   
Thus on 24th May 1867 Juárez decreed that Maximilian and the two Generals, Miramón 
and Mejía, should be brought before a military court on the charges of promoting 
invasion and usurping the supreme power contrary to the presidential law of 25th 
January 1862.668 
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5.2 THE COURT MARTIAL 
 
 
 
At the end of May the news that Maximilian and the imperial forces had surrendered 
and that he had been imprisoned by liberals reached Europe. The Austrian newspapers 
expressed their hope that ‘in contrast to many historic tragedies, the Mexican one will 
have a happy ending’.669 Nevertheless, the prevailing opinion was that the United States 
would use her considerable influence over the Mexican Republic to prevent any kind of 
reprisals against the Habsburg prince. ‘The great influence of the northern American 
republic and the respect for the bravery and misfortune [of Maximilian] on the side of 
Juárez will secure the personal fortune of the dethroned monarch. Of this we can rest 
assured’.670 However, soon there were different reports and rumours circulating in the 
Austrian and European press claiming that Maximilian had been strangled and the two 
generals Miramón and Mejía had been hanged; or ‘although the reports about the tragic 
death of Emperor Maximilian have not been confirmed yet, this unfortunate outcome 
[of the Mexican adventure] appears all the more likely’.671 
Although Maximilian and his fellow prisoners had heard rumours that Maximilian 
would be tried by court martial and executed, Maximilian, nevertheless, remained 
confident that he would be allowed 'with all European officers and troops to leave the 
country’672. Arguably Maximilian could not imagine that the Mexican liberals would 
execute an anointed monarch and he also based his belief of a return to Europe on the  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fact that the liberals had treated himself and his fellow prisoners quite humanely. After 
he had surrendered to Escobedo. Maximilian had been taken back to the convent of La 
Cruz, where he fell ill with dysentery Maximilian’s health had not been the best during 
the last few years and the strains of the last two months had further aggravated his 
condition.673 His physician, Dr Basch, had asked to be allowed to consult with the chief 
surgeon of the liberal army, Riva de Nejra, who examined Maximilian and on whose 
advice Maximilian had been moved to the healthier quarters of Teresita Convent, and a 
few days later to the Convent of the Capuchins.674 There Maximilian had been forced to 
spend the first night in the vaults of the convent but had been given a cell, which was 
about ten paces long and three paces wide with a window that looked out on the 
passage, the next day. The cell contained a camp bed, a cupboard, two tables and four 
chairs. At night a general and three colonels were on duty in the passage with revolvers 
in their hands; in general, the liberal guards treated Maximilian with consideration and 
even respect.675 As Maximilian had been expecting to be allowed to return to Europe, it 
must have come as a shock when he was told at the end of May that he would be tried 
by court martial on the charge of treason against the Mexican Republic under the 
provisions of the decree of 25 January 1862; Miramón and Mejía were also informed 
that they were to be tried with Maximilian at the same court-martial on the same charge 
of treason.676 Furthermore, Maximilian and the two generals were told that they could 
choose lawyers to defend him at court; Maximilian selected Mariano Riva Palacio, 
Martinez de la Torre, Jesus Maria Vasquez, Eulalio Ortega and Frederic Hall but it was 
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questionable if they would arrive in time for the trial as two of them had come to 
Querétaro from Mexico City.677 
Now for the first time Maximilian apparently realized the full seriousness of his 
situation: he and his generals were not to be tried as prisoners of war but as common 
felons. Felix von Salm-Salm and his wife Agnes tried on several occasions to persuade 
Maximilian to escape. They even offered one of the liberal officers a bribe of $100,000, 
but Maximilian, hearing that the ministers of Prussia, Austria and Belgium as well as 
two of his lawyers were on their way to Querétaro, aborted the plan. Maximilian 
deemed it incompatible with his dignity for the ministers and the lawyers to arrive and 
find that he had fled. Mariano Riva Palacio and Martinez de la Torre were two of the 
most respected lawyers in the capital and as members of the liberal party might yet 
succeed in convincing Juárez to commute the death penalty to banishment. Maximilian 
was also not entirely convinced that the plan was not a trap; he did not trust the officer, 
whom Salm-Salm had bribed, and was afraid that an escape attempt would give the 
liberals a chance of shooting them all and then publishing to the world that Maximilian 
of Habsburg and his two generals had “accidently” been shot while trying to break out 
of prison.678 
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5.2.1. THE CHARGES AND THE TRIAL 
 
 
Maximilian had only been informed that he would be charged under the provisions of 
the decree of 25th January 1862 but on 25th May 1867 Maximilian was given a list of 
thirteen precise points with which the liberals were charging him. The charges against 
Maximilian were: 
 
1. He was a tool of the French intervention. 
2. He usurped the title emperor of Mexico. 
3. He usurped the rights of a sovereign and freely constituted people. 
4. He commanded with the force of arms the interests, rights and lives of all 
Mexicans. 
5. He waged an unjust war on the side of the French. 
6. He recruited foreign volunteer corps. 
7. He published a manifesto on 2nd October 1865, which stated that the republican 
government had left the country and which thus declared the republican forces as 
bandits. 
8. He enacted the decree of 3rd October 1865 and implemented it. 
9. He continued to wage war against the republic after the French troops had 
departed from Mexico. 
10. He decreed that in case he would be captured his abdication should be made 
public; and in the event of his death sovereignty should be passed to a regent. 
11. He demanded to be treated by the court martial as a defeated sovereign in a just 
war. 
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12. He refused to acknowledge the decree of 25th January 1862 and jurisdiction of 
the court martial. 
13. He showed contempt of the court by not answering the prosecuting attorney.679 
 
The last three points had originally not been included but when the prosecuting 
attorney, Azpiroz, had questioned Maximilian about the charges, the latter had refused 
to answer any questions as he thought that ‘the charges are so ridiculously inept and 
mean-spirited’.680 Maximilian also claimed that the court did not have the jurisdiction to 
try him whether they regarded him as their emperor or as an Austrian archduke; for if he 
should be tried as the defeated emperor of Mexico then this could only be done by a 
national congress; and if the liberals regarded him as an Austrian Archduke then he 
should transferred to an Austrian warship. It is likely that in the case that the liberals 
saw Maximilian as a mere archduke, he would have attempted to invoked a regulation 
in Austria, which stated that no member of the House of Habsburg could be tried by 
court martial.681  
As the trial was to begin on 7th June 1867 Maximilian’s lawyers protested that this gave 
them not enough time to prepare their defence against all thirteen charges.682 Thus the 
lawyers sent a telegram to Juárez and the ministers of justice and war in San Luis Potosi 
asking for a longer adjournment. They were granted another five days but were told that 
the trial must begin on 13th June.683 Since the two lawyers Mariano Riva Palacio and 
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Martinez de la Torre were themselves members of the liberal party, they set off to San 
Luis Potosi to ask Juárez to postpone the trial for a month to give them more time to 
prepare the defence and not to proceed against Maximilian under the decree of 25th 
January 1862, which they called inappropriate in this case.684 They also asked Juárez to 
pardon Maximilian and to commute the death sentence if he was convicted by the court. 
Juárez listened to the arguments but referred the decision to a meeting of his cabinet; 
after the meeting he informed Mariano Riva Palacio and Martinez de la Torre that the 
cabinet had decided that the trail must start on 13th June and that the charges under the 
decree of 25th January must be proceeded with.685 As to their request to pardon 
Maximilian and to commute his death sentence, this could only be decided after the 
trial. 
The trial began at 8 a.m. on 13th June 1867 in the Iturbide theatre in Querétaro. The 
judges, lawyers and prisoners sat on the stage of the theatre, and the audience was 
packed with members of the public. Mejía and Miramón were forced to be present at the 
hearing but Maximilian was adamant that he would not ‘appear on stage and [that he 
would] resist against this until his last breath’,686 and in the end he obtained a medical 
certificate that stated that he was too ill to attend. The court was composed of seven 
officers: a lieutenant colonel, who presided, and two major and four captains. When 
Maximilian was told that the judges were all young officers he said that he believed 
‘that they have chosen for the court martial only those who possess the best 
uniforms’.687 
Although Maximilian had been charged with thirteen points, the arguments of the 
defence centred around refuting the four main charges: that Maximilian had been a tool  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of the French intervention; that he had usurped the title emperor of Mexico and the 
rights of a sovereign and freely constituted people; and that he had enacted the decree of 
3rd October 1865 and had implemented it. Maximilian’s lawyers refuted the first charge 
by pointing out that the French intervention had in effect been a civil war between two 
almost equal forces and that civil wars could only resolved through force of arms. 
Maximilian’s involvement in the initial intervention had been minimal and once he had 
arrived in Mexico had denied the French many of the concessions that the regency 
under Almonte had granted them.688 The second and third points were regarded by the 
defence as void as Maximilian had only accepted the throne of Mexico after a 
referendum held in Mexico assured him that this was the expressed wish of the people. 
The lawyers argued that the fact that the referendum had taken place under the threat of 
French arms had not been known to Maximilian; thus he could not be an usurper as he 
had not known that he had taken unlawfully power against the wish of the Mexican 
people.689 The third charge, that Maximilian had enacted and implemented the decree of 
3rd October 1865, was especially difficult: the defence of course pointed out the 
parallels between Maximilian’s decree and the decree that the Juárez had issued on 25th 
January 1862.  Moreover, the lawyers also attempted to argue that the decree 25th 
January 1862 conflicted with the republican constitution of 1857, which stated under 
article 13 that no one was allowed to be sentenced by special decrees or special 
courts.690 In the eyes of the defence the decree of 25th January 1862 represented a 
special decree and was thus unconstitutional. They argued, furthermore, that the decree 
did not apply to Maximilian since he first came to Mexico after the republic had de 
facto ceased to exist. The prosecution though argued that the republic had never ceased 
to exist; therefore the decree of 25th January was valid and Maximilian was subject to it                                                         
688 Ratz, K., Militärgerichtsverfahren, 1985, p. 44 689 Ratz, K., Militärgerichtsverfahren, 1985, p. 45 
690 Ibid, p. 36 
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because it was a clearly recognized principle of international law that an alien who 
resides in a foreign country is subject to that country’s law.691 The lawyers defending 
Miramón and Mejía pointed out that the two generals had merely carried out the orders 
of the established a de facto government, which they had loyally served, believing that 
it was the lawful government of Mexico. 
Despite the fact that Maximilian’s lawyers had presented a strong case in Maximilian’s 
defence, the seven judges did not take long to reach their verdict. On 14th June, the 
second day of the trial, they announced that: 
 
Maximilian has been convicted of having committed crimes against the state, 
international law, public order and peace according to article 1 (…), article 2 (…) and 
article 3 of the decree of 25th January 1862. The defendants Miguel Miramón and 
Tomas Mejía have been convicted of having committed crimes against the state and 
international law, which are defined under the article one in the mentioned decree. All 
three have been caught in the process of an act of war on 15th May (…) whereby they 
fall under the mentioned decree. Due to this decree the defendants Ferdinand 
Maximilian, Miguel Miramón and Tomas Mejía are sentenced to (…) death.692 
 
Maximilian and the two generals were to be executed by firing squad at 3 p.m. on 
Sunday 16th June 1867. 
 
 
 
                                                         
691 Ridley, J., Maximilian and Juárez, 1992, p. 268 
692 Quoted in: Ratz, K., Militärgerichtsverfahren, 1984, 347f 
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5.3. THE NINETEENTH OF JUNE  
 
 
 
After the verdict had been pronounced the defence layers only had forty-two hours in 
which to obtain a reprieve from Juárez; both went to San Luis Potosi to see him, and 
repeated to him all the arguments they had used in their final pleas to the court. After 
Riva Palacio and de la Torre had spoken to Juárez, he still refused to pardon 
Maximilian, for if he were pardoned, it would be illogical and unjust to punish any of 
his subordinates for having carried out executions under the imperial decree of 3rd 
October 1865; the people of Mexico, especially the army, would never tolerate it if all 
the crimes committed against the liberals went unpunished.693 Juárez knew that 
pardoning Maximilian would have caused great indignation in the army and amongst 
his liberal supporters, who claimed that Maximilian should not be spared ‘just because 
he is the brother of the Emperor of Austria’.694 Apart from these considerations Juárez 
and his ministers also had sound political reasons for refusing to pardon Maximilian. 
Romero, Juárez’s delegate in Washington D.C., explained them in a private letter to his 
friend Hiram Barney in the United States on 31st May 1867: 
 
I do not know what disposition President Juárez will make of Maximilian, but I’m 
afraid that if he is allowed to go back to Europe with impunity, he will be a constant 
menace to the peace of Mexico. He will keep on styling himself, to our shame – 
Emperor of Mexico: all dissatisfied Mexicans will keep up an active correspondence 
with him about his supposed popularity there, and even may induce him to return at                                                         
693 Ridley, J., Maximilian and Juárez, 1992, p. 270 
694 NA, Notes from the Mexican Legation in U.S. to Department of State, 1821-1906 , M54 – 13 
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some future time (...) such of them as can afford it, will go over to Austria and form a 
Mexican court for Maximilian at Miramar, and he will have enough of them to 
organize a legitimate government there (...), some European powers will keep 
recognizing him as the Emperor of Mexico (...), whenever we may be likely to have 
complications with any European nation, the first step taken by the interested party 
will be to intrigue with Maximilian and to threaten us with giving aid to our lawful 
sovereign to recover his authority from the hands of the usurpers, if we decline to 
accept their terms. Besides, if Maximilian is pardoned and is allowed to go home, 
nobody in Europe, I am sure, will give us credit for magnanimity (...), on the contrary 
it will be said that we did so through fear of public opinion in Europe and because we 
would not dare to treat harshly our sovereign.695 
 
However, when the two lawyers protested that the time between the sentencing and the 
execution of the sentence was too short, Juárez agreed to postpone the execution for 
three days so that the condemned could order their affairs. The order that the execution 
had been postponed to the morning of the 19th June, only arrived in Querétaro at the 
evening of the 15th June.696 Meanwhile Maximilian, Miramón and Mejía had spent their 
last days in religious devotions and reading; they had already received absolution and 
were preparing for death when the telegram from San Luis Potosi arrived postponing 
the execution for three days.697  
 
 
 
                                                         
695 NA, Notes from the Mexican Legation in U.S. to Department of State, 1821-1906 , M54 – 13 696 Ratz, K., Militärgerichtsverfahren, 1984, 351f 697 Ridley, J., Maximilian and Juárez, 1992, p. 270 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5.3.1 THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION 
 
 
In Europe and the United States there was much concern over Maximilian’s fate. The 
foreign governments that wished to intercede for Maximilian’s life had no diplomatic 
relations with Juárez’s government; they therefore addressed their pleas to the 
government of the United States. Juárez’s minister in Washington reported that the 
United States foreign minister was ‘desirous that the administration of President Juárez 
should know that besides the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of France and the Queen 
of England have secretly and in a confidential manner appealed to the United States to 
use any legitimate good offices within their power to prevent the execution of Prince 
Maximilian’.698 However some of these governments also had ulterior motives; Prussia 
for instance had recently defeated the Habsburg Empire in war and Bismarck was eager 
to reconcile Austria. It is in this light that the telegram of Baron Magnus, the Prussian 
minister in Mexico, to Juárez has to be understood, in which he assured the president 
that  
 
My sovereign, his Majesty the King of Prussia, and all the monarchs of Europe, united 
by the ties of blood with the prince prisoner, (…), his brother the Emperor of Austria, 
his cousin the Queen of Great Britain, his brother-in-law the King of Belgium, and 
also his cousin the Queen of Spain and the Kings of Italy and Sweden, will readily 
come to an understanding to give to his Excellency Don Benito Juárez every assurance 
that no one of the three prisoners shall return to tread on Mexican territory.699 
                                                         
698 NA., Notes to Foreign Legations in the U.S. from the Department of State, 1834 -1906, M99 
– roll 70 
699 NA, Notes from the Mexican Legation in U.S. to Department of State, 1821-1906, M54 – 13 
260 
 
However, it is important to notice that Baron Magnus, and not the United States, 
directed the appeal to Juárez; indeed throughout his captivity Maximilian relied 
exclusively on the assistance and influence of Magnus and Salm-Salm, whereas the 
Austrian envoy, Baron Lago, seemed to be curiously absent. Many contemporaries 
argued that the Austrian government acted too late and only tried half-heartedly to save 
the life of Maximilian; an accusation that made it appear as if Prussia had been more 
concerned with the safety and well-being of Maximilian than his family and his native 
country. Austria’s reluctance to interfere in the events in Mexico was commented on not 
only by Maximilian’s lawyers, who felt as if ‘the transatlantic cable had been cut’700 but 
also by the Austrian press, which raised the question why ‘our envoy in Washington, 
von Wydenburgk, still cannot report anything positive about the fate of Emperor 
Maximilian’.701 The Austrian government’s attempts to influence Juárez and thus to 
save Maximilian’s life appeared to be uncoordinated and clumsy. The Austrian 
government had assumed that the United States had great influence over the Mexican 
liberals and Juárez. Too late did the cabinet in Vienna realize that the US government 
could not dictate to Juárez how to treat Maximilian and the conservatives; thus when 
Franz Joseph assured the Mexican government that he would ‘at once re-establish 
Prince Maximilian in all his rights of succession as Archduke of Austria, upon 
Maximilian’s release and renouncing forever all projects in Mexico’,702 Maximilian had 
already been shot the previous day. 
 
 
                                                         
700 Quoted in: Ratz, K., Militärgerichtsverfahren, 1985, p. 50 701ANNO, Neue Freie Presse, 4th June 1867, retrived 11th January 2010,  
<http://anno.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/anno?apm=0&aid=nfp&datum=18670604&zoom=2> 
702 NA-Washington D.C., Notes to Foreign Legations in the U.S. from the Department of State, 
1834 -1906, M99 – roll 70 
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5.3.2. THE EXECUTION 
 
 
The execution took place early in the morning of 19th June 1867 on the Cerro de las 
Campanas, the hill where Maximilian had surrendered on 15th May. Maximilian was 
resigned to his fate; he had written his farewell letters to his mother and to his wife, in 
case she would ever recover, and had asked Dr Basch to take his body back to Austria.† 
On the day of the execution Maximilian woke before daybreak, he confessed again and 
then heard mass in his cell. Just before 6 a.m. he was taken to the Cerro de las 
Campanas, where the execution was supposed to take place. The only acquaintances of 
Maximilian who attended the execution were his valet, Grill, his cook, Todos, and 
Baron Magnus; Dr Basch could not bear to go. But apart from those and from the 
soldiers that surrounded the square, there were less than fifty people present to witness 
the execution. The three condemned were lined up with Maximilian on the left, 
Miramón in the centre and Mejía on the right of Miramón. Edouard Manet famously 
painted this scene.† It is worth noticing the iconography of the painting: The Mexican 
soldiers wear French uniforms, the prisoners clutch hands and Maximilian is already 
growing pale and haloed. In short Manet’s accused Napoleon of killing Maximilian by 
withdrawing French military support.703 Facing the firing squad Maximilian made a 
short speech in Spanish in which he stated, 'I forgive everybody. I pray that one may 
also forgive me, and I wish that my blood, which is now to be shed, may be for the good 
of the country. Long live Mexico, long live independence!'.704 Then the commanding 
officer gave the order to fire; Maximilian was shot ‘from the shortest distance and all                                                         
† Appendix 3: Maximilian’s last will 
† Appendix 4: Edouard Manet famous painting this scene.  
703 See: Wilson-Bareau, J., (ed.), Manet: the Execution of Maximilian. Painting, Politics and 
Censorship, National Gallery England, London, 1992 
704 Quoted in: Ridley, J., Maximilian and Juárez, 1992, p.277 
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six bullets passed through the body (….) The three chest wounds were absolutely fatal. 
One had found its way through the heart’.705 Maximilian died instantly, as did Mejía 
and Miramón.†  
 
 
 
 
 
5.4. Homecoming 
 
 
 
The news of Maximilian’s death was published in the press in New York on 30th June 
1867 and reached Paris by 1st July. As the World Exhibition was just being opened by 
Napoleon III on that day, he withheld this news but on the 3rd July it had been reported 
in most of the European newspapers. It created an atmosphere of outrage, indignation 
and disbelief. The statement of the president of the French Senate, that ‘a horrible crime 
has been committed against the laws of war, of nations and of humanity’706 summed up 
the prevailing feeling of the courts and the public in Europe. There were many both in 
Austria and France, who blamed Napoleon for Maximilian’s fate and regarded him as 
the ‘original author of this tragedy’.707 In the session on 9th July 1867 the deputies of the 
Corps Législatif did not only attack Napoleon for his role in the events in Mexico but                                                         
705 Basch, S., Recollections, 2001, p. 251 † Appendix 5: The official announcement of Maximilian’s death by the Juárez government 
706 Quoted in: Ridley, J., Maximilian and Juárez, 1992, p.321 
707 Quoted in: Ruzicka, J.R., Der Einfluß der öffentlichen Meinung der Vereinigten 
Staaten und Europa’s auf das Schicksal Kaiser Maximilian I von Mexiko, University of 
Vienna, Vienna, 1950, p. 159 
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they also challenged Napoleon’s form of government. Adolphe Theirs, the Orléanist,  
argued that the lesson learned from the expedition to Mexico was that the ministers had 
to have the power to control the government and if necessary to resist the decisions of 
the monarch.708 The situation got even more tumultuous when Jules Favre, a republican,  
exclaimed that the blood of Maximilian would revisit France;709 the attacks of the 
deputies and of the press against Napoleon and his form of government continued for 
several weeks. 
The Austrian newspapers also blamed Napoleon for the events in Mexico and argued 
that ‘Maximilian’s (…) ghost will haunt the French Emperor for ever’.710 However, the 
Austrian press did not only blame Napoleon for the tragic outcome of the Mexican 
adventure but they also accused the United States of having only their own interest in 
mind and had thus ‘watched the events in Mexico in order to have a pretext for an 
intervention through which they could justify an annexation of Mexico’.711 
Nevertheless, the majority of the Austrian press hailed Maximilian as a martyr and as an 
artistic man, who had lived like a poet and died like a soldier. The Neue Freie Presse 
commented that ‘Maximilian did (…) what honour demanded of him; he remained at 
his post against all odds; and when there was no more to preserve the throne he held on 
to his Mexican idea with such tenacity that even impressed his enemies’.712  
While the press and the public in Austrian and France were asserting blame, Franz 
Joseph and the rest of Maximilian’s family tried to persuade Juárez and the liberals to 
allowed them to take Maximilian’s corpse back to Austria to be buried with the other 
                                                        
708 Opinion Nationale, 10th July 1867 
709 Ibid 
710 ANNO, Morgenpost, 1st July 1867, retrieved 11th January 2010,  
< http://anno.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/anno?apm=0&aid=wrz&datum=18670701&zoom=2> 
711 ANNO, Prager Abendblatt, 4th July 1867, retrieved 11th January 2010, <http://anno.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/anno?apm=0&datum=18670704&zoom=2 > 
712 ANNO, Neue Freie Presse, 1st July 1867, retrieved 11th January 2010, 
 < http://anno.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/anno?apm=0&datum=18670701&zoom=2> 
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royal Habsburg in the crypt of the Capuchin church in Vienna. The Juárez government 
‘wanted to gain political capital from [this]. (…) They declared themselves ready to 
deliver the body only if it were to be claimed by an official act of the Austrian 
government’.713 The Mexican government’s insistence on the official act of government 
meant that Franz Joseph indirectly acknowledged the legitimacy of the Juárez and the 
liberal government. Thus Franz Joseph ordered Admiral Tegetthoff to go to Mexico and 
bring back Maximilian’s corpse. Juárez’s government raised many difficulties and 
Tegetthoff had to stay in Mexico-City for two months before finally leaving for Vera 
Cruz with Maximilian’s body.714 Maximilian's body was returned to Austria on the 
Novara, the same ship that had brought him to Mexico in 1864. On 20th January 1868 
Maximilian was buried in the Habsburg family vault in the Capuchin church in the 
presence of the Austrian imperial family and the diplomatic representatives of the 
European court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
713 Basch, S., Recollections, 2001, p. 254 
714 Schöndörfer, U.,, Tegetthoff, 1958, p.57ff  
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Epilogue 
 
 
 
According to the Catholic rite, the body of Maximilian should have been laid out before 
he was put to rest in the Capuchin vault in Vienna on 20th January 1868. However, in 
Maximilian’s case the imperial family refrained from displaying the body of the late 
emperor and thus the mourners walked past a closed coffin. This led to the creation of a 
conspiracy theory surrounding his execution and death of the emperor and to the rumour 
that Maximilian might not have been shot at all but was living quietly somewhere in 
South America. Although these rumours were common knowledge it was not until 2001 
that they were investigated further. In his research Rolando Ernesto Deneke claimed 
that Emperor Maximilian had not been executed but had lived under the name of Justo 
Armas in El Savador. According to Deneke Justo Armas arrived in the capital San 
Salvador around 1868 and apparently the man had a striking resemblance with the late 
Mexican emperor: he was tall, had blue eyes, an unusual beard, spoke several languages 
fluently and had, from the very beginning the patronage of the vice president of El 
Salvador, Gregorio Arbizú.715 Moreover, Armas appeared to have several possessions, 
such as silverware, furniture and paintings, which bore the crest of either the House of 
Habsburg or the Second Mexican Empire.716  
To validate his research and to verify these rumours Deneke analysed the handwritings 
of Maximilian and Armas and came to the result that both were nearly identical.717 
Moreover, the decedents of Gregorio Arbizú, in whose family grave Justo Armas had 
been buried, agreed to let Deneke take a DNA sample in order to compare it with one                                                         
715 Lughofer, J.G., Maximilian, 2002, p. 198 
716 Bestenreiner, E., Charlotte von Mexiko, 2008, p. 282 
717 Der Standard, 24th March 2001, retrieved 16th May 2010,  <http://derstandard.at/522581> 
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provided by a member of the House of Habsburg. Although the sample of Justo Armas 
had been contaminated with microbes, it nevertheless showed a high percentage of 
congruence with the Habsburg sample.718  
Had Maximilian really not been shot and had lived a happy life in El Salvador? Had 
someone been executed in his stead? Or had the execution squad been shooting with 
blanks?  
Deneke, and other historians like Lughofer, have argued that the firing squad had been 
using blanks and that it would have been easy to remove the alleged body of 
Maximilian under a blanket.719 Moreover, they have pointed to the fact that Juárez did 
not release the body for two months; a timeframe in which, according to Lughofer, 
Juárez and the liberal government were looking for another body that physically 
resembled Maximilian; not an impossible task as there were many bodies of dead 
European soldiers in Queretaro at the time.720 The theory that another body than 
Maximilian’s had been embalmed and shipped to Europe has been substantiated by a 
study of the Mexican historian José Manuel Villalpando, who compared several pictures 
of the body. Villalpando came to the conclusion that there were considerable differences 
between the photographs and that in one instance the body had been replaced with a 
dummy.721 Furthermore, the embalmment of the body had been done amateurishly, with 
the consequence that features of the face could hardly be identified anymore. Therefore, 
Maximilian’s mother, Archduchess Sophie, allegedly exclaimed when she was shown 
the mortal remains: ‘This is not my son’.722 
Although Deneke’s and Lughofer’s ideas have been widely discussed amongst 
historians, there are, nevertheless, a few arguments that refute their theories. Firstly,                                                         
718 Der Standard, 24th March 2001, retrieved 16th May 2010,  <http://derstandard.at/522581> 
719 Lughofer, J.G., Maximilian, 2002, p. 197 
720 Ibid, p. 199 
721 Der Standard, 24th March 2001, retrieved 16th May 2010,  <http://derstandard.at/522581> 
722 Bestenreiner, E., Charlotte von Mexiko, 2008, p. 283 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Juárez would have taken a huge risk by pardoning Maximilian. The former emperor 
could have returned to Mexico, like Iturbíde had done in 1824, and proclaim another 
empire with the military assistance of a European power. Secondly, the last days of 
Maximilian are very well documented through eyewitness reports and letters, which 
suggest that there would not have been enough time to organise and execute such a 
complex plan. And thirdly, Dr Basch and Admiral Tegetthoff, who examined and 
viewed the body, had been close confidants of the emperor; both confirmed that the 
mortal remains, which they saw in Mexico, were those of emperor Maximilian.723 
Although the research of Deneke appears to be plausible, some doubts nevertheless 
remain. The only way to find out whether a stranger was buried in the Capuchin vaults 
in Vienna would be a DNA analysis. If it were Maximilian, the sample would show 
congruence with the genetic material of members of the House of Habsburg and 
Wittelsbach. However, both houses have so far refused to provide samples for such an 
analysis. Thus it will remain a mystery whether the mortal remains in the pompous 
sarcophagus in the Capuchin vaults are those of Maximilian, the Emperor of Mexico. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
723 Bestenreiner, E., Charlotte von Mexiko, 2008, p. 289 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
Writing this thesis about the life and fate of Maximilian it has often been difficult not to 
fall into the pitfalls of the biographical approach. Documents and original sources, of 
course, presented a problem: they were intended to persuade, and can mislead, 
particularly if quoted selectively. However, this thesis has made extensive use of 
original material, because historical works are most valuable if they are securely based 
on as wide a mastery of the archival sources as is possible. These sources enable both 
the author and the reader to grasp the uncertainties of the past and also restore a human 
perspective to a historical figure such as Maximilian. However, even for an individual 
who wrote as much as Maximilian there is still much that is unclear, and there are major 
gaps in the evidence. Relatively little correspondence survives for his youth and for his 
last weeks in Mexico, in part possibly because the Mexican documents were lost after 
his execution in 1867. As a consequence, all interpretations of the events during these 
periods need to be cautious. 
It has also been, on occasions, tempting to overemphasise the importance of a single 
event or to focus too closely on one specific aspect or phase in Maximilian’s life. As 
this research has shown, it is worth examining Maximilian’s experiences before he 
accepted the Mexican crown and not just concentrate on the short period in his life that 
he spent in Mexico. Maximilian’s upbringing and education, his travels and time in the 
navy as well as his experiences as governor of Lombardy-Venetia shaped and 
influenced his ideas of kingship and government. This thesis has argued that in contrast 
to the standard view, Maximilian’s political thinking was not formed by liberal concepts 
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but that it was fundamentally conservative. A prime example for his elitist-conservative 
ideas was his proposal for an autonomous Lombardo-Venetian kingdom; the reforms 
would have increased the power of the governor immensely by uniting all aspects of 
civil government in his hands.724 At the same time, Maximilian’s ideas about the 
establishment of a senate also revealed his conservative view of government as it would 
merely function as a consultative institution.725 In many ways Maximilian’s proposal 
mirrored the neo-absolutist system established under Franz Joseph after the suppression 
of the revolutions in 1848. 
This thesis also examined the similarities between Maximilian’s experience as governor 
of Lombardy-Venetia and his rule in Mexico. The proposal for political reforms in 
Lombardy-Venetia as well as the Estatuto Provisional del Imperio Mexicano showed 
that Maximilian’s political ideas were strongly influenced by conservative ideas; both 
concentrated power in Maximilian’s hands. Moreover, the council of state only had 
limited powers, as it was Maximilian prerogative to initiate proposals; after debate in 
the council the approved resolution would then circulate as law.726 It is again worth 
pointing out that the political system Maximilian established in Mexico resembled 
closely the neo-absolutist government in Austria under Franz Joseph. Further 
similarities between Maximilian’s experience in Lombardy-Venetia and his reign in 
Mexico were his attempts to establish a brilliant court that was supposed to create a 
sense of dynastic loyalty amongst the aristocracy and the local elites by giving him the 
opportunity to grant favours and access to court. However, this disregarded the vast 
majority of the population of both countries who were deemed unfit to attend court. 
This was based on Maximilian’s belief in certain stereotypes and national characteristics 
                                                        
724 HHStA, Archiv K. Maximilian von Mexiko, cart. 84, Faszirkel I, p. 354 
725 Ibid, Faszirkel I, p. 357-360 
726 AGN, Gobernación, Segundo Imperio, cart. 12/18; HHStA, Archiv K. Maximilian von 
Mexiko, cart. 84, Faszirkel I, p. 357-360 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and, consequently, he perceived both Mexican and Italian culture as inferior to his own 
and saw it as his mission to educate and civilize his subjects.727  
Looking at the parallels between his time as governor in Lombardy-Venetia and his 
reign in Mexico, it is striking that Maximilian never abandoned his elitist-conservative 
view of society nor his belief in a neo-conservative form of kingship. His attempts to 
create a sense of dynastic loyalty had clearly failed in Italy; yet, when he arrived in 
Mexico Maximilian implemented the same measures to bind the Mexican nobility to the 
court. Maximilian obviously had not understood the changes in society; the Italian and 
Mexican nobles were no longer appeased by the creation of a brilliant court but they 
demanded access to the high offices of state. However, as Maximilian regarded Italians 
and above all Mexicans as inferior and inefficient, these positions were often denied to 
them and instead given to Germans, and in the case of Mexico, French officials. With 
regards to the political system, Maximilian also appears to have been unable to modify 
his concept of kingship in order to adapt it to the situation in Mexico. Upon being made 
emperor, Maximilian implemented a political system along the same lines that he had 
proposed for Lombardy-Venetia, which in return mirrored neo-absolutism in Austria. 
However, by 1864 even Franz Joseph had had to abandon neo-absolutist government; 
the February Patent of 1861 was effectively the constitution of the Habsburg Empire. 
Moreover, it established a bicameral imperial parliament that was not a consultative 
institution but had actual legislative powers.728 Maximilian failure to implement a 
constitution and to establish a parliament in Mexico also alienated moderate liberals, 
who might have accepted and supported a constitutional monarchy. Thus it is possible 
to argue that Maximilian’s stubborn adherence to Habsburg ideas and principle of 
kingship contributed hugely to his downfall in Mexico.                                                          
727 Haslip, J., Imperial Adventurer, 1971, p.93 
728 Taylor, A.J.P., The Habsburg Monarchy, p. 113f. 
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In addition Maximilian’s shortcomings regarding the creation of a constitutional 
monarchy, historians such as Stephen Valone, Michele Cunningham and José Fuentes 
Mares have argued that the Second Mexican Empire was doomed from the very 
beginning due to such different reasons as lack of funds, military dependence on France 
and the threat of invasion by the USA to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. Furthermore, 
after gaining their independence and the ensuing internal struggles, most Latin 
American countries adopted some form of democracy or became dictatorships. The 
notable exception is Brazil, which besides Mexico was the only other monarchy in the 
Americas; thus it is to compare the two states. When Pedro II, to whom Maximilian was 
related, became emperor of Brazil in 1831the country was politically fragmented, with 
different ruling groups fighting for power. Moreover, no national economy existed, the 
level of economic activity and such of revenue was low, and wealth was concentrated in 
the hands of a few. Brazil’s population was racially diverse and overwhelmingly 
illiterate.729 These conditions meant that the central government possessed few 
resources, limited administrative capacity, and a restricted field for action. The situation 
in Brazil was thus comparable to the one in Mexico when Maximilian arrived in 1864. 
The political parties were split into liberals and conservatives, society was divided along 
different ethnic groups, and economic activity was nowhere high. As the situation in 
both countries was similar, how did Pedro manage to establish a successful monarchy in 
Brazil, whereas Maximilian failed to do the same in Mexico? 
The main answer to this question is the fact that Pedro was regarded as a neutral arbiter 
between the different political factions. He was resourceful, patient and above all 
persevering and as a consequence established an undisputable dominance over public 
affairs. Even more importantly, Pedro eschewed bold initiatives and avoided                                                         
729 Barman, R.J., Citizen Emperor. Pedro II and the Making of Brazil, 1825-91, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 1999, p. 34 
272 
 
confrontation, thus making it possible for the ruling elements in Brazil to identify with 
the values, concepts and principles he embodied.730 Maximilian, on the other hand, had 
become emperor of Mexico with the support of the conservative party that had offered 
him the throne and that hoped that Maximilian would reinstate them in their old 
privileges and powers. Thus the liberal elements in Mexican society regarded 
Maximilian as a conservative and an usurper; his attempts win over the liberals and 
integrate them into his government remained unsuccessful. Moreover, Maximilian’s 
refusal to restore property and privileges to the Catholic Church alienated his 
conservative powerbase and yet failed to fashion support amongst the liberals. 
Maximilian was left isolated without a large group of supporters. In contrast to 
Maximilian, Pedro was seen as an authority figure who brought stability and certainty to 
the political scene. The ruling groups in Brazil had to defer to the emperor in settling 
policy matters; Brazil was a constitutional monarchy but the provisions of the great 
prerogatives. Among other powers he had the right to name ministers, appoint senators, 
and to dissolve the lower house of the legislature.731 As demonstrated above, 
Maximilian’s administration was fundamentally neo-absolutist; he never implemented 
an official constitution and the established council of state had too little powers to be 
more than just a consultative body. 
In summary this thesis has demonstrated that Maximilian was essentially a 
conservative, who held specific neo-absolutist or Habsburg ideas about the concept of 
kingship and government. These principles were instilled in him by his upbringing and 
education and had further been shaped by his travels and his experiences as governor in 
Lombardy-Venetia. Thus when he became emperor of Mexico, Maximilian 
implemented a very similar system of government as he had outlined in his proposal for                                                         
730 Barman, R.J., Citizen Emperor, 1999, p. xiv 
731 Ibid 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autonomy for Lombardy-Venetia. He also attempted to bind the Mexican aristocracy to 
the dynasty by employing the same methods as before in Italy. In effect, Maximilian 
failed largely to realize the political realities in Mexico; thus he proved himself to be 
incapable of modifying his political ideas in order to adapt them to the situation in 
Mexico. Combined with the withdrawal of French military and financial support, 
Maximilian’s adherence to the Habsburg concept of kingship ultimately led to his 
downfall and execution in 1867. 
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Appendix 1: 
 
Maximilian’s timetable in 1844:732 
 
 
 Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
  7.00 am Mass  Self -
occupation 
Mass Self -
occupation 
Mass Italian Toilette 
  7.30 am Italian Hungarian Italian Hungarian Hungarian Italian Self -
occupation 
  8:00 am Italian Hungarian Italian Hungarian Hungarian Italian Self –
occupation 
  8.30 am Breakfast Breakfast Breakfast Breakfast Breakfast Breakfast Breakfast 
  9.00 am Going for a 
walk 
Going for a 
walk 
Going for a 
walk 
Going for a 
walk 
Going for a 
walk 
Going for a 
walk 
Mass 
  9.30 am Self -
occupation 
History Self -
occupation 
Going for a 
walk 
Self -
occupation 
Going for a 
walk 
Mass 
10.00 am French History Maths Natural 
science 
History French Going for a 
walk 
10.30 am French Maths Maths Natural 
science 
History French Going for a 
walk 
11.00 am Drawing Maths Writing Latin French Maths Self –
occupation 
11.30 am Religion Writing Drawing Latin French Maths Self –
occupation 
12.00 am Bohemian Geography French Religion Writing History Geography 
12.30 am Bohemian Horse riding French Religion Drawing History Religion 
  1.00 pm Dancing Horse riding Sports 
 
Self 
occupation 
Fencing Horse riding Going for a 
walk 
  1.30 pm Dancing Horse riding Sports Self -
occupation 
Fencing Horse riding Going for 
walk 
  2.00 pm Lunch Horse riding Lunch Lucnh Lunch Lunch Lunch 
  2.30 pm Lunch Lunch Lunch Lunch Lunch Lunch Lunch 
  3.00 pm Recreational 
time 
Lunch Recreational 
time 
Recreational 
time 
Recreational 
time 
Recreational 
time 
Recreational 
time 
  3.30 pm German Recreational 
time 
German Maths Natural 
science 
Recreational 
time 
Recreational 
time 
  4.00 pm German Natural 
science 
German Maths Natural 
science 
Latin Natural 
science 
  4.30 pm Latin Natural 
science 
Latin Geography German Latin Self 
occupation 
  5.00 pm Latin Latin Latin Self 
occupation 
German  German Benediction 
  5.30 pm Going for a 
walk 
Latin Going for a 
walk 
Horse riding Going for a 
walk 
German Military 
exercises 
  6.00 pm Going for a 
walk  
Going for a 
walk 
Going for a 
walk 
Horse riding Going for a 
walk 
Going for a 
walk 
Military 
exercises 
  6.30 pm Going for a 
walk 
Going for a 
walk 
Going for a 
walk 
Going for a 
walk 
Going for a 
walk 
Going for a 
walk 
Military 
exercises 
  7.00 pm Music Music Music Music Music Music Military 
exercises 
 
 
                                                         
732 HHSTA: Archiv K. Maximilian von Mexiko, cart. 99 
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Appendix 2: 
 
 
Maximilian’s ideas about a new structure for the Austrian navy:733 
 
 
 
Navy Ministry   Navy Command   Commission 
     
Minister Burger  Ferdinand Max 
military/ technical/   technical advice 
and administrative  insepections 
section    
 
 
   Admirals of the Ports 
  Triest  Pola Venedig Lissa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
733 HHSTA: Archiv K. Maximilian von Mexiko, cart. 115 
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Appendix 3: 
 
 
Memorandum „Comments about the budget for the imperial navy in the year of 1861:734 
 
 
If Austria neglects (...) to develop her navy, she will become a second rate power; The 
Italian empire will plant its victorious tricolour in Istria and Dalmatia. (…) In addition, 
the vulnerable coastal provinces will reach the conclusion that Austria cannot protect 
them, and they will thus gravitate towards more powerful centres. Even now the coast 
of Istria stirs towards Italy and in the south of Dalmatia the Slavic-Russian influence is 
gaining more and more ground.  
(…) 
We have set the budget of the navy for the year 186, with a bleeding heart, to 5.000,000; 
we have set, in accordance with the requests of the army, the budget of the flotilla to 
1.000,000 (...) The navy has thus (...) done its obligation in the important budget 
question. It is now left to the (...) patriotic judgement of the Reichsrat to give the 
command of the navy to opportunity to develop in a few years the strength to protect the 
coasts and the trade so that Austria can seize her political position at sea. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
734 HHSTA: Archiv K. Maximilian von Mexiko, cart. 113 
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Appendix 4: 
 
 
The act of renunciation, which Maximilian signed in 1864:735 
 
 
As your Imperial Highness Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian has told his Imperial 
Majesty of your intention to accept the offered Mexican throne, and thus to establish, 
with the help of God, an empire of your own, his Imperial Majesty has considered in a 
family council the conditions, under which his majesty as the head of the House of 
Habsburg and as the regent of the Habsburg Empire, will give his consent to the state 
act: 
His Imperial Highness, Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian, will renounce for himself and 
all his descedants the rights to the succession to the Austrian throne, and all appending 
kingdoms and countries, without exemption, in favour of the line of succession of the 
other male descendants of the Austrian house (…) 
Neither his Imperial Highness nor his descendants, nor someone in his name, can at any 
time reclaim his rights to the succession to the Austrian throne.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
735  HHSTA: Archiv K. Maximilian von Mexico, cart. 12 
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Appendix 5: 
 
Handwritten note by Maximilian concerning the committee on the Indian question.736 
 
 
Indian Question: 
Secret Committee with administrative, military and religious departments: 
The parish priest of Vera Cruz as head of the religious department. 
Own cipher for correspondence. 
Own riders with centre. 
Own archive in Chalputec. 
 Messengers for the centre. 
Agents in the centres. 
Regular weekly reports. 
Book on Indians (Pierron) with all capable military men, priests, officials, judges and 
accomplished students. 
No important office should be assigned with the approval of the committee. 
Secret taking of the oath in Chalputec. 
Indian grade: Cura Telles Giron de Texcoco, Sanchez Solis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
736 HHSTA: Archiv K. Maximilian von Mexiko, cart. 43 
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Appendix 6: 
 
 
Maximilian’s last will and testament:737 
 
 
My last wishes only concern my body, which soon will be relieved of all pain, and then 
my supporters, who will survive me. Dr Basch will take my body back to Vera Cruz. It 
is my will that this will happen without ceremony or pomp and that there will be no 
special protocol on the ship that will carry my body back to Europe. I am anticipating 
death calmly, and thus wish that silence around my coffin. If the rumour about the death 
of my poor wife proves to be false, then my body should be entombed somewhere until 
the Empress and I can be united in death. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
737 HHSTA: Nachlass EH Sophie, cart. 10 
281 
 
Appendix 7:   
 
The famous painting by Edouard Manet depicting the execution of Maximilian:738  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
738 Kunsthalle Mannheim, Germany 
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